© 2014 UZH, chkroute – A tool for route compliance analyisis Daniel Dönni 1 1 Department of Informatics IFI, Communication Systems Group CSG, University of Zürich UZH Zürich, ZH, November 18, 2014

© 2014 UZH, Introduction  The Snowden affair revealed that a significant amount of Internet traffic was being intercepted by intelligence agencies  One possible countermeasure suggested by European politicians was to introduce ‘Schengen Routing’.  ‘Schengen Routing’ refers to the idea of ensuring that traffic exchanged between two hosts located in the Schengen zone does not leave the zone.

© 2014 UZH, Introduction II  Research trying to quantify the amount of traffic that leaves the Schengen area is limited.  According to [1], the number of routes amounts to 0% - 35%.  A tool which allows the end-user to verify whether a route leaves the Schengen zone does not exist yet.  chkroute is the first tool specifically designed for Schengen routing compliance checking.

© 2014 UZH, Related Work  The only work which specifically addresses Schengen routing is [1]. It suggests that –0% (Iceland) - 35% (Belgium) of routes headed for Schengen leave the zone. –Switzerland ranks 3 rd (23%) among all Schengen countries. –The work is based on BGP tables and Maxmind data [5]  Relevant topics with respect to Schengen routing are –Network topology discovery –Geolocation of IP addresses

© 2014 UZH, Related Work II (Topology Discovery)  Network topology discovery –Layer 2: Physical Connectivity, e.g. Ethernet [2], [4] –Layer 3: Can be subdivided into 4 areas [3] 1. IP Interface Level 2. Router Level (after alias resolution) 3. PoP Level (Groups PoPs) 4. AS Level (Groups ASs) –Layer 3+: Overlay networks, e.g. P2P [3]  Broad range of research available –Practical: Development of tools –Theoretical: Mathematical models

© 2014 UZH, Related Work II (Geolocation)  Geolocation –Mechanisms that try to find the geographic location of an IP address. –There are two main approaches [6] Active: Latency driven Passive: Database driven –A major problem: Accuracy of the data Less than 20% are within 10km of actual position [6] 80% deviate between 100km – 1000km [6] Substantial improvements using the location of University campus locations (Median deviation: 690m) [7]

© 2014 UZH, chkroute Demo  chkroute is a tool developed to verify routing compliance  Brace for demo…

© 2014 UZH, chkroute Architecture

© 2014 UZH, chkroute Process I 1 1. Running traceroute towards target server

© 2014 UZH, chkroute Process II 2 2. Running query against compliance DB

© 2014 UZH, chkroute Process III 3 3. Evaluating result

© 2014 UZH, Selected Issues  Definition of the location of Schengen –Possibility 1 “An IP address is considered to be in Schengen, if the host owning the respective NIC is geographically located in Schengen.“ Problem: What if packets are forwarded by a backbone provider which has PoPs in Schengen but is operated outside Schengen? –Possibility 2 “An IP address is considered to be in Schengen, if the host owning the respective NIC is owned by a company headquartered in Schengen. Problem: Is there reliable corporate information available? Problem 2: What if a large backbone provider has a subsidiary in Schengen. Should it count as a Schengen company?

© 2014 UZH, Questions  Questions?

© 2014 UZH, References [1] N. Pohlmann, Secure Communication and Digital Sovereignty in Europe, ISSE 2014 Securing Electronic Business Processes, 2014 [3] B. Donnet et al., “Internet Topology Discovery: A Survey”, IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 4th Quarter 2007 [4] Y. Breitbart et al., “Topology Discovery in Heterogeneous IP Networks,” Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, Mar [5] Maxmind, dat.gz. Last access: [6] I. Poese, IP Geolocation Databases: Unreliable?, ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, Volume 41, Number 2, April 2011 [7] Y. Wang, Towards Street-Level Client-Independent IP Geolocation, Usenix, 2011