Chapters 10 and 18 (p. 503-513) –Incentive Conflicts and Contracts –eBay Case, P. 275 –Schmidt Brewing Company –Sarbanes-Oxley Review Assignment 3 Managerial.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT I and II
Advertisements

Chapter 21 Rewarding Performance Cost Accounting Traditions and Innovations Barfield, Raiborn, Kinney.
Chapter 1 Financial Management.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT I AND II
Corporate Governance Chapter 2.
The problem of Economic Organization Aim: Introduce the notion of an efficient organization, i.e. an organization that produces efficient outcomes. Efficient.
© 2009 Pearson Education Canada 19/1 Chapter 19 The Theory of the Firm.
CHAPTER 1 THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT Zoubida SAMLAL - MBA, CFA Member, PHD candidate for HBS program.
© 2003 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Introduction To Corporate Finance Chapter One.
Competing For Advantage Part IV – Monitoring and Creating Entrepreneurial Opportunities Chapter 11 – Corporate Governance.
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e Chapter 17: Divisional Performance Evaluation McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2009 by The McGraw-Hill.
11-1© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited. Corporate Governance Chapter Eleven.
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e Copyright © 2009 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Managerial Economics.
Stockholder Rights and Corporate Governance Stockholders Corporate Governance Executive Compensation: A Special Issue Shareholder Activism Government.
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e Chapter 15: Incentive Compensation McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
Corporate Governance Hitt, Ireland, and Hoskisson
Copyright © 2010 Pearson Prentice Hall. All rights reserved. Chapter 1 Financial Management.
The prime aim Make you acquainted to the contractual approach to agency problems.
The Organization of the Firm
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e Chapter 22: Ethics and Organizational.
Chapter 1 Financial Management.
The Corporation Chapter 1. Chapter Outline 1.1 The Types of Firms 1.2 Ownership Versus Control of Corporations 1.3 The Stock Market.
Responsibility Accounting and Transfer Pricing
This module provides a preview to corporate finance by explaining the major role and tasks of the financial executive. The module describes the criteria.
Copyright © 2011 Pearson Prentice Hall. All rights reserved. Getting Started: Principles of Finance Chapter 1.
Chapter 1 Financial Management. © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved Describe the cycle of money, the participants in the cycle, and.
Tam Lai Ying Law Tsz Yeung Au Man Hung
BA 5201 Organization and Management Organizational governance and control Instructor: Ça ğ rı Topal 1.
Chapter 11 Corporate governance. Businesses in the United States Number of businesses in the United States? Number of employers in the United States?
Hong Kong Polytechnic University AF3303 Business Finance Lecture 1 Introduction to Corporate Finance Instructor: Dr. Jacqueline Wang.
© 2004 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited Chapter 1: The Role and Objective of Financial Management Contemporary Financial Management.
This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture by Brickley.
Chapter 2 Executive Incentives.
10/7/20151 Business Organizations Chapter 3. 10/7/20152 Sole Proprietorships  Most common form of business organization in the U.S.  Owned & run by.
Chapter 1 © 2009 Cengage Learning/South-Western The Scope of Corporate Finance.
Chapter 1 Introduction to Financial Management and Markets The objectives of this chapter are to introduce you to: The roles of the corporation and financial.
CHAPTER 10 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ETHICS
Week 11 Chapter 10 Incentive Conflicts & Contracts
Chapter 1 © 2009 Cengage Learning/South-Western FIN 3303 Business Finance.
Microeconomics Business Organizations. Microeconomics: Overview Study of individual businesses and households SMALL scale decisions –A firm’s business.
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Prentice Hall. All rights reserved. Chapter 1 The Role and Environment of Managerial Finance.
© 2004 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin Incentive Conflicts and Contracts.
MGRECON401 Economics of International Business and Multinationals LECTURE 7 Motivating Employees and Performance Evaluation in a Complex Organization.
Budi Purwanto Department of Management Bogor University of Agriculture.
Principles of Finance – Fall 2012 (FIN 3403) Instructor: Nina Schmidt, Ph.D. OUTLINE: Welcome & Introduction Syllabus, Blackboard and Connect Chapter 1.
Essentials of Managerial Finance by S. Besley & E. Brigham Slide 1 of 23 Chapter 1 An Overview of Managerial Finance.
Chapter 1 - An Introduction to Financial Management Chapter 1 - An Introduction to Financial Management  2005, Pearson Prentice Hall.
Intro and Chapter 1 Questions
CHAPTER 10 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ETHICS
CHAPTER 1 The Role and Environment of Managerial Finance
Introduction to Managerial Finance
1-1 Introduction to Finance Lecture Goals and Governance of the Corporation This chapter introduces the corporation, its goals, and the roles of.
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2004 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 2 Objective and Risk Management.
Responsibility Accounting and Transfer Pricing Chapter Five Copyright © 2014 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
Accounting Seminar 1 Professor: Bonita Daly, PhD Accountancy Office: Room 423 Office Hours: By appointment.
Chapter 22 Corporate Control and Governance Lawrence J. Gitman Jeff Madura Introduction to Finance.
Milgrom and Roberts (1992): Chapter 6 Economics, Organization & Management Chapter 6: Moral Hazard and Performance Incentives Examples of Moral Hazard:
CHAPTER 1 An overview of Managerial Finance. What is Financial Management Is the ability to adapt to change, raise funds, invest in assets, and manage.
FNCE 3010 CHAPTER 13 Agency Conflicts & Corporate Governance 1 GJ Madigan F2014.
Incentive Conflicts and Contracts
MKT 450 Strategic Management Mishari Alnahedh
Chapter 1 Introduction to Corporate Finance.
Chapter 1 Learning Objectives
Overview of Financial Management
Chapter 1 Learning Objectives
Chapter 1 The Corporation
STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION
Chapter 1 Principles of Finance
Who Controls Our Business?
©2003 South-Western Publishing Company
Presentation transcript:

Chapters 10 and 18 (p ) –Incentive Conflicts and Contracts –eBay Case, P. 275 –Schmidt Brewing Company –Sarbanes-Oxley Review Assignment 3 Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Managing with Economics “traditional managerial economics” Firm is a single profit maximizing decision maker “new managerial economics” Firm is a focal point for a set of implicit & explicit contracts between many decision makers Highlights the role of decentralized information

Full information management decisions –Maximizing profits Perfect Knowledge of Demand Perfect Knowledge of Costs Marginal thinking –Cost minimization Perfect knowledge of relationship between inputs and output Managing in a world of imperfect, asymmetric information –Making the best use of decentralized information –Decision rights –Incentives and evaluation Managing with Economics

Firm as focal point for set of contracts Contract is an agreement about obligations in a relationship

The role of contracts Costless contracting –ideal contracts would align interests (minimize incentive conflicts) at no or low cost Costly contracting and asymmetric information –contracts costly to negotiate, write, administer –parties to contract have asymmetric information on performance levels

The Story of the Chinese Junks (attributed to Steve Cheung) A refined British lady is taking a boat ride in China. A mean-looking man is yelling at the rowers and whips them when they fail to work hard. The lady comments to her guide that the British would not allow this cruel treatment of workers. Indeed, the owner of the boat would be put in jail for violating labor laws. The guide is amused by her statement and indicates that the people rowing the boat are the owners. The mean-looking man is an employee. Explain what is going on!

Precontractual information problems Bargaining failures –asymmetric information See recent the bus strike and NHL lockout Adverse selection –use of private information in manner detrimental to trading partner Insurance markets Valuable insurance markets fail to exist –No grade insurance

Postcontractual information problems Agency problems –principal contracts with agent for service –agent has postcontractual incentive to serve own perceived best interests Asymmetric information complicates resolution of agency problems –principal incurs monitoring costs and/or –agent incurs bonding costs Total agency costs = monitoring/bonding cost + any residual cost due to agency problem Incentives to economize on agency costs –sharing increased gains from trade

eBay, p How does eBay create value? 2.What potential contracting problems exist on eBay? 3.How does eBay address these problems? 4.What are the contracting costs at eBay? 5.eBay claims that it has only a small problem with fraud and misuse of the system. –Does this imply that it is overinvesting in addressing potential contracting –problems? Underinvesting? Explain.

Optimal combination of compensation and perks CEO utility function, C is compensation, P is perquisites: U=f(C,P) Owners have precise knowledge of profit potential:  p Realized profits are:  R =  p -P Therefore offer CEO compensation contract: C=S-(  p -  R )

Optimal perquisite taking

Value Maximization Principle Incentive problems generate costs that reduce value. It is in the interests of all parties to a contract to develop efficient solutions to agency problems. More value is created (gains to trade), which can be shared among the contracting parties. How does this apply to corporate governance?

Discussion Questions Describe an agency conflict in one of your organizations. What do you think is causing this conflict? What suggestions do you have for better controlling this conflict?

Schmidt Brewing Company Schmidt Brewing Company is family-owned and -operated. The family wants to raise some capital by selling 30 percent of the common stock to outside shareholders. The company has been profitable and the family indicates that it expects to pay high dividends to shareholders. The family will maintain 70 percent ownership of the common stock and continue to manage the firm. The rights of shareholders are specified in the company's corporate charter. The charter specifies such items as voting rights (procedures and items subject to a vote), meeting requirements, board size, rights to cash flows, and so on. Once adopted, a charter can only be changed by a vote of the shareholders. What types of provisions in the corporate charter of Schmidt Brewing might motivate minority shareholders to pay higher prices for the stock? Explain.

Sarbanes-Oxley What potential effects will the Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002 have on the legal form of organization? What potential effects will the Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002 have on the willingness of individuals to serve of corporate boards? What potential effects will the Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002 have the level of executive pay?

Assignment 3

Looking Forward Next Class: Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture –Organizational Architecture, Ch. 11 –Kodak case from Chapter 11 –Ethics, Ch 21 Coursepack: Nordstrom Giving Until it Hurts, WSJ Recycling Corporate Responsibility, WSJ

Midterm Evaluations Please fill out Goes directly to instructor Feedback on what works; what could be improved – can allow adjustment of 2 nd half of course Thank you