Logical behaviourism: objections Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

Logical behaviourism Mental states are dispositions of a person to behave in certain ways (in certain circumstances) Talk about the mind and mental states is talk about behaviour

Mental causation Ryle: mental states aren’t causes – to think that they are is a category mistake To cite a disposition is not to cite a cause Obj: there is mental causation Even if dispositions aren’t causes in the same sense as events, they are part of the ‘causal story’ E.g. the flying stone won’t break the glass if it is not brittle

Davidson’s argument ‘I went to the party because I thought it would be fun’ My thought is causally relevant to my action Suppose I also believe that you’ll be at the party, and I want to see you. But suppose that my reason for going is not to see you, but because I want to have fun How is this possible? I have both dispositions My reason for going is the one that causes my action

Is mind without body conceivable? If mental states are behavioural dispositions, only creatures that can behave have mental states So mind without body is inconceivable – a category mistake But mind without body is conceivable So behaviourism is false Reply: we are wrong to think that mind without body is conceivable

Multiple realizability Which behaviour is a mental state a disposition to? Multiple realizability: different people can express the same mental state by different behaviours in the same situation How can these different dispositions be the same mental state? Reply: On the whole, people with the same mental state have similar dispositions Fear: facial expression; saying ‘yes’ to ‘are you scared?’ …

Multiple realizability The same behaviour can express different mental states E.g. running towards a lion Depends on what else one believes and desires Reply: ‘Behaviour’ doesn’t name a single ‘piece’ of behaviour Can’t tell from this what disposition is being expressed – need to consider broader spectrum of behaviour This doesn’t remain the same while expressing different mental states

Circularity There is no set behaviour correlated with a mental state Can’t analyze what dispositions to behaviour a mental state without referring to other mental states A particular belief is compatible with any behaviour at all, depending on what else you believe or want

Circularity So different mental states may be dispositions to the same behaviour, depending on other mental states. And the same mental state may be dispositions to different behaviour, depending on other mental states So mental states can’t be analyzed as behavioural dispositions

Reply Ryle: we can’t reduce mental concepts to a set of behavioural dispositions They are ‘indefinite’ Dispositional statements can’t be completely analyzed either But mental concepts are still concepts of behavioural dispositions, just at a higher level of generality So the circularity objection is correct, but not an objection

Knowledge of the mind Dualism thinks of mental states as ‘inner’ and defends an asymmetry of knowledge Our mental states are inaccessible to other people But known to us through conscious introspection

Knowledge of the mind Behaviourism rejects this We don’t have to infer that someone has a mind from their behaviour To say that someone has certain behaviour dispositions just is to say they have a mind So we can know other people’s mental states But now, can I only know my own mental states by observing my behaviour?? If they are behavioural dispositions, how could ‘introspection’ reveal them?

Knowledge of the mind Ryle: conscious introspection is a myth We pay attention to ourselves just as we pay attention to others’ behaviour To know what you think is just to be ready to say what you think We just have more evidence – thinking is inner speech

Mental states without behaviour Many conscious mental states, e.g. pain, have a particular feeling, ‘what it is like’ – this cannot be understood just as a behavioural disposition Behaviourism misses the phenomenology of the mind Putnam’s ‘super-spartans’ Through culture, they have no disposition to express pain at all Yet they feel pain