Consciousness and biological naturalism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk © Michael Lacewing

Searle on consciousness Creature consciousness: some organisms are conscious, some aren’t State consciousness: conscious creatures have conscious mental states, in which the creature is conscious of something Consciousness as a ‘field’, states as ‘flux’ in the field

A functional account Searle must say what creature consciousness is. An alternative is this: A creature is conscious if it has conscious mental states. A mental state is conscious just in case it has certain other (causal-functional) relations to other states and behaviour. But functionalism faces the objection from qualia.

The ‘first-personal’ nature of consciousness Searle: the phenomena and reality of consciousness is irreducibly ‘first-personal’, known from the ‘inside’ Conscious states are only available (as conscious) to the person whose states they are Functional analysis is ‘third-personal’, from the ‘outside’, which is why it misses the subjective perspective

Biological naturalism Consciousness is a biological property, a ‘systemic’ property of the (working) brain Systemic properties are properties of a whole system not possessed by its parts, e.g. liquidity, transparency In these two cases, we can explain the systemic property in terms of molecular arrangements

Biological naturalism Neurones aren’t conscious, but some brain processes, as a whole, are conscious Consciousness is caused by neuronal processes So consciousness is a natural, biological property

Objection We can give scientific questions of why liquids are liquid, why glass is transparent But the first-personal nature of consciousness prevents us giving a scientific (third-personal) explanation; so consciousness is not a physical property (an argument for property dualism)

Searle on reduction With the molecular explanation of liquidity, we redefine liquidity as a particular arrangement of molecules (ontological reduction) We could do the same with consciousness, but we don’t, because it would miss out the first-personal aspect of consciousness But this doesn’t show consciousness isn’t physical - we have already explained that it is a systemic property of the brain The unwillingness to reduce is pragmatic, not metaphysical

When are two things really one thing? With liquidity, the explanation also shows why, given how molecules interact, the substance must be liquid; so we can’t think of the two as separate Nagel: we can’t imagine an explanation that would show why neuronal activity has to produce consciousness; so it is natural to suppose that consciousness is something more than just neuronal activity

Searle’s response Neuroscience might yet produce such an explanation But how can any third-personal explanation account for first-personal phenomena? Scientific theories don’t always show why something must be the case, e.g. e=mc2

Naturalism? Is Searle a property dualist? He says ‘no’ But if consciousness is irreducibly first-personal, then if it is a biological property, it is unique, not like any other biological property