After the Cold War

The Post-Cold War World, main trends: --Unprecedented expansion of capitalism --Formation of the global capitalist class, which has absorbed former communist elites --Unprecedented rise of US global influence --Ideological dominance of neoliberalism --Lack of major ideological alternatives to the new status- quo --Logic of the market vs. logic of democracy --Steady buildup of tensions and conflicts: from relative peace to a global war mode --Discovery of climate change: new stage in the growth of eco-consciousness --The global economic crisis

The Post-Cold War World: 3 periods

First Period, : Triumph of the West  Russia’s transition crisis  The Unipolar Moment: US hegemony at its peak  The Western expansion  Formation of the global neoliberal regime

Second Period, : US Hegemony Tested  The Islamist challenge and the Bush response  Development of a multipolar system  Russia’s resurgence  Relative decline of US hegemony

Third Period,  The global economic crisis  Gorbama and the American perestroika  The rise of China as a global power  Europe: from integration to fragmentation?  Reset in Russia’s relations with the West

2 international perspectives on Soviet foreign policy  USSR AS A PROBLEM  an empire dominating Eurasian Heartland  a global subversive force undermining capitalism  USSR AS A SOLUTION  a key ally against Hitler  a source of help to developing countries (support of national liberation movements, economic assistance)  a counterbalance to the US

Contraction of Russian power

NATO enlargement,

Main changes in Russia’s international role following the end of the Cold War: 1. Reduction of the main parametres of Russia’s power  Territorial losses  Economic depression  The military crisis  Ideological neutralization  after being a key part of the Global Left for most of the 20 th century, Russia joined the Global (neoliberal) Right 2. Russian society was opened to the impact of global forces with minimal regulation by the state 3. Political affiliation with the West 4. Reluctant acceptance of US hegemony

Post-Soviet Russia was no longer a problem for the West in the Cold War sense:  Russia’s abandonment of its Soviet mode became a key enabling factor for the formation of the global neoliberal regime  RUSSIA AS A “NORMAL COUNTRY”: capitalist, cautious, status quo, pragmatic, with limited ambitions, seeking friends everywhere, wary of making enemies

RUSSIA AS A PROBLEM AFTER THE COLD WAR The transition crisis: dangerous side-effects of reforms:  The nuclear dimension  Possibility of a totalitarian backlash  Potential for civil war  Tensions with new neighbours, attempts to maintain a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space Russia as a US client: no longer counterbalancing the US (not a problem for the US, but a problem for many other states) – or: Russia as a member of coalitions to counterbalance US hegemony (a problem for the US)

The dominant American perspective: Help Russia become a “normal” country Prevent Russia from acting as a counterbalance Control Russia’ behaviour to keep it congruent with US interests Expand US influence into the post-Soviet space Perspectives outside the US: Many countries would like Russia to play the role of a non- hostile, but relatively independent, actor in international politics Most Russians have the same perspective

The economy GDP, PPP - $2.11 trln. (No.8 in the world)  Canada – $1.28 GDP per capita - $15,100  Canada - $38,200 Real growth rate – 5.6% in 2008, -7.9 in 2009, 2.7% in 2010  Canada – 0.5 in 2008, -2.5% in 2009, 0.3% in 2010

US National Intelligence Council forecast for the year 2025, unveiled in October 2008, described Russia as one of four rising centers of international power: “In terms of size, speed, and directional flow, the transfer of global wealth and economic power now under way — roughly from West to East — is without precedent in modern history.... No other countries are projected to rise to the level of China, India, or Russia, and none is likely to match their individual global clout.... Growth projections for Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRICs) indicate they will collectively match the original G-7’s share of global GDP by ” “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World”. Washington: National Intelligence Council, November pp. vi, vii

In the 2000s, Russian state capacity has been partially repaired Putinism has consolidated Russian capitalism, protected it from internal challenges, and returned Russia to the rank of major international actors But huge problems remain unsolved, while new problems have been created

The Russian economy needs major modernization to be competitive The new Russian state is in many ways dysfunctional and needs major reforms to meet Russia’s challenges The Russian society is deeply split by social inequality Continued resurgence requires new policies and reforms

