Sami Yläoutinen Medium-Term Fiscal Frameworks and Fiscal Objectives: Concepts and Practices.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Improving Budgetary Outcomes
Advertisements

October 29,  Fiscal Risks identified and quantified in Mexico: ◦ Budgetary impact of fluctuations in key assumed macro-economic variables ◦ Long-term.
Viet Nam: Recent Economic Developments and Near-Term Prospects Bahodir Ganiev Country Economist Viet Nam Resident Mission Launch of the Asian Development.
Saving, growth and the current account Daan Steenkamp ERSA / SASI Savings workshop August 2009.
The Experiences of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka with FRLs Yang Hyun Jin Maldives, April 1, 2010.
Fiscal Rules Eldad Shidlovsky, Head of Economics and Research Department. Ministry of Finance May 2009 Ministry of Finance.
1 A New Fiscal Rule Karnit Flug Research department The Bank of Israel May, 2009.
Macro-Fiscal Forecasting Sami Yläoutinen Fiscal Affairs Department (IMF) & METAC Workshop on MTFF December 16 th –19 th, 2014, Beirut, Lebanon.
Objectives of Fiscal Responsibility Laws (FRLs) and Prerequisites for Success Ian Lienert April 1, 2010.
The Medium Term Expenditure Framework
Fiscal Discipline Charles Wyplosz The Graduate Institute, Geneva Conference on Fiscal Policy IMF, June 2, 2009.
1 FISCAL INSTITUTIONS IN MEXICO: WHAT REFORMS ARE PENDING? November, 2003.
Introduction to Macroeconomics
The Importance of Macroeconomic Frameworks for Economic Stability Dave Ramsden 11 January 2006.
Should policy be active or passive?
International Experience with Rules-Based Fiscal Frameworks: Design Issues George Kopits Fiscal Council Republic of Hungary Conference on Fiscal Frameworks.
Peru: Two approaches for the fiscal sustainability analysis Jean Paul Rabanal Economics and Social Studies Division Ministry of Economy and Finance - Perú.
Ireland’s Medium-Term Budgetary Framework John McHale Irish Fiscal Advisory Council National University of Ireland, Galway 17 April 2015 Session 7 – Independent.
Macroeconomic Policy and Economic Performance: Chile’s Recent Experience Luis F. Céspedes Ministry of Finance-Chile.
Achieving the MDGs: RBA Training Workshop Module 8: Developing the MDG-based poverty reduction strategy 9-12 May 2005.
NATIONAL BANK OF AZERBAIJAN KHAGANI ABDULLAYEV, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR.
NATIONAL CONSULTATION ON THE ECONOMY Theme: “The Architecture of an Efficient and Sustainable Public Sector in Support of our Economic Growth Agenda” St.
The Stability and Growth Pact Frederick University 2013.
The MTEF in Practice - Reconciling Conflicting Claims Malcolm Holmes.
PEFA Performance Measurement Framework A Tool For Budget Reforms THE GEORGIA EXPERIENCE.
Maintaining Growth in an Uncertain World Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa African Department International Monetary Fund November 13, 2012.
The Role of Fiscal Institutions in Managing the Oil Revenue Boom CEPAL XIX Regional Seminar on Fiscal Policy January 2007 Rolando Ossowski Fiscal Affairs.
INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT Module 2.1 :Macroeconomics of the budget.
Fiscal Policy. Influencing the level of economic activity though manipulation of government income and expenditure Associated with Keynesian Demand Management.
General Directorate of Annual Programs and Conjunctural Evaluations1 15 February 2010 Turkish Economy: Macroeconomic Developments in 2009 and Medium Term.
INDONESIA BUDGET REFORM (Priorities and Challenges) International Conference Budgeting for Performance-Modernizing PFM in Indonesia May , Hotel.
Fiscal Frameworks: The Swedish experience 8 July, Ljubljana Joakim Sonnegård Head of Agency 1.
Comments on Introducing MTEF in Korea Youngsun Koh March 15, 2004 Korea Development Institute.
1 Public Expenditure Management and the Medium-Term Fiscal Framework Workshop on Bhutan Public Expenditure Management August 16-20, 2004 Christian Eigen-Zucchi.
The Government Budget Process and the Role of the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council Lars Calmfors Chairman.
MEDIUM TERM FINANCIAL PLAN ( ) Date : 8/10/2010 Decision No : 2010/28.
Economic Challenges of Bulgaria Lecture at the Military Academy of Sofia, July 17, 2003 by Piritta Sorsa, IMF representative in Bulgaria.
ITCILO/ACTRAV COURSE A Capacity Building for Members of Youth Committees on the Youth Employment Crisis in Africa 26 to 30 August 2013 Macro Economic.
AS Economics PowerPoint Briefings Introduction to Macroeconomics AS Economics.
An Introduction World Bank – Elliot (Mick) Riordan MFM Debt Group GN-PBO Webinar April 6, 2016.
Embedding Fiscal Rules in Legislation Embedding Fiscal Rules in Legislation Country Case: Albania Gelardina Prodani Secretary General Ministry of Finance,
Fiscal Rules: Key Concepts and Approaches Jason Harris PEMPAL 2016 BCoP Plenary Meeting FISCAL RULES FOR EFFECTIVE AND SUSTAINABLE BUDGETING Minsk, February.
Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments Teresa Ter-Minassian Director, Fiscal Affairs Department International Monetary Fund Contact:
Association of Parliamentary Budget Offices Community Meeting Montreal, June 17-19, 2013.
BCOP MEETING ON FISCAL RULES: WRAP-UP Naida Carsimamovic Vukotic, BCOP Resource Team BCOP plenary meeting, Belarus, February
Improving public financial management. Supporting sustainable development. PEFA and fiscal transparency OECD CESEE SBO Ljubljana, Slovenia July 8, 2016.
Introduction and Overview
Our role: fiscal analysis
The 2006/7 Budget and Macroeconomic Policy
Budget Formulation: good practices
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework: Lessons
Budget Formulation: good practices
PEFA 2016 Slides selected from the training materials of the PEFA secretariat.
Main players in budget execution
Flavio Padrini Italy’s Parliamentary Budget Office
Introduction and Overview
INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT
Russia. Recent Developments and Long-Term Challenges
PEFA 2016 Slides selected from the training materials of the PEFA secretariat.
Finding A Common Scale: An Overview of PFM Performance Indicators
Fiscal Sustainability
BCOP MEETING ON FISCAL RULES: WRAP-UP
Budget Policy Statement Macro-economic Policy
International Experience with Rules-Based Fiscal Frameworks: Design Issues George Kopits Fiscal Council Republic of Hungary Conference on Fiscal.
Ministry of National Economy of The Republic of Kazakhstan
Bulgaria – Capital Budgeting And Fiscal Institutions
Budget Reforms, MTMF & MTBF
A New Fiscal Rule Karnit Flug Research department The Bank of Israel
Making Budget Reform Matter for the Poverty Reduction
Chapter 12 – Government and Fiscal Policy
Presentation transcript:

Sami Yläoutinen Medium-Term Fiscal Frameworks and Fiscal Objectives: Concepts and Practices

Outline of Presentation I.Definition and Features II.Why Medium-Term Fiscal Frameworks III.Medium Term Fiscal Objectives and Rules IV.Challenges V.Conclusions 2

Medium-term Fiscal Framework Principles of fiscal management Numerical fiscal rule Disclosure requirements Multi-year macroeconomic forecast Multi-year fiscal forecast Medium-term fiscal target Multi-year expenditure ceiling Multi-year spending allocations Planning margin Detailed expenditure outturn Reconciliation of change from Budget Explanation of discrepancies InstrumentContent Medium-term Budget Framework Final Accounts Objective Foundation for fiscal objectives State multi- year fiscal policy targets Set multi-year spending plans Report actual expenditure Detailed expenditure appropriations Other budgetary controls Reconciliation of changes from MTBF Fiscal Rule or Responsibility Law Annual Budget Authorize annual expenditure I. Definition 3

I. Definition and Features of Medium-Term Fiscal Frameworks MTFF in a nutshell: –A medium-term macro-fiscal forecasts: aggregate level of revenue, expenditure and financing –A comprehensive statement of fiscal policy objectives and targets consistent with macroeconomic stability and fiscal sustainability  Embedded within realistic and internally consistent medium term macroeconomic projections.  Best practice supplements this with transparent assessment of fiscal risks 4

II. Why Medium-Term Fiscal Frameworks? Sets the top-down context for the MTBF Political priorities Reallocation New spending Cyclical position Fiscal multipliers Borrowing and debt sustainability Public or private service provision Level of tax Size of government Sustainability Policy allocations Economic growth 5

III. Why Medium-Term Fiscal Objectives? Part of the overall fiscal framework Medium- term Fiscal Objectives Accounting Principles Medium- Budget Framework Reporting Mechanisms Verification of Compliance Escape Clauses and Sanctions 6

III. Why Medium-Term Fiscal Objectives? Time-inconsistency problem Transparency and market confidence Fiscal policy trade-offs Can help with: Well developed forecasting Broad political commitment Balance between firmness and flexibility But requires: Is consistent with political control over fiscal policy 7

III. Fiscal Objectives and Rules “The Rules Approach” What? Permanent constraint on fiscal policy, typically defined in terms of an indicator of overall fiscal performance Balance, surplus or deficit Expenditure Debt Revenue Why? Create broad ownership and support Institutionalize key fiscal policy priorities How? Irresponsible policies become politically costly Annual budget plans can be benchmarked against a numerical indicator 8

III. Fiscal Objectives and Rules: “The Rules Approach” Balance, surplus or deficit Good for planning … … but more difficult to execute Can be pro-cyclical Golden rule Protects investment … … but does not capture other growth- enhancing expenditure Cyclically adjusted balance Promotes counter-cyclical policy … … but is ambiguous both ex ante and ex post Average over the cycle Allows for both automatic and discretionary stimulus … But cannot be verified until the cycle is closed Non resource balance Can help to delink policy from the volatility of resource revenue… … but can be ambiguous 9

III. Fiscal Objectives and Rules: “The Rules Approach” Expenditure Operational—targets what the government controls Allows counter-cyclical revenue policies … … but requires advanced budgeting, accounting and control Fixed or flexible Fixed ceilings promote discipline … … particularly when they apply to outturn … … but require stable conditions Time horizon Multi-year ceilings create stability and predictability … … but are subjected to more uncertainty Coverage Comprehensive ceilings promote aggregate discipline … … but are subjected to more volatilities Inflation adjustment Real ceilings reduce transparency … … but protects the room for expenditure during varying inflation 10

III. Fiscal Objectives and Rules: “The Rules Approach” Debt Relevant indicator for the medium to long term … … but difficult to operationalize into the budget process Gross or net debt Gross debt is less open to subjective definitions … … and not by asset valuation changes … … but can be reduced by privatization Foreign debt Will typically change in the short term for reasons not related to fiscal policy decisions Central or general government debt General government is a more relevant indicator … … but can fluctuate in the short term if local governments borrow 11

III. Fiscal Objectives and Rules: “The Rules Approach” Choosing an Indicator Ex ante or ex post Annual or ‘over the cycle’ Outturn lag Cyclical adjusted Expenditure, deficit, debt Counter cyclicality Central or local government Exclusion of certain categories Compre- hensive Relevant Time- bound Verifiable 12

