After the Catastrophe: IP Network Availability and Resiliency In The Post-Disaster Environment. Rakesh Bharania Network Consulting Engineer Cisco Tactical Operations

© 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 2 Agenda – After the Catastrophe  The Need for Information In A Post-Disaster Environment  Questioning Assumptions  The role of Cisco in the Infrastructure picture  Examples: 1. September 11, 2001 attacks Japan Earthquake and Tsunami San Bruno, CA gas pipeline explosion

© 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 3 The Fundamental Problem… Public Safety 33 In complex disasters with multiple response organizations … How to deliver the right information in the right format to the right person at the right time? Defense National, State & Local Government Healthcare Critical Infrastructure Transportation NGO / International Orgs

© 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 4 Changing Technologies Affect Mission Success  Radio, Phone Integrated Mobile/Fixed  Single DeviceAny Device  Voice only Voice, Video, Data  Closed Teams Open Collaboration  Command&Control CentricIn the field, social media, public  Fixed LocationsDeployable anywhere Goal: Mission workflow and productivity benefits that save lives and speed recovery. Evolution in People, Process and Technologies to support Disaster and Humanitarian relief

© 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 5 Mythbusting  Assumption: “When a disaster happens, telecommunications will go down.”  Reality: Not always. About 60% of Haiti telecom stayed operational after quake. Other examples: Chile Quake, Japan.  Assumption: “I have a cellphone, an ordinary telephone line, a PBX (etc). Why should I care about the IP network?”  Reality: Everything is IP now –and has been for some time.  Assumption: “The Internet is an optional luxury for public safety.”  Reality: Not anymore – just as critical as radio communications. Haiti was a data- driven response.

© 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 6 Cisco’s Role in IP Resiliency  As a vendor, Cisco doesn’t have direct responsibility for the health of the national telecommunications infrastructure (owned by the Service Providers such as AT&T, Verizon, etc.)  But our products constitute a large part of the national communications infrastructure, We have an obligation to produce secure, reliable products and to assist where appropriate with our expertise.  We participate in the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (DHS) – - ongoing public/private coordination for tech companies, service providers, Federal gov. agencies.  Cisco has aggressive customer support available for crisis situations: CAP, Cisco Tactical Operations, etc.

© 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 7 September 11, 2001  Infrastructure to note: WTC 1/2: below-ground fiber from transatlantic cables & Telehouse and 60 Hudson St. 60 Hudson St: termination point to many transatlantic cables NYIIX at 25 Broadway Telehouse: peering site for 40 ISPs from NY, Europe South America and South Africa.  WTC 2 collapse severed fiber between 60 Hudson and 25 Broadway  Reachability disruption to <1000 BGP prefixes (less than 1% of advertised prefixes globally)  No global Internet routing instability occurred (But there was with Nimda worm on 9/18/2011)  Global Internet routing continued normally.

© 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 8 Location of Critical Internet Infra on 9/11/2001

© 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency Japan Quake and Tsunami  M9.0 quake/tsunami on March 11, 2011 Internet impact: Both IIJ redundant backbone fiber links Tokyo/Sendai were severed. 20% of Japan’s total traffic dropped immediately due to outages. 3 of 8 fiber links failed to USA, but good links remained available. Japanese ISPs: “outside of immediately affected areas, no region was disconnected from Japan or the world.” Internet was used heavily by the Japanese public for streaming video, social media, etc.  Rapid recovery from the event: One of the major Tokyo/Sendai fibers restored by March 12 All three trans-Pacific fibers restored by T+28 hrs ISPs reported 85-90% normal traffic T+10 days after quake  Were we lucky? Most of Japan’s core Internet infrastructure was outside of the affected region.

© 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 10 Example: SINET4  Japan’s Science and Information Network (SINET4) links 700 universities, colleges, and national laboratories.  While there was some network disruption (Sendai), restoration was rapid. Network continued to work normally outside of immediate area and was used for emergency information use (heavy ustream traffic, etc)

© 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 11 San Bruno CA Explosion  Local communications disruption to cellphones, mobile data services immