Putting the Tools to Work – DDOS Attack 111. DDOS = SLA Violation! ISPCPETarget Hacker What do you tell the Boss? SP’s Operations Teams have found that.

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Presentation transcript:

Putting the Tools to Work – DDOS Attack 111

DDOS = SLA Violation! ISPCPETarget Hacker What do you tell the Boss? SP’s Operations Teams have found that they can express DDOS issues as SLA violations, which allow for their management to understand why they need to act.

BOTNETS – Making DDoS Attacks EasyCE Customer premise: Server/FW/Switch/router Zombies Extortionist Last Mile Connection ISP Edge router BOTNETs for Rent! A BOTNET is comprised of computers that have been broken into and planted with programs (zombies) that can be directed to launch attacks from a central controller computer BOTNETs allow for all the types of DDOS attacks: ICMP Attacks, TCP Attacks, and UDP Attacks, http overload Options for deploying BOTNETs are extensive and new tools are created to exploit the latest system vulnerabilities A relatively small BOTNET with only 1000 zombies can cause a great deal of damage. For Example: 1000 home PCs with an average upstream bandwidth of 128KBit/s can offer more than 100MBit/s Size of attacks are ever increasing and independent of last mile bandwidth 2 for 1 Special

 It is all about the packet …..  Once a packet gets into the Internet, someone, somewhere has to do one of two things: –Deliver the Packet –Drop the Packet  In the context of DoS attacks, the questions are who and where will the “drop the packet” action occur? Internet IP Packet POP Border OC48 OC12 Nine ChOC12 Big Aggregation Box Big Aggregation Box It is all about the packet ………

PREPARATION Prep the network Create tools Test tools Prep procedures Train team Practice IDENTIFICATION How do you know about the attack? What tools can you use? What’s your process for communication? CLASSIFICATION What kind of attack is it? TRACEBACK Where is the attack coming from? Where and how is it affecting the network? REACTION What options do you have to remedy? Which option is the best under the circumstances? POST MORTEM What was done? Can anything be done to prevent it? How can it be less painful in the future? Six Phases of Incident Response

SITREP Everything is normal in the Network. Then alarms go off – something is happening in the network.

Customer Is DOSed—Before NOC A B C D E F G Target Peer B Peer A IXP-W IXP-E Upstream A Upstream B POP Upstream A Target is taken out

NOC A B C D E F G Target Peer B Peer A IXP-W IXP-E Upstream A Upstream B POP Upstream A Customer Is DOSed—Before— Collateral Damage Customers Attack causes Collateral Damage

SITREP – Attack in Progress Attack on a customer is impacting a number of customers. COLATERAL DAMAGE INCIDENT! Immediate Action: Solve the Collateral Damage issues.

Customer Is DOSed—After— Packet Drops Pushed to the Edge NOC A B C D E F G iBGP Advertises List of Black Holed Prefixes Target Peer B Peer A IXP-W IXP-E Upstream A Upstream B POP Upstream A

SITREP – Attack in Progress Collateral Damage mitigated Customer who was attacked has PARTIAL SERVICE. DOS Attack is Still Active Options: –Sink Hole a part of the traffic to analyze. –Watch the DOS attack and wait for Attack Rotation or cessation. –Activate “Clean Pipes” for a Full Service Recovery.

Corp Network Core Data Center POP/Customer Upstream A Peer X Peer Y Communities 1, 100, 200 Community abc Communities 1, 100, 300 Community hijCommunity efg Remote Triggered Drops and Communities

SITREP – Attack in Progress Collateral Damage mitigated Customer who was attacked has PARTIAL SERVICE. DOS Attack is Still Active Action: Monitor the Attack & Get more details on the Attack – Use BGP Community based triggering to send one regions flow into a Sink Hole

BGP Community Trigger to Sinkhole Peer B Peer A IXP-W IXP-E Upstream A Upstream B POP Customer Primary DNS Servers / Services Network Sinkhole Send DOS to Sink Hole.

Analyze the Attack Use the tools available on the Internet and from Vendors to analyze the details of the attack. This will provide information about what you can or cannot do next. To ISP Backbone Sinkhole Gateway Target Router Sniffers and Analyzers

SITREP – Attack in Progress Collateral Damage mitigated Customer who was attacked has PARTIAL SERVICE. DOS Attack is Still Active Action: Provide the Customer who is the victim with a Clean Pipes FULL SERVICE RECOVERY (off to vendor specific details).

What is Full Service Recovery “Clean Pipes” is a term used to describe full service recovery. The expectations for a full service recovery is: –DDOS Attack is in full force and ALL customer services are operating normally – meeting the contracted SLA. –The Device used for the full service recovery is not vulnerable to the DDOS & the infrastructure is not vulnerable to collateral damage. Full Service Recovery/Clean Pipes products are very specialized. Talk to the appropriate vendor.

BGP—More Information Cisco BGP Home — k80/tech_protocol_family_home.html k80/tech_protocol_family_home.html Slammer/BGP analysis — massey_iwdc03.pdf massey_iwdc03.pdf Team CYMRU BGP Tools —

Syslog—More Information Syslog.org - Syslog Logging w/PostGres HOWTO— og_postgresql/ og_postgresql/ Agent Smith Explains Syslog—

Packet Capture—More Information tcpdump/libpcap Home— Vinayak Hegde’s Linux Gazette article— 6/vinayak.html 6/vinayak.html

Remote Triggered Black Hole Remote Triggered Black Hole filtering is the foundation for a whole series of techniques to traceback and react to DOS/DDOS attacks on an ISP’s network. Preparation does not effect ISP operations or performance. It does adds the option to an ISP’s security toolkit.

More Netflow Tools NfSen - Netflow Sensor – NFDUMP – FlowCon –