Course Material 1.Overview of Process Safety 2.Compliance with standards 3.Process Hazard Analysis 4.Standard Operating Procedures 5.Safe Work Procedures 6.Mechanical Integrity 7.Management of Change 8.Auditing Process Safety systems 9.Emergency response procedures

5. Safe Work Procedures Process Safety Management for Biofuels This material was produced under grant SH F-36 from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. It does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Department of Labor, nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the U.S. Government. 29 CFR (f)(4)

5. Safe Work Procedures Process Safety Management for Biofuels This material was produced under grant SH F-36 from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. It does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Department of Labor, nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the U.S. Government. 29 CFR (f)(4)

Piper Alpha Oil Platform Explosion

Failure of Lock out / Tag out Procedure

Permit-To-Work System Safe Work Permit

Safe Work Procedures Lock out / Tag out

Each Craft Should have Their Own Lock

Lock out / tag out Safe Work Permit OSHA 29 CFR

Try the Lock Out OSHA 29 CFR

Additional Information Additional information on Lock out / Tag out procedures can be found in the document referenced in the below link.

Hot Work Permit 29 CFR (k)

Hot Work Permit Requirements OSHA 29 CFR

Hot Work Permit Failure

Closing the Permit Joint inspection when the nonroutine work is complete 1.Valve alignment 2.Blinds removed 3.Sewer drains reopened 4.Vents 5.Rotating equipment 6.Locks and tags 7.Utilities 8.Barricades removed

Confined Space Fatalities

CSB Bulletin

Confined Space Entry Permit Safe Work Procedures oshaweb/owadisp.show_ document?p_table=STA NDARDS Permit-Required Confined Spaces (PRCS) standard 29 CFR

“Opening Process Equipment” Fatalities 29 CFR (f)(4)

“Opening Process Equipment” Fatalities 29 CFR (f)(4)

BP Amoco Incident; Georgia; March, CSB Video on BP Amoco Incident Can be viewed from video time 6:45 – 10:20

BP Amoco Incident; Georgia; March, Fact: Three maintenance workers were fatally injured. 1. Why? The workers were working on the “Polymer Catch Tank”. The polymer catch tank was still pressurized. The workers partially removed the cover.

BP Amoco Incident; Georgia; March, Fact: The polymer catch tank was still pressurized 2. Why? Loss of gas venting capability by catch tank. Decomposition generating gas in core of vessel. Pressure gauge was inoperative. No de-energizing procedure for vessel.

BP Amoco Incident; Georgia; March, Fact: There was no de-energizing procedure for tank. 3. Why? Pressure gauge and drain used as indication of de- energized status. Process had been shut down, was not operative. Outdated vessel cleaning procedure was being used.

BP Amoco Incident; Georgia; March, Fact: Outdated vessel cleaning procedure was being used. 4. Why? Foaming of the polymer product was not well understood by operations. The plugging capacity of the foaming polymer was not well understood by operations.

BP Amoco Incident; Georgia; March, Foaming and plugging of product was not well understood by operations. 5. Why? Operations’ safe work procedures had not been modified to consider foaming of polymer material. Operations had not taken advantage of opportunities to learn from near misses on product foaming and plugging.

Applicability of Previous Material 1.Overview of Process Safety 2.Compliance with standards 3.Process Hazard Analysis 4.Standard Operating Procedures 5.Safe Work Procedures

Remaining Course Material 1.Overview of Process Safety 2.Compliance with standards 3.Process Hazard Analysis 4.Standard Operating Procedures 5.Safe Work Procedures 6.Mechanical Integrity 7.Management of Change 8.Auditing Process Safety systems 9.Emergency response procedures