Impact Evaluation 4 Peace March 2014, Lisbon, Portugal 1 DRC Public Service Reform and Rejuvenation project World Bank: Sadia Afolabi Chiara Bronchi Marco Larizza Eric Mvukiyehe Michael Roscitt Dan Rogger Columbia University, Harvard Raul Sanchez de la Sierra Latin America and the Caribbean’s Citizen Security Team

Problems  Low state capacity  Low quality of public service delivery  Former solutions  Aid delivery  Here: target low performance of civil servants  Lack of skills: brain drain, ageing  Bad motivation 2

Intervention summary  Management of the retirement process  Identify civil servants eligible to retire  Guarantee retirement benefits  Young professional program ( )  Targeting: attract skilled, Motivated, Women (25%)  Deploying  Training: promote skills and motivation 3

Evaluation Questions 1. Recruitment  How best to get skilled aspiring civil servants?  How best to get motivated aspiring civil servants? 2. Individual performance  How best to increase performance of civil servants? 3. Change in norms  Can individual change lead to change in norms? 4

1. Recruitment: Evaluation Design 5 Standard wageLower wage Non financial incentives: YESPackage I Non financial incentives: NOPackage II Phase 0: Open call for YP positions (~5 000) Phase I: Pre-select eligible candidates (~2 000) Phase II: Randomize job application profiles Outcome: who applies? Hypothesis 1: wage attracts more qualified, but likely opportunistic (lower retention, less effort)

1. Recruitment: measurement  Skills ▪ IQ test, Work experience, Education  Personality test  Behavioral games ▪ Pro-social behavior ▪ Public goods / public service game 6

2. Performance: Evaluation design  Phase III: Send job offers  500 – 1000 applicants  Surprise bonus: equalize wage package  Phase IV: Training Hypothesis 2: Performance will increase if individuals are provided with skills and/or motivation 7 Skill-based training YesNo Intrinsic motivation-based training YesIII NoIIIIV

2. Performance: Measurement Yearly core outcome measurement:  Performance outcomes:  Attendance (random calls)  Corruption: random audit  Auxiliary outcomes:  Satisfaction, Self-esteem  Motivation 8

3. Norms: Evaluation Design  Deployment design  Allocate YP to government agencies (geographical)  Vary presence of YP by agency Hypothesis 3: Civil servants exposed to more YP’s will be more likely to change their behavior, norms and expectations  Measurement  Self reported norms  Behavioral game: public goods 9

3. Norms: Varying intensity of YP Unexposed unitExposed unit

Next steps  Field visit: September 2014-December 2014 ▪ Fine tune hypotheses: meetings, focus groups ▪ Re-examine evaluation budget  Finalize CN with GOV: September 2014-January 2014  Mini Pilot: January June 2015 ▪ Recruitment of 50 YP’s ▪ Evaluate capacity to manage the program  Project Implementation ▪ Recruitment: July October2015 ▪ Training: October October 2017 ▪ Measurements: November January