Transmission1 ECON 4925 Autumn 2007 Electricity Economics Lecture 8 Lecturer: Finn R. Førsund.

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Presentation transcript:

Transmission1 ECON 4925 Autumn 2007 Electricity Economics Lecture 8 Lecturer: Finn R. Førsund

Transmission 2 A radial transmission network Two nodes with one line the simplest case Converting variables to energy units (kWh) The energy balance

Transmission 3 A radial transmission network, cont. Expressing loss on a line supplying a single consumer node from a single hydropower generator node Loss is increasing in consumption, and with a positive second-order derivative, according to Ohm’s law A thermal capacity on the line:

Transmission 4 The social planning problem for the two- node case for two time periods

Transmission 5 The Lagrangian function

Transmission 6 The Kuhn – Tucker conditions

Transmission 7 Interpretation of the first-order conditions Assuming positive production in both periods The shadow prices on the energy balance will then be positive and equal to the water values The difference between the social price and the water value

Transmission 8 Interpretations, cont. Difference in social price between periods Difference even if water values are equal (reservoir constraint not binding)

Transmission 9 A bathtub illustration without congestion Total available water R o + w 1 + w 2 p1p1 λ DMD' A λ p2p2 A' Loss 2 Period 1 Period 2 Loss 1 B C

Transmission 10 A bathtub illustration with binding reservoir constraint, but without congestion Total available water R o + w 1 + w 2 p1p1 λ1λ1 DD' A λ2λ2 p2p2 A' Period 1 Period 2 B C 11

Transmission 11 Bathtub with congestion p1p1 λ D B D' A λ Total available water p2p2 A' Period 1 Period 2 22 C

Transmission 12 Three nodes and two periods Electricity flow Generating node 1 Generating node 2 Consumption node Electricity flow

Transmission 13 The social planning problem

Transmission 14 The Lagrangian function

Transmission 15 The Kuhn – Tucker conditions

Transmission 16 Interpretations of the first-order conditions Assumptions:  Positive production in the first period at both plants (both empty the reservoirs in the second period)  No threat of overflow in the first period Water values for a plant the same for both periods Difference between consumer price and water values

Transmission 17 Interpretations, cont. Difference between water values The plant with highest sum of marginal loss and congestion will have the lowest water value

Transmission 18 Interpretations, cont. Differences between consumer prices The highest consumer price will be in the period with the highest value of the sum of marginal loss and congestion term

Transmission 19 Nodal prices Prices and water values are specific to each node Consumer price greater than water values for each time period Water values differ due to loss and congestion between plants for each time period Marginal loss evaluated at water values plus congestion is equal for each time period

Transmission 20 Congestion in the two-period case Assumptions:  A line is at most congested in the high-demand period only  There is no lock-in of water due to congestion  Period 1 is the low-demand period and period 2 the high-demand period Immediate implication: at least one plant must produce more in the high-demand period than the low-demand -period

Transmission 21 Production levels for the two periods Both plants will produce more in the high- demand period and less in the low-demand period due to marginal loss increasing in energy Disregarding congestion if plant 1 produces more in the high-demand period so must plant 2 Introducing congestion does not change this situation

Transmission 22 Implication of transmission for utilisation of the hydro plants Transmission causes higher price in the high- demand period 2 and leads to a relatively greater use of water in period 1 than compared to no transmission The plant with relatively less marginal loss will shift production from the low demand- period to the high-demand period, and opposite for the plant with relatively greater marginal loss

Transmission 23 Implications, cont. The plant with relatively higher marginal loss plus congestion in one period will also have a relatively higher loss plus congestion in the other period (plant water value constant) The plant with the lowest water value is used relatively more in the low-demand period, and the plant with the highest water value relatively more in the high-demand period

Transmission 24 Loop-flows (meshed network) Electricity flow Generating node 1 Generating node 2 Consumption node Electricity flow