Party in Government: Gains from Exchange Last time: how does the brandname/coalition change over time? Today: party in government –stabilizing collective choice

Historical “party systems” 1 st party system: Federalists vs. Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans 2 nd party system: Jacksonian Democrats vs. Whigs 3 rd party system: pre-Progressive Republicans vs Democrats 4 th party system: Republicans vs. Democrats in the Progressive period 5 th party system: New Deal and beyond

Historical overview, cont. Key issues –trade policy: pro-exporter vs. import-substitution industrialization. “Special interest” lobbying or broad class/factor-based coalitions? –national power vs state power civil rights and civil liberties (including slavery & voting) property rights and regulatory policies (including monetary policy, regulation of business combinations, labor policy) internal improvements: transportation policies –US role in international affairs

Groups and PID Income: strong identifiers differ sharply in income distribution Occupation: service and blue collar sectors lean strongly toward Dems, white collar/professional sectors neutral, farm sector strongly Repub Religion: “born again” lean strongly Repub Gender gap: women lean strongly Dem

Issues Brandname value is in its signals about quality and content –when tastes in the marketplace change, a brand can lose market share. –But if the brand holder tries to change the quality or content of the branded products, it affects the informational value of the brand name Dems and Repubs have well established reputations for credibility in certain issue areas (issue ownership) –social welfare issues, jobs and the economy: usually Democratic issues –defense, law and order, security: usually Republican issues New issues can cross-cut older, established lines of political competition –tobacco regulation & abortion in the 1960s, 1970s

Party in Government “Long” coalitions of elected officials How to stabilize cooperation within the legislature when members want different things? Divide the dollar game: N players bargain over how to split up a “pie”, using majority rule on binary agendas to decide –any proposed division that rewards a majority of members can be trumped by a different division rewarding a different majority

“Gains from Trade” How can the divide-the-dollar game be solved? recognition rules and first-mover advantage If different legislators want different things from government, maybe there are opportunities for institutionalizing trading relationships –divide up the “pie” into different substantive policy arenas; assign special agenda powers to subgroups responsible for each of the arenas