Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia Sharad Joshi Monterey Institute of International Studies November 13, 2009

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia Introduction  Why is this such a crucial issue?  Nuclear weapons on both sides + deep rooted conflict  Prospect of horizontal proliferation  Nuclear weapons  Terrorist groups  Rationale for nuclear weapons  Security threat perceptions  India vis-à-vis Pakistan and China  Pakistan vis-à-vis India  Nationalistic, domestic, scientific-bureaucratic reasons Jammu & Kashmir

 Stability/Instability Paradox  Strategic stability  Increased violence at sub-strategic level  Strategic instability  Increased violence at sub-strategic level  Helps link non-state violence and nuclear postures in South Asia Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia

 Currently  Nuclear weapons deployed by both  Deterrence posture (stable/unstable?)  Periodic crises situations (e.g. 2001/02) involved nuclear threats  Nonproliferation regime positions  Both India and Pakistan outside Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)  Debate in India over CTBT  Varied positions on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)  Pakistan’s problems with FMCT

 Expansion of specific capabilities  Continued production of fissile material  Continued development of more lethal delivery systems  Introduction of cruise missiles, longer-range ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles  Consideration of missile defense systems Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia

Capabilities and Strategies Capabilities and Strategies  India  Tests in 1974, 1998  Estimated nuclear devices  Ballistic missile capability – Prithvi, Agni I&II  Acquisition of cruise missiles (BrahMos)  Deterrence strategy  No first use doctrine Prithvi (India)

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia Capabilities and Strategies Capabilities and Strategies  India  Quest for ‘credible minimum deterrent’  Agni III long range ballistic missile  Submarine launch capability sought  Nuclear submarine (INS Arihant) launched in July 2009  Approval for Agni-V  Restricted increase in range-5,000 km  Testing of missile defense systems Launch of Sagarika/K-15, Feb. ‘08 Agni-III test, May ‘08

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia Capabilities Capabilities  Pakistan  Tests in 1998  Refusal to adopt a no-first use policy  Put forward a “No War pact”  Credible minimum doctrine  Estimated material for nuclear devices.  Missile capability covers most of India – Ghauri, Shaheen  Development of cruise missiles – Babur  nuclear delivery role  F-16 deal with U.S. November 16, 2006 photo showing then Pakistani PM Shaukat Aziz in front of the Ghauri V (Hatf) missile just before it was test fired.

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia Source: CNS Source: Dept. of Atomic Energy, Government of India

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia Capabilities and Strategies Capabilities and Strategies  Pakistan  Concern over security of nuclear weapons  Both countries:  Development of cruise missiles  Pakistan – Babur, Ra’ad (nuclear capable)  India – BrahMos, Nirbhay  Implications for military strategy  How do cruise missiles fit into broader thinking on security and deterrence issues in South Asia? Babur cruise missile (Pakistan) BrahMos cruise missile (India)

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia Capabilities and Strategies Capabilities and Strategies  Missile defense  Two tests by India in 2006/2007  Quest for cruise missile defense  Nuclear Confidence Building Measures  Missile test notification  no cruise missiles  Agreement for reducing risk of nuclear accidents  Exchange of nuclear facilities lists India’s Endo-atmospheric interceptor test, Dec. 2007

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia  U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement  Current situation  IAEA safeguards agreement approved in August 2008; signed in March 2009  NSG approval in September 2008  Nuclear Deal with France – Sept. 30, 2008  U.S. Congressional approval for bilateral pact in October 2008  Benefits for India  Nuclear technology, materials from external suppliers  Domestic sources of uranium can be diverted to military  Enhanced energy supply  De facto approval of nuclear status IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna on August 1, 2008, to consider the Indian safeguards agreement.

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia  U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement  U.S. goals  Strategic partnership with India  Some regulation of India’s nuclear facilities  Business incentives for U.S. nuclear industry  Will lessen India’s dependence on fossil fuels  Unstated objective: Building India as a regional counterweight to China

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia  U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement  Negative Consequences  Breaks the nonproliferation regime  Bad precedent  More difficult to stop DPRK and Iran  Pakistan’s quest for similar agreement  China’s proposed nuclear assistance to Pakistan  Allows India to produce more fissile material  Could actually stabilize India’s nuclear capabilities?  Indian argument  India needs to be part of nuclear energy trade  Regime ineffective anyway

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia  Proliferation From South Asia  A.Q. Khan network  Evolution from an import role to an export role also  Lingering questions  Has the network (or similar networks) been rounded up?  Pakistan political and military establishment involved?  Important implications  What all was transferred?  Introduction of more stringent export controls by Pakistan

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia Country Transfers or negotiations for transfers Period In exchange for Iran 1. Agreement on training scientists, transfer of P1 centrifuge and enrichment plant diagrams, P1 machine components 2. Diagrams of P1, P2 centrifuges, 500 used centrifuges; manual related to fabrication of nuclear weapons components , possibly till 2003 Possible agreements on oil supplies, conventional weaponry, political support, and cash. Libya L1 centrifuges; components for 200 other centrifuges 2. L2 centrifuges; 1.7 tons UF6 3. Nuclear weapon design manuals, blueprints 4. L2 centrifuge components Cash North Korea 1. Transfers of P1 centrifuges and technology and possible P-2 centrifuges 2. Training of personnel Possibly till 2002 In exchange for missile components at a later stage (earlier missiles had been procured from NK for cash) Iraq 1. Offers from Khan to help establish enrichment program and provide nuclear weapon designs 1991 Export side of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia  Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear weapons  Growing Pakistani nuclear arsenal + expansion of delivery systems  Political instability and violence  Implications for security of nuclear weapons and materials.  E.g., meetings in 2001 between Pakistani scientists and Al Qaeda leadership  Technological hurdle towards a workable nuclear device, i.e., intent does not necessarily equal capability  But, dirty bomb possible  Psychological effect of nuclear materials use Source: McClatchy

 Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Source: The New York Times Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia  Striking at ungoverned spaces and weak states  Increasing attacks in vicinity of nuclear facilities  Instances of kidnapping of nuclear personnel  Unclear about motivations  Signifies potential inadvertent or deliberate access to nuclear personnel and facilities

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia  Conclusions  Expansion of nuclear capabilities and changes in Indian position in nonproliferation system  South Asian proliferation also has to be seen in context of Asia-Pacific power dynamics, especially the rivalry between China and the U.S.  India-Pakistan nuclear stalemate leading to changes in conventional strategies? – e.g., BrahMos  Importance of Confidence Building Measures in other areas of contention, e.g., Siachen glacier. Can facilitate Nuclear CBMs.  Security of nuclear materials and facilities from terrorist and proliferation networks remains a key problem.