Chapter 4 Conventional Solutions to Environmental Problems: The Command-and-Control Approach © 2004 Thomson Learning/South-Western.

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Chapter 4 Conventional Solutions to Environmental Problems: The Command-and-Control Approach © 2004 Thomson Learning/South-Western

Use of Standards in Environmental Policy Standards are the fundamental basis of most environmental policies Types of Environmental Standards Ambient standard – a standard that designates the quality of the environment to be achieved, typically expressed as a maximum allowable pollutant concentration Technology-based standard – a standard that designates the equipment or method to be used to achieve some abatement level Performance-based standard – a standard that specifies a pollution limit to be achieved but does not stipulate the technology

Use of Standards in Environmental Policy Economic Implications of Using Standards Two important economic implications The level at which the standards are set How standards are implemented across polluting sources

Are Environmental Standards Set at an Allocatively Efficient Level? Allocatively efficient standards – standards set such that the associated marginal cost (MSC) of abatement equals the marginal social benefit (MSB) of abatement

Are Environmental Standards Set at an Allocatively Efficient Level? Marginal social benefit (MSB) of abatement – a measure of the additional gains accruing to society as pollution abatement increases From a market perspective, the MSB of abatement is society’s demand for pollution abatement, or, equivalently, its demand for environmental quality

Are Environmental Standards Set at an Allocatively Efficient Level? Marginal Social Cost of Abatement – the sum of all polluters’ marginal abatement costs plus government’s marginal cost of monitoring and enforcing these activities Firm-Level Marginal Abatement Cost Marginal abatement cost – the change in costs associated with increasing abatement, using the least-cost method

Are Environmental Standards Set at an Allocatively Efficient Level? Market-Level Marginal Abatement Cost – the horizontal sum of all polluters’ MAC functions Marginal Cost of Enforcement – Added costs incurred by government associated with monitoring and enforcing abatement activities

Are Environmental Standards Set at an Allocatively Efficient Level? Figure 4.1 Single Polluter’s Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC)

Are Environmental Standards Set at an Allocatively Efficient Level? Figure 4.2 Effect of Cost-Saving Technology on the Polluter’s MAC Curve

Are Environmental Standards Set at an Allocatively Efficient Level? Figure 4.3 Deriving the Marginal Social Cost of Abatement

Are Environmental Standards Set at an Allocatively Efficient Level? Are Abatement Standards Set Efficiently? Legislative Constraints Benefit-based standard – a standard set to improve society’s well-being with no consideration for the associated cost

Are Environmental Standards Set at an Allocatively Efficient Level? Figure 4.4 U.S. Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditures

Are Environmental Standards Set at an Allocatively Efficient Level? Imperfect Information Even when a cost-benefit balancing is called for by law, the absence of full information would likely prevent the government from identifying the MSB and MSC of abatement. In the absence of perfect information, it is highly probably that the government will unknowingly establish the abatement standard at some level other than the allocatively efficient one, even if that was the legislated intent

Are Environmental Standards Set at an Allocatively Efficient Level? Figure 4.5 Allocatively Efficient Amount of Pollution Abatement

Are Environmental Standards Set at an Allocatively Efficient Level? Regional Differences There is a qualifier on the use of AE as a national standard across all polluting sources because this optimal level is determined from MSB and MSC, both of which assume the absence of region-specific abatement benefits and costs

Are Environmental Standards Set at an Allocatively Efficient Level? Figure 4.6 Setting and Environmental Quality Standard: Is It Allocatively Efficient?

Are Environmental Standards Set at an Allocatively Efficient Level? Nonuniformity of Pollutants An inefficient outcome can arise within the same region, if changes in releases from polluting sources to not have a uniform impact on the environment

Are Environmental Standards Set at an Allocatively Efficient Level? Fig. 4.7 Effect of Regional Differences on Achieving Allocative Efficiency

General Approaches to Implementing Environmental Policy Cost-effective policy – a policy that meets an objective using the least amount of economic resources Command-and-control approach – a policy that directly regulates polluters through the use of rules or standards Market approach – an incentive-based policy that encourages conservation practices or pollution reduction strategies

Is the Command-and-Control Approach Cost-Effective The practical way to assess whether the command-and-control approach is cost-effective is to determine whether society is incurring higher costs than necessary to achieve a given level of environmental quality

Is the Command-and-Control Approach Cost-Effective Cost-Ineffectiveness of the Technology-Based Standard Technology-based standard potentially prevents the polluter from minimizing the costs of achieving a given abatement level

Is the Command-and-Control Approach Cost-Effective Cost-Ineffectiveness of Uniform Standards Under strict command-and-control framework, standards are often imposed uniformly The use of uniform standards across polluting sources will waste economic resources as long as abatement cost conditions differ among those sources Cost-effective abatement criterion – allocation of abatement across polluting sources such that the MACs for each source are equal

Is the Command-and-Control Approach Cost-Effective Figure 4.8 Cost-Effective Solution in a Two-Polluter Model