Russia’s Resurgence

Capitalism and democracy in Russia, Dmitry Trenin: 8N3LGV8&feature=channel 8N3LGV8&feature=channel

"Russia is never as strong as she looks; Russia is never as weak as she looks."  Attributed to Talleyrand, Metternich, and Churchill

Russia in Europe

Russia in Asia

Russia on the Pacific

Russia in the Arctic

Moscow Kremlin Moscow, Kremlin: the center of Russian state power

St. Petersburg, Russia’s “Second Capital”

Kazan’, Russia’s “Third Capital”

The peoples of Russia: nearly 200 nationalities

Russia’s major assets Territory  Size – 1/7 of the global landmass  Position – most of the Eurasian Heartland Natural resources – at least 1/3 of the world’s minerals and fresh water Transportation networks – Eurasia’s central hub 1 of 2 nuclear superpowers 1 of 2 global leaders in outer space A permanent member of UNSC A member of G8 and G20 A key international actor across Eurasia (involved in more international organizations and projects than any other state except US)

The economy GDP, PPP - $2.11 trln. (No.8 in the world) Canada – $1.28 GDP per capita - $15,100 Canada - $38,200 Real growth rate – 5.6% in 2008, -7.9 in 2009, 3.4% forecast for 2010 Canada – 0.5 in 2008, -2.5% in 2009

Russia’s resurgence Contrast between the 1990s and the past 8 years Economy shrank by half Falling deeper and deeper into debt Capital flight High degree of political instability Governability was in question Defeat in the first Chechnya war Russia’s image – country beyond repair

In the 2000s, Russian state capacity has been partially repaired in ways compatible with globalization –  and in line with Russia’s historical traditions Similarities with China Putinism has consolidated Russian capitalism, protected it from internal challenges, and returned Russia to the rank of major international actors

: World financial crisis hits Russia

Need for change The global model Russia has fit into – the neoliberal model - is collapsing The Russian economy needs major modernization to compete successfully The new Russian state is in many ways dysfunctional and needs major reforms to meet Russia’s challenges The Russian society is deeply split by social inequalities Further resurgence requires a shift of gears

“Must we go on dragging into our future our primitive raw materials- based economy, our chronic corruption, our old habit of relying for the resolution of problems on the government, on foreign countries, on some “omnipotent doctrine” – on anything but ourselves? And does Russia, overloaded with such burdens, have a future of her own?” President Dmitry Medvedev, Article “Forward, Russia!”, Sept “One gets quickly addicted to narcotics. Well, raw materials trade is like a narcotic which demands that the doses get stronger and stronger… Who could imagine even 5 years ago that oil prices would hike to $150 a barrel? But breaking the habit of raw materials trade is very painful, because this trade makes it possible, without doing much, to create an illusion of economic stability. Money pours in, a lot of it, the most pressing problems are solved, it is not necessary to reform the economy, to work on diversifying it. But we can break out of this inertial pattern if we draw the proper lessons from the economic crisis.” President Dmitry Medvedev, Interview with German magazine Der Spiegel, Nov. 2009

The structure of Russia’s exports: 93% raw materials

Russia’s interests Primacy of domestic concerns The economy  Modernization Society  Need to reverse negative trends The state  How to make it efficient  Need for rule of law  Need for democratization

Globescan polls, BBC, the 2000s: Steady improvements in Russia’s image in global public opinion – until The 2008 poll: Russia’s influence in world affairs?  37% - “mainly positive”  34% - “mainly negative.” US influence in world affairs?  35% - “mainly positive”  47% - “mainly negative” Germany: 56% positive, 18% negative China: 47% positive, 32% negative

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Globescan poll of Russians, April 2009:

Russia’s military power Mid-1980s – defence spending accounted for 15-17% of Soviet GDP Massive cuts following dissolution of USSR in 1991 Steady rise since 2000 – by 15-25% a year In 2006, a new state armaments program, which will span , was adopted Price tag: 4.9 trillion rubles (US$186 billion). 63% is to be allocated for the procurement of modern weapons and equipment 27% towards defense research and development – defence spending accounts for 2.5% of Russia’s GDP  normal level for a Western country

Topol-M, Russia’s new mobile ICBM

A Tu-95 over the Arctic

Russian infantry in Georgia, August 2008

A Russian warship in the Caribbean

Russia is buying a Mistral amphibious assault ship from France

NATO – Russia military balance Total armed forces personnel 3:1 Military aircraft 10:1 Tanks 3:1 Artillery 2:1 Naval ships 2:1 Submarines 3:1 Aircraft carriers 19:1  How real is this picture?  Partly

The latest military reform plan To cut the number of officers by more than half, to 150,000, by The number of generals and admirals will fall from 1,107 to 886 To cut the number of military units in the ground forces from 1,890 to 172 within three years The four-tier system inherited from the Soviet army -- where the line of command is from a military district, to army, to division to regiment -- will be replaced with a streamlined three-tier system in which brigades will play a central role Under the plan, brigades – units bigger than regiments and smaller than divisions, will be largely self-contained, combat-ready forces which are highly mobile and can be deployed quickly in an emergency

Russian threat perceptions  Security – internal and external  Control of resources  Russia’s defence capability  Technological lag behind the West  Negative demography

The dominant trends in Russian foreign policy thinking  No desire to confront the West  Recognition of Western concerns  Relations with the West are top priority But also:  Primacy of national interests, emphasis on independence  Claim for “privileged interests” in the post-Soviet space  Multivector foreign policy – active engagement with other international actors Pragmatism Primacy of trade and investment issues Readiness for dialog, for development of joint solutions to problems

The Network Principle The Russians are discovering that what works for Russia is networking Not hegemony, not building imperial hierarchies But networking Based on pragmatic pursuit and matching of national interests In the growing network of Russia’s ties with the world, the West is only one segment, even if the most important

Russia and the West Integration Frictions 2 aspects of a closer relationship

In the past two decades, Russia has become more deeply integrated with the West than ever before On both sides, the rise of concerns and frictions reflects the fact of that deepening of integration By the late 1990s, the growth of Western influence inside and outside Russia generated a backlash against Western influence, pressures and interference In the 2000s, Russia has been trying to change terms of its integration with the West

A more assertive foreign policy, reflecting Russia’s growing strength and self-confidence But also: like winning huge in a lottery and scrambling to find ways to spend the money Assertiveness mixed with insecurity, a fear that this moment is fleeting, that things may change for the worse very quickly In the West, this trend generated a tendency toward new containment of Russia Part of Western unease about Russia’s resurgence was that it was happening amid signs of relative decline of the West It could be too easily pictured as a zero-sum game

A WCIOM opinion poll, How should Russia behave in world affairs? 54% - pursue an independent foreign policy, but not dictate its will to others 24% - as a great power, dictate its will to others 8% - does not need an independent fgn policy 2% - world interests should hold priority over national

A Russian opinion poll, 2007: In talks with the US, should Putin adopt a harder line, or should he make more concessions?  Harder line – 47%  Make concessions – 5%  Neither harder line, nor concessions, his current policy is just about right – 31%  Hard to say – 16%

Which of the following statements do you most agree with?  Russia is part of the West, it should develop closer relations with Europe and the US and adopt “Western” ways – 11%  Russia is a Eurasian state which has its own path of historical development – 74%  Russia is an “Eastern” country which should be most interested in cooperation with Asian countries – 7%  Hard to say – 9%

How would you characterize the leading Western countries (in terms of their relations with Russia)?  As Russia’s partners, which have important common interests with her (such as struggle against crime and terrorism, solving ecological problems, etc.) – 42%  As Russia’s adversaries, which seek to solve their problems at Russia’s expense and damage Russia whenever they can – 46%  Hard to say – 13% Poll of 1600 respondents conducted by Levada Center, July 23,

In 2008, tensions between Russia and the West reached the highest level since the Cold War  The Russia-Georgia war of August 2008 Weeks later, the global financial crisis reached its peak and transformed the entire context of global politics, pushing Russia and the West toward closer cooperation

Improvement of US-Russian relations  Security and arms control – key area Resumption of cooperation between NATO and Russia  Further NATO expansion put off  Afghanistan as the main area of common interests  Change of US policy and a new dialog on missile defence  Trial balloons about Russia’s membership New push for EU-Russia integration

In recent years, it became habitual to exaggerate:  The degree of differences between the interests between Russia and the West  And both sides’ ability to succeed without cooperation from the other side But it is anything but a zero-sum game  Russia cannot, and does not plan to, thrive on Western troubles  Neither can the West hope to gain by undercutting Russia’s resurgence Win-win is possible – and since , both sides have been engaged in a new dialog

Realistic terms of Russia-West cooperation Priority of cooperation over competition Construction of a new world order New mutual security arrangements  Which means taking each other’s interests and concerns into account No hegemony No ideological wars Competition by the rules Primacy of international law

Huge agenda for joint actions  Arms control and disarmament  Afghanistan  Dealing with the global economic crisis  Energy security  Climate change  The food crisis  The water crisis  New international security arrangements  The Arctic