1 Ensuring Temporariness: Mechanisms to Incentivise Return Migration in the Context of GATS Mode 4 and Least Developed Country Interests “If all economists were laid end to end, they would not reach a conclusion” George Bernard Shaw ( )

2 Presentation Overview Case studies of three bilateral agreements between developing and developed countries to manage the movement on non-high skilled workers: The accord between Spain and Ecuador regulating migratory flows. Canada’s Seasonal Agricultural Workers Programme (CSAWP) with Mexico and the Caribbean. The Philippines’ partnership with various countries in East Asia, Southwest Asia and the United States. Observing lessons learned from these ‘Mode 4’ style bilateral agreements from LDCs and their development interest.

3 Two caveats: 1.The necessity of remembering key differences in the nature of bilateral agreements and WTO agreements, particularly with respect to host country control on incoming service providers 2.The lack of data on temporary service provider return rates where entering the host country through bilateral agreements.

4 Case study 1: Spain and Ecuador The Agreement on the Regulation and Planning of Migratory Flows (Acuerdo entre el Reino de España y la República del Ecuador relativo a la Regulación y Ordenación de la Flujos Migratorios) signed between Spain and Ecuador in 2001 allows for both permanent and temporary migration of Ecuadorian workers. The Government of Ecuador and the IOM jointly established the Technical Unit for the Selection of Migrant Workers (UTSTM) in 2002 to screen Ecuadorian workers wanting to work in Spain. The screening process was also carried out in collaboration with Spanish authorities and employers. UTSTM also assisted Ecuadorian workers in settling contract and visa issues as well as providing pre-departure training. Between 2002 and 2006 UTSTM selected 2,577 Ecuadorian workers out of 2,700 Spanish employment offers, with a majority of migrant workers entering the agriculture, restaurant and personal service industries.

5 Case study 1: Spain and Ecuador Positive incentive mechanisms provided by Ecuador: Maintenance of social networks: Association of Ecuadorian Migrants Llactacaru in Barcelona. Political investment: 2005 legislation to allow Ecuadorians living overseas to vote in Ecuador's presidential elections. Flexible work contracts: possibility to extend temporary work contracts for work or service specified in initial contract. Disregarding national labour situation for re-entry. Livelihood capacity-building in source country: free transfers via Ecuadorian Banco Solidario for migrant remittances so money can be saved for housing and micro-enterprises.

6 Case study 2: Canada, Mexico and the Caribbean The Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Worker’s Programme (CSAWP) created to hire overseas workers during the peak harvesting and planting periods in Canada. CSAWP based on a government to government memoranda of understanding. These MOUs can be terminated with only three months’ notice. The CSAWP has been going since 1966 when Canada signed an agreement with Jamaica, then agreements made with Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados the following year, followed by Mexico in Finally the agreement was extended to the Organisation of Caribbean States in In 2005 the average length of stay for a seasonal worker was 19 weeks, although they are technically permitted to work in Canada for a maximum period of eight months.

7 Case study 2: Canada, Mexico and the Caribbean Positive incentive mechanisms to ensure the temporariness of workers in the CSAWP include: –Flexible work contracts –Mandatory remittance –Avoidance of double taxation –Name-hiring However, the programme also employs a number of negative mechanisms such as: –Restriction of labour mobility –Premature repatriation

8 Case study 3: The Philippines The Philippines has developed a highly elaborate system of temporary labour export governed by the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA). In 2006 the Philippines deployed 1,062,567 overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) in 197 country destinations. The Philippines government asserts that it is facilitating a response to global market forces in labour demand. The Philippines government pinpoints labour market niches in countries with which it has concluded bilateral agreements.

9 Case study 3: The Philippines The Philippines has developed a highly elaborate system of temporary labour export governed by the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA). In 2006 the Philippines deployed 1,062,567 overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) in 197 country destinations. The Philippines government asserts that it facilitating a response to global market forces in labour demand. The Philippines government pinpoints labour market niches in countries with which it has concluded bilateral agreements.

10 Case study 3: The Philippines Several positive incentive mechanisms used by the Philippines government to ensure the return of workers going abroad on temporary work contracts: –Migrant Workers’ Resource Centre and OFW advisories –Maintenance of social networks –National Reintegration Centre –Credit, savings, investment and livelihood schemes –Name-hiring –Public recognition of exemplary performance –Education and training programmes in source country –Exit clearance

11 Lessons learned for LDCs Market access to service sectors must be complementary to development policies. Investment required in prioritising sectors and investing infrastructure for screening processes. Consider collaboration with targeted markets on capacity building, domestic regulation and mutual recognition of educational qualifications. Consider pros and cons on negotiating trade in services in the multilateral and in the bilateral contexts.

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