III. Fiscal Objectives and Rules: “The Rules Approach” Examples FISCAL INDICATOR COUNTRY TARGET EVALUATION CRITERIA Simple Counter -cyclical Clear Policy Guide Medium- term VerifiableCoverage Expenditure Rule Finland Total Expenditure Ceiling  Overall Balance Mexico Zero Balance   Gross Debt Botswana Debt ceiling of 45% of GDP   Golden Rule Japan Borrowing=Investment    Balance over Cycle United Kingdom Current Balance over Cycle   Structural Balance Chile 1% of GDP Structural Surplus Every Year  Non-oil Balance Timor-Leste Non-oil balance set in line with sustainable income  Debt Brake Switzerland Structural Balance over the Medium-term 

III. Fiscal Objectives and Rules: “The Transparency Approach” What does it mean? The rules approach relies on (permanent) numerical targets The transparency approach relies more on i.Outlining principles for fiscal policymaking, ii.A requirement for the government to set a target for one or more fiscal indicators, iii.Arrangements for reporting performance against those targets … but it’s important to avoid undermining the credibility of the framework by frequent changes –Explicit revision clause in place (e.g. targets to be reassessed every four years to reevaluate long-term price assumptions and variations in oil reserve estimates) Why transparency approach? –Volatility (e.g. resource revenues) –Distance from a steady state 14

III. Fiscal Objectives and Rules: “The Transparency Approach” Examples CountryFiscal PrinciplesStatement ContentsSample Rules/Objectives Australia Charter of Budget Honesty (1998) Keep debt at prudent levels Adequate national savings Moderate cyclical fluctuations Ensure stable tax system Regard to future generations LT fiscal objectives ST fiscal targets Budget priorities Stabilization measures Accounting basis Balance on ave over cycle Surpluses over forecast period No increase in tax burden from levels Improve net worth over M-LT New Zealand Public Finance Act (1989) Keep debt at prudent levels Balance operating budget over reasonable period Maintain adequate net worth Prudently manage fiscal risks Ensure stable tax system LT fiscal objectives ST fiscal intentions S & LT fiscal projections Assessment of consistency w/ principles Operating surplus on ave over cycle Keep net debt below 40% of GDP & reduce to 30% by early 2020s & 20% over the LT Net worth rising by early 2020s United Kingdom Code for Fiscal Stablity (1998) Transparency Stability Responsibility Fairness Efficiency LT fiscal objectives Fiscal rules for Parliament ST econ & fiscal outlook LT fiscal projections Analysis of cyclical impact Golden Rule: Balance the current budget over the cycle Sustainable Investment Rule: Keep debt below 40% of GDP 15

V. Challenges to effective macro- fiscal frameworks: Data 1.Limited data to build tools and reliable forecasts of GDP, inflation, exchange rates: –Sparse historical GDP data needed to build models/tolls and update parameters and forecasts –That much more challenging to produce reliable forecasts for the medium term 16

V. Challenges to effective macro- fiscal frameworks: Skills 2.Limited skills to develop and maintain tools: –Various crisis during the 1980s/1990s/2000s (economic/political/social/health) resulting in erosion of skills –Seniority and coaching of juniors in Ministries of Finance? 17

V. Challenges to effective macro-fiscal frameworks: Uncertainty 3.Highly uncertain external conditions: –Trading partners’ incomes affect demand for exports of goods and services: Commodities, tourism –Volatility in international commodity prices: Both imports (e.g. oil) and exports (e.g. metals – despite the recent boom) –Dependence on other uncertain external revenues Official grants/loans 18

V. Challenges to effective macro-fiscal frameworks: Policy inconsistency Weak strategic decision making leading to deviation in fiscal parameters between budget outlook papers and final budgets 19

VI. Conclusion 1.MTFF a starting point of macro-fiscal planning 2. Fiscal objectives can be expressed in many different ways, but should be: i) transparent; ii) stable; iii) comprehensive; iv) realistic 3. Choice between rules or transparency approaches depends on country specific factors 4. Creating an efficient macro-fiscal framework is challenging but underlying issues can be gradually addressed 20