© Michael Lacewing Mental causation Michael Lacewing

Mental causation Causation requires things to ‘happen’. ‘Things happening’ are events. A cause and its effect are both events, changes at a time (or over time) in the properties of objects. Like picking up the remote control

Substance dualism If the mind is just thought, not in space, and matter is just extension, in space, how could one possibly causally affect the other? Perhaps causation is not ‘ contact ’, but ‘ regular succession ’, e.g. kick me and I will feel pain, and when I feel pain, I cry out. Hume thought that we needed to find a causal law, but it is very difficult to find laws involving mental states and events.

Causal laws If causation requires laws, and we can ’ t find any for mental events, this is a problem for any theory of mind, not just dualism. Materialists might say that mental events are just events in the brain; and there are physical laws involving those.

Picturing the problem  ‘Ow!’  Mental event, e.g. pain = Physical event, e.g. in brain But physical property explains effect

Causal ‘ closure ’ All physical effects have a sufficient physical cause. Nothing physical happens needs a non-physical explanation. –So do mental states have no effects? –Or do their effects always have more than one cause? In materialism, mental causes depend on physical causes, e.g. neurons firing, for their effects; but if those physical causes are enough on their own, why bring in mental causes as well?

Functionalism On any particular occasion, a mental state is realized by a physical state. –Problem: The physical properties of the state are sufficient for its effects (causal closure). Using counterfactuals to prove relevance: –If the headache hadn ’ t hurt, I wouldn ’ t have reached for the aspirin. Actions, i.e. intended movements, can only be explained by mental properties. –If these particular neurons hadn ’ t fired, I would still have reached for the aspirin. It was, but it didn ’ t have to be these neurons, for me to reach for aspirin; but it did have to hurt.

Logical Behaviourism ‘ The mind ’, a ‘ mental state ’, is not a ‘ something ’ that causally interacts with the body. It is a way of talking about complex patterns of behaviour. Psychological explanation is not causal explanation, but explanation in terms of reasons. –Causal explanation uses laws, psychological explanation doesn ’ t.

Reasons are causes Davidson: I can have two reasons to do something, but only act on one of them. To act on a reason is for the reason to be the cause of the action. Jane hasn’t invited me to her party. I could go anyway, just to show her. But Steve, my ex, will be there. I won’t go.

Token identity and counterfactuals If the headache hadn’t hurt, I wouldn’t have reached for the aspirin. If the pain was irrelevant, then if the neurones had fired, but the headache hadn’t hurt, I would still have reached for the aspirin. This sounds wrong. how could they have fired without the headache hurting? But if the physical properties necessitate the mental ones, why not just say that the neurones firing are responsible for both the headache hurting and my reaching for the aspirin?

Counterfactuals The neurones firing is sufficient for me to reach for the aspirin only given the presence of a headache. If these particular neurons hadn’t fired, I would still have reached for the aspirin, if I had a headache - for me to have a headache, some other neurones would have fired It was, but it didn’t have to be these neurons, for me to reach for aspirin; but it did have to hurt.