Distributed Computer Security 8.2 Discretionary Access Control Models - Liang Zhao

Outline Security Policies Discretionary Access Control Model Access Control Matrix (ACM) Distributed Compartments ACM Implementation ACL vs CL References

Security Policy There are two kinds of security policies: Simple security policies Access control matrix (ACM) models are widely used to enforce the simple security policies. Complex Security policies Security requirements how and when the accesses are performed( special constraints are involved). Relevant to the distributed systems.

Discretionary Access Control Discretionary security models provide access control on an individual basis. Access control is based on User’s identity and Access control rules Most common administration: owner based Users can protect what they own Owner may grant access to others Owner may define the type of access given to others

Access Control An access control is a function that given a subject and object pair i.e. (s,o) and a requested operation r, from s to o, returns a true value if requested is permitted. R = P ( s, o ) P – access matrix R – set of allowable operations.( ‘r’ is a particular operation belonging to set ‘R’ ). s – subject o – object

Access Control matrix Access Control Matrix model is perhaps the most fundamental and widely used discretionary access control model for enforcing simple security policies. Resource and process protection can use separate access control matrices. [Randy, 97]

Resource ACM In a resource ACM subjects are users and objects are the files to be accessed. Access Rights - “read”, “write”, “execute”, “append”. Special privileges may be like “owner” privilege.

Process ACM In process ACM the subjects and objects are both processes. Operations are basically related to communication and synchronization

Domain ACM Set of objects with same access rights

Access Control Matrix Reducing the Size of Access Control Matrix Subject rows in the ACM that have identical entries i.e subjects that have similar access rights on common objects, could be merged into groups. If a user belongs to more than one group, its access rights is the union of all access rights of all the groups it belongs to. Similarly Object columns with same entries could be merged into ‘categories’ [Randy, 97]

A Distributed Compartment Model Local Subjects & Objects Local Subjects & Objects Collaborating Subjects & Objects across nodes boundaries with application oriented ACM Distributed Compartment Compartment Access using Distributed Handles [Randy, 97]

Advantages of Distributed compartment model The grouping of subjects and objects is logical and application specific. The accesses are more transparent since they do not depend on the operating systems and administrative units. Since the application manages the distributed handles, it allows different security policies to be implemented [Randy, 97]

ACM implementations For efficiency and organizational purposes, access control matrices need to be partitioned The Linked list structure that contains all entries in a column for a particular object is called a Access control List (ACL) for the object - specifies the permissible rights that various subjects have on the object Likewise all entries in a row for a subject is called a Capability List (CL) for the subject - CL specifies privileges to various objects held by a subject – like movie tickets

Comparison of ACL & CL Comparison in terms of management functions Authentication Reviewing of Access Rights Propagation of Access Rights Revocation of Access Rights Conversion between ACL and CL [Randy, 97]

Authentication ACL Authenticates subjects, which is performed by the system While in CL, authentication is performed on capabilities of objects, by the object server. Objects have knowledge of the capabilities,but do not know the users or processors. This is one of the reasons why many Distributed implementations favour the CL approach

Review of Access rights To know which subjects are authorized to use a certain objects. Easier to review ACL, because ACL contains exactly this information. For storage efficiency subject grouping, wildcards,prohibitive rights could also be used. It is difficult to review for a CL unless some type of activity log is kept for all subjects that are given the capability

Propagation Of Access Rights Access rights must be replicatable to facilitate sharing. Propagation is Duplication of some or all the privileges from one subject to the others. Propagation is not transfer of rights, it is only duplication. In ACL, propagation of rights is explicitly initiated by a request to the object server, which modifies or adds an entry to its ACL. [Randy, 97]

Propagation Of Access Rights Propagation of rights must adhere to the principle of least principles. i.e. Only the minimum privileges required to perform the tasks are given when propagating the rights In CL, theoretically it is propagate rights between subjects without intervention of object server. This could result in an uncontrollable system and hence is avoided.

Revocation Of Access Rights Revocation is trivial in ACL because it is easy to delete subject entries from the ACL. It is difficult for CL’s to revoke access selectively.

Conversion Between ACL & CL Interactions among processes involving different Access control models would require gateways for conversions. Conversion to ACL is straightforward. Consider example of processes in a CL requiring to access remote objects in ACL Gateway Authenticates the process identifier. It Then verifies the operation in the capability list. The request is then converted to ACL and is presented to the remote host Source: Randy, 97

Conversion Between ACL & CL Converting a ACL request to CL is slightly more complex Requires a database with resource capabilities for the interacting processes Gateway validates the ACL request obtains the resource capability from the database server Capability is then presented to capability based object server. A system utilizing both ACL and CL suffers the drawback of both approaches Furthermore the conversions causes additional security hazards

My current research Distributed Computing in Smart Grid

Distributed Computing in SG

References [1]Randy Chow & Theodore Johnson, 1997,“Distributed Operating Systems & Algorithms”, (Addison-Wesley), p. 271 to 278 [2] Samarati, P.; Bertino, E.; Ciampichetti, A.; Jajodia, S.; “Information flow control in object-oriented systems”. Knowledge and Data Engineering, IEEE Transactions on Volume 9, Issue 4, July-Aug Page(s): [3] Izaki, K.; Tanaka, K.; Takizawa, M.; “Access control model in object- oriented systems” Parallel and Distributed Systems: Workshops, Seventh International Conference on, July 2000 Page(s): Parallel and Distributed Systems: Workshops, Seventh International Conference on, 2000 [4] Lin, Tsau Young (T. Y.); “Managing Information Flows on Discretionary Access Control Models” Systems, Man and Cybernetics, ICSMC '06. IEEE International Conference onVolume 6, 8-11 Oct Page(s): Systems, Man and Cybernetics, ICSMC '06. IEEE International Conference on [5] Solworth, J.A.; Sloan, R.H.; “A layered design of discretionary access controls with decidable safety properties” Security and Privacy, Proceedings IEEE Symposium on 9-12 May 2004 Page(s): Security and Privacy, Proceedings IEEE Symposium on

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