Domain Name System | DNSSEC. 2  Internet Protocol address uniquely identifies laptops or phones or other devices  The Domain Name System matches IP.

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Presentation transcript:

Domain Name System | DNSSEC

2  Internet Protocol address uniquely identifies laptops or phones or other devices  The Domain Name System matches IP addresses with a name  IP routing and DNS are the underpinning of unified Internet The World’s Network – the Domain Name System

3 A sample DNS query Where is

4  A computer sends a question to a DNS server, like “where is IANA.org?”  It receives an answer and assumes that it is correct.  There are multiple ways that traffic on the Internet can be intercepted and modified, so that the answer given is false. Making the DNS Secure

5 Receiving the Wrong Answer Where is

Poisoning a Cache  Attacker knows iterative resolvers may cache  Attacker  Composes a DNS response with malicious data about a targeted domain  Tricks a resolver into adding this malicious data to its local cache  Later queries processed by server will return malicious data for the life of the cached entry  Example: user at My Mac clicks on a URL in an message from What is the IPv4 address for loseweightfastnow.com? My Mac My local resolver ecrime name server loseweightfastnow.com IPv4 address is ALSO is at I’ll cache this response… and update 6

7  Protects DNS data against forgery  Uses public key cryptography to sign authoritative zone data  Assures that the data origin is authentic  Assures that the data are what the authenticated data originator published  Trust model also uses public key cryptography  Parent zones sign public keys of child zone (root signs TLDs, TLDs sign registered domains… DNS Security (DNSSEC) 7

8 Authority signs zone data with private key Authorities must keep private keys secret! Public Key Cryptography in DNSSEC 8 DNS Data Signed DNS Data + Digital signatures Signed DNS Data + Digital signatures Publish Sign with Private key Authoritative server

9 Authority publishes public key so that any recipient can decrypt to verify that “the data are correct and came from the right place” Public Key Cryptography in DNSSEC 9 Authoritative server Signed Zone Data Validating recursive server Validate with Public key

10  Manages root key with VeriSign and trusted international representatives of Internet community  Processes requests for changes of public key and other records from registries at top of DNS  Educates and assists Internet community with DNSSEC  Implements DNSSEC on its own domains ICANN’s Role in DNSSEC Deployment

11  Browser and/or Operating System support  DNSSEC support from domain name registration service providers (registrars, resellers)  Misconceptions regarding key management, performance, software/hardware availability and reliability Obstacles to Broader DNSSEC Adoption

12 Fast pace of deployment at the TLD level Deployed at root Supported by software Growing support by ISPs Required by new gTLDs  Inevitable widespread deployment across core Internet infrastructure DNSSEC Deployment

Thank You & Questions?