Black-Box Garbled RAM Sanjam Garg UC Berkeley Based on join works with

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Presentation transcript:

Black-Box Garbled RAM Sanjam Garg UC Berkeley Based on join works with Steve Lu, Rafail Ostrovsky and Alessandra Scafuro

Two-party Secure Computation… Yao’s garbled circuits

RAM analogue of Garbled circuits Server User 𝑃, 𝑥 𝑃, 𝑥 𝑃(𝑥) If the running time of the program 𝑃 is 𝑇 then the corresponding circuit is of size 𝑇 3 . Communication complexity and computational complexity of both parties grows with 𝑇 3 .

More Ambitious: Garbled RAM [LO13,GHLORW14] Server User 𝑃 𝑖 , 𝑥 𝑖 𝑃 𝑖 ( 𝑥 𝑖 ) 𝑃 𝑖 , 𝑥 𝑖 Size of garbled database is 𝑂 𝐷 Communication and computation cost grows in 𝑂 𝑇 𝑖 Garbled circuits lead to a solution where the communication and computational cost per program grows with database size.

More Ambitious: Garbled RAM [LO13,GHLORW14] Server User 𝑃 𝑖 , 𝑥 𝑖 𝑃 𝑖 ( 𝑥 𝑖 ) 𝑃 𝑖 , 𝑥 𝑖 ORAM [Goldreich-Ostrovsky] Full-security: Server learns nothing but the output Unprotected Memory Access (UMA): Server learns access pattern. Garbled circuits lead to a solution where the communication and computational cost per program grows with database size.

Landscape: Garbled RAM Known results make non-black box use of OWFs [LO13, GHLORS14, GLOS15] OWF can’t be modeled as a random oracle Focus of this talk: do it using only black-box use of OWFs? Qualitatively better efficiency [GLO15] Not talk about succinct constructions based on iO [CHJV14, BGT14, LP14, KLW15, CH15, CCCLLZ15...]

Outline of the rest of the talk RAM model LO13 approach ([GHLORW13, GLOS15] are similar) Technical bottleneck in realizing black-box construction High level idea of black-box construction [GLO15]

RAM Model Writes require additional work but let’s ignore that! next index read 2 next index read 3 next index CPU step 1 CPU step 2 CPU step 3 Writes require additional work but let’s ignore that!

LO13 approach Use garbled circuits! next index next index next index read 1 next index read 2 next index read 3 next index CPU step 1 CPU step 2 CPU step 3 Use garbled circuits!

LO13 approach Translate what is in the memory 1) garbling memory read 1 next index read 2 next index read 3 next index CPU step 1 CPU step 2 CPU step 3 Translate what is in the memory 1) garbling memory 2) translate table How do reads work? Access pattern is revealed!

LO13 approach 𝑏 𝑖 𝑖 𝑃𝑅 𝐹 𝐾 (𝑖,𝑏 𝑖 ) STEP 1: garbling of the memory read 1 next index read 2 next index read 3 next index CPU step 1 CPU step 2 CPU step 3 PRF key K to garble

LO13 approach 𝑏 𝑖 𝑖 𝑃𝑅 𝐹 𝐾 (𝑖,𝑏 𝑖 ) 𝑗 𝑠 0 , 𝑠 1 STEP 2: translate table 𝑏 𝑖 𝑖 𝑃𝑅 𝐹 𝐾 (𝑖,𝑏 𝑖 ) 𝑗 read 1 next index read 2 next index read 3 next index 𝑠 0 , 𝑠 1 CPU step 1 CPU step 2 CPU step 3 K K K 𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝑃𝑅 𝐹 𝐾 𝑗,0 , 𝑠 0 ) PRF key K to garble 𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝑃𝑅 𝐹 𝐾 𝑗,1 , 𝑠 1 )

Technical Bottleneck The data needs to be encrypted so that the server doesn’t learn it! CPU step garbled circuits need to decrypt the read values internally Need of black-box use of cryptography seems inherent

GLO15 high level idea Garbled memory comprises of a collection of garbled circuits with data values hardwired in them Read implemented by a sub-routine call Control flow is passed to memory circuits

GLO15 – for one read only 𝑗, 𝑠 0 , 𝑠 1 𝑏 1 𝑏 2 ………

Memory no longer useful! GLO15 – for one read only Say 𝑗 = 2 𝑗, 𝑠 0 , 𝑠 1 Memory no longer useful! 𝑏 1 𝑏 2 ……… Outputs 𝑠 𝑏 2

GLO15 – for 𝑚 reads only Say 𝑗 = 2 Assume uniform memory accesses. 𝑏 1 𝑗, 𝑠 0 , 𝑠 1 ……… ……… ……… How many backups? How do we connect them? Assume uniform memory accesses. 𝑏 1 𝑏 2 ……… ……… ……… Outputs 𝑠 𝑏 2

How to connect backups? ……… ………

How to connect backups? ……… ………

How to connect backups? ……… ……… Problem: Number of keys hardcoded in each circuit needs to keep grow. But not all, because of uniform memory access 𝑇 reads can cause an imbalance of √𝑇

Our Fix: Moving window

Our Fix: Moving window Ensure that next unused children remain in window: Have 1 + 𝜖 times the garbled circuits needed and perform artificial consumption if lagging from window. Over-consumption beyond this does not happen

GLO15 – for unbounded reads Replenish memory in an oblivious way After 𝑚 reads have been performed, memory has been replenished to support 𝑚 more reads ……… Add more garbled circuits to each queue! This process can be amortized! ……… ……… 𝑏 1 𝑏 2 ……… ……… ………

Security proof - other issues Circularity issue Input labels of one garbled circuit are hardcoded in quite a few other garbled circuits We remove this issue in our final solution Input labels of one garbled circuit are provided by different sources at different times

Conclusion Remove this barrier Cryptography for RAM computation Secure RAM computation Typically large round complexity Barrier to efficiency – non-black box use Remove this barrier Expect consequences in efficient constructions with weaker security…

Thanks!