Dan Boneh Authenticated Encryption Chosen ciphertext attacks Online Cryptography Course Dan Boneh.

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Presentation transcript:

Dan Boneh Authenticated Encryption Chosen ciphertext attacks Online Cryptography Course Dan Boneh

Dan Boneh Example chosen ciphertext attacks Adversary has ciphertext c that it wants to decrypt Often, adv. can fool server into decrypting certain ciphertexts (not c) Often, adversary can learn partial information about plaintext dest = 25 data data TCP/IP packet ACK if valid checksum

Dan Boneh Chosen ciphertext security Adversary’s power: both CPA and CCA Can obtain the encryption of arbitrary messages of his choice Can decrypt any ciphertext of his choice, other than challenge (conservative modeling of real life) Adversary’s goal: Break sematic security

Dan Boneh Chosen ciphertext security: definition E = (E,D) cipher defined over (K,M,C). For b=0,1 define EXP(b): Chal. b Adv. kKkK b’  {0,1} m i,0, m i,1  M : |m i,0 | = |m i,1 | c i  E(k, m i,b ) for i=1,…,q: (1) CPA query: (2) CCA query: c i  C : c i ∉ {c 1, …, c i-1 } m i  D(k, c i )

Dan Boneh Chosen ciphertext security: definition E is CCA secure if for all “efficient” A: Adv CCA [A, E ] = | Pr[EXP(0)=1] – Pr[EXP(1)=1] | is “negligible.” Example: CBC with rand. IV is not CCA-secure Chal. b Adv. kKkK m 0, m 1 : |m 0 | = |m 1 |=1 c  E(k, m b ) = (IV, c[0]) c’ = (IV1, c[0]) D(k, c’ ) = m b 1 b

Dan Boneh Authenticated enc. ⇒ CCA security Thm:Let (E,D) be a cipher that provides AE. Then (E,D) is CCA secure ! In particular, for any q-query eff. A there exist eff. B 1, B 2 s.t. Adv CCA [A,E] ≤ 2q ⋅ Adv CI [B 1,E] + Adv CPA [B 2,E]

Dan Boneh Proof by pictures Chal.Adv. kKkK CPA query: m i,0, m i,1 CCA query: c i c i =E(k,m i, 0 ) D(k,c i ) Chal.Adv. kKkK CPA query: m i,0, m i,1 CCA query: c i c i =E(k,m i, 1 ) D(k,c i ) CPA query: m i,0, m i,1 Chal.Adv. kKkK c i =E(k,m i, 0 ) Chal.Adv. kKkK CPA query: m i,0, m i,1 c i =E(k,m i, 1 ) ⊥ CCA query: c i ⊥ ≈p≈p ≈p≈p ≈p≈p ≈p≈p

Dan Boneh So what? Authenticated encryption: ensures confidentiality against an active adversary that can decrypt some ciphertexts Limitations: does not prevent replay attacks does not account for side channels (timing)

Dan Boneh End of Segment