The structure of Russia’s exports: 93% raw materials

Russia’s military power Mid-1980s – defence spending accounted for 15-17% of Soviet GDP Massive cuts following dissolution of USSR in 1991 Steady rise since 2000 – by 15-25% a year In 2006, a new state armaments program, which will span , was adopted Price tag: 4.9 trillion rubles (US$186 billion). 63% is to be allocated for the procurement of modern weapons and equipment 27% towards defense research and development – defence spending accounts for 2.5% of Russia’s GDP  normal level for a Western country

Topol-M, Russia’s new mobile ICBM

A Tu-95 over the Arctic

Russian infantry in Georgia, August 2008

A Russian warship in the Caribbean

Russia is buying a Mistral amphibious assault ship from France

NATO – Russia military balance Total armed forces personnel 3:1 Military aircraft 10:1 Tanks 3:1 Artillery 2:1 Naval ships 2:1 Submarines 3:1 Aircraft carriers 19:1  How real is this picture?  Partly

Comparing 1917 and 1991: The Romanov Empire collapsed as a result of a revolution, the elites were overthrown and replaced by new elites as a result of the civil war The Communist elites moved to divide the empire to recast themselves as leaders of independent nation-states –  or of units of the Russian Federation A key reason why the Soviet empire made a relatively quiet exit was because key Soviet elites saw a future for themselves after communism Transition to capitalism would enable most of them to maintain and even enhance their power and privilege

Having dissolved the empire, the new elites have been engaged in competition and cooperation between themselves to:  secure their control,  reform their political-economic systems,  find new places in the regional and global orders THIS STRUGGLE OVER THE IMPERIAL SPOILS IS THE ESSENCE OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN EURASIA Some of them stick together (RF, CIS, GUUAM) Others go their own separate ways, look for new partnerships Meanwhile, many other states are exploring opportunities to expand their influence in Eurasia

Two basic imperatives of Russia’s post-Soviet foreign policy: the imperative of systemic transformation into a capitalist-type society (the market imperative) and the realities of her historic-geographic position as Eurasia’s core state (the geopolitical imperative). The 2 imperatives may interact in a number of ways.

They can be mutually reinforcing, making it possible to achieve significant foreign policy gains. They can be mutually exclusive, forcing Russia’s leaders to make hard choices between them, which makes policy setbacks likely. They can be managed through tradeoffs, which requires great political skills, significant and diverse power resources, and effective institutions.

Choices and balances between market and geopolitical considerations in Russia’s international behaviour. If the market imperative is considered decisive:  Russia can be expected to try to market its geopolitical assets – that is, to achieve economic gains through a skillful use of its unique geopolitical position. If the geopolitical imperative becomes uppermost:  Russia may adopt mercantilist stances and use market interactions with other countries to achieve maximum possible geopolitical gains. Different forces within Russia favor different market- geopolitical balances.

Russian elite interests The oligarchy – the upper crust of the new capitalist class, product of the post-communist transformation  Most important sources of wealth: oil, gas and arms  Dependent on the West, primarily the US  Dependent on the Russian state, wants to rationalize it  Needs traditional foreign policy assets of the USSR  Assertive in the political sphere  Seeks economic opportunities worldwide  Intertwined with state bureaucracy

The bureaucrats  The “enforcers” (siloviki) – military and security elites  Determined to get upper hand over the oligarchs, get their property  Institutionally and traditionally suspicious of the West  Interested in a restoration of a stronger and more authoritarian Russian state, but on a capitalist basis  Federal civilian bureaucracy  Interested in whatever protects and increases their power  Regional bureaucracies, regional foreign policy interests

The national bourgeoisie  Well below the ranks of the oligarchy  Gets little from the West  Feels dominated by the oligarchs  Is nationalist and protectionist The politicians  1990s: liberals, communists, nationalists, “United Russia” – becoming the ruling party under Putin  The Westernizer-Eurasianist divide – and synthesis

Russian threat perceptions  Security – internal and external  Control of resources  Russia’s defence capability  Technological lag behind the West  Negative demography

Globescan poll of Russians, April

Russia’s foreign policy compass West - US, EU, NATO East – China, India, Japan South - the Muslim world North - the Arctic

The dominant trends in Russian foreign policy thinking  Relations with the West are top priority  No desire to confront the West  Recognition of Western concerns But also:  Primacy of national interests, emphasis on independence  Claim for “special interests” in the post-Soviet space  Multivector foreign policy – active engagement with other international actors Pragmatism Primacy of trade and investment issues Readiness for dialog, for development of joint solutions to problems