Prohibited agreements: Article 101 (3) Julija Jerneva (+371 29131597)

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Presentation transcript:

Prohibited agreements: Article 101 (3) Julija Jerneva ( )

Plan Type of agreement Object or effect De minimis Exemption under Article 101(3)

3 Art INDIVIDUAL EXEMPTION BLOCK (OR GROUP) EXEMPTION

The rule Article 101(1) may be declared inapplicable to agreements which: 1. “contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, 2. allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which do not: 1. impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable; 2. afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition”

the four conditions of Article 101(3) are cumulative Métropole télévision SA (M6), Case T-185/00 The Article 101(3) exception only refers to that behavior which falls within Article 101(1) This is a fundamental point.

1. Efficiency gains “contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress” The nature of the claimed efficiencies; The link between the agreement and the efficiencies The likelihood and magnitude of each claimed efficiency; and How and when each claimed efficiency would be achieved.

The nature of efficiencies Objective? only objective benefits can be taken into account Consten and Grundig, Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/66 efficiencies are not assessed from the subjective point of view of the parties Cost savings that arise from the mere exercise of market power by the parties cannot be taken into account

The nature of efficiencies Cost efficiencies Qualitative efficiencies

Cost efficiencies Development of new production technologies and methods Synergies resulting from an integration of existing assets Economies of scale, i.e. declining cost per unit of output as output increases Economies of scope, i.e. cost savings by producing different products on the basis of the same input

Cost efficiencies the production assets of firm A generate a high output per hour but require a relatively high input of raw materials per unit of output, the production assets of firm B generate lower output per hour but require a relatively lower input of raw materials per unit of output

Cost efficiencies a producer of frozen pizzas and a producer of frozen vegetables may obtain economies of scope by jointly distributing their products. Both groups of products: must be distributed in refrigerated vehicles significant overlaps in terms of customers are likely

Cost efficiencies Must always prove that the consumer will benefit from the costs savings (“passing over of the benefit”)

Qualitative efficiencies Technical and technological advances Research and development agreements Joint production of new or improved goods or services Specialisation agreements Specialised distributors, bringing in more qualitative services Specialised production, allowing better quality products to be made

The link between the agreement and the efficiencies efficiencies must result from the economic activity that forms the object of the agreement Claims based on indirect effects are as a general rule too uncertain and too remote to be taken into account

The likelihood, magnitude and proof of efficiency calculate or estimate the value of the efficiencies and detailed argumentation as to how the amount has been computed method(s) by which the efficiencies have been or will be achieved all data must be verifiable

2. Allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit ‘consumers’ Only consumers or includes corporate buyers? “fair share’ the pass-on of benefits must at least compensate consumers for any actual or likely negative impact caused to them by the restriction of competition

A fair share of benefits to consumers Pass-on and balancing of cost efficiencies Markets with effective competition Concentrated markets, non-effective competition Pass-on and balancing of other types of efficiencies

3. Indispensability of restrictions 1. The agreement as such must be reasonably necessary in order to achieve the efficiencies there are no other economically practicable and less restrictive means of achieving the same efficiencies 2. The individual restrictions of competition that flow from the agreement must also be reasonably necessary for the attainment of the efficiencies.

Agreement is necessary to achieve efficiencies The question is not whether in the absence of the restriction the agreement would not have been concluded, but whether more efficiencies are produced with the agreement or restriction than in the absence of the agreement or restriction - European Commission’s guidelines

Agreement is necessary to achieve efficiencies the claimed efficiencies take the form of cost reductions resulting from economies of scale or scope the undertakings concerned must explain and substantiate why the same efficiencies would not be likely to be attained through internal growth and price competition

Agreement is necessary to achieve efficiencies The larger the minimum efficient scale (the level of output required to minimise average cost and exhaust economies of scale) compared to the current size of either of the parties to the agreement, the more likely it is that the efficiencies will be deemed to be specific to the agreement

Restrictions of competition must be necessary to achieve efficiencies 2. The individual restrictions of competition that flow from the agreement must also be reasonably necessary for the attainment of the efficiencies. A restriction is indispensable if its absence would eliminate or significantly reduce the efficiencies that follow from the agreement or make it significantly less likely that they will materialise Limitations in time

4. No elimination of competition Elimination of competition between whom? Agreements Joint ventures Potential competition Competitive strength of close competitors

Inapplicability of Article 101(3) Agreement cannot contain restrictions by “object” fixing prices sharing markets limiting output

S is a producer of carbonated soft drinks, holding 40 % of the market. The nearest competitor holds 20 %. S concludes supply agreements: with customers accounting for 25 % of demand, whereby they undertake to purchase exclusively from S for 5 years. with other customers accounting for 15 % of demand whereby they are granted quarterly target rebates, if their purchases exceed certain individually fixed targets. S claims that the agreements allow it to predict demand more accurately and thus to better plan production, reducing raw material storage and warehousing costs and avoiding supply shortages

Firm A is brewer, holding 70 % of the relevant market, comprising the sale of beer through cafés and other on-trade premises. Over the past 5 years A has increased its market share to 60 %. There are four other competitors in the market, B, C, D and E with market shares of 10 %, 10 %, 5 % and 5 %. No new entry has occurred in the recent past and price changes implemented by A have generally been followed by competitors. A wants to conclude agreements with 20 % of the on-trade premises representing 40 % of sales volumes whereby the contracting parties undertake to purchase beer only from A for a period of 5 years

A is a producer of electric appliances users with a market share of 35% of a relevant national market. B is a competing manufacturer with 5 % market share B has developed a new type of motor that is more powerful while consuming less electricity. A and B conclude an agreement whereby they establish a production joint venture for the production of the new motor. B undertakes to grant an exclusive license to the joint venture. The joint venture combines the new technology of B with the efficient manufacturing and quality control process of A. There is one other main competitor C with 15 % of the market, who recently acquired an another competitor D with 5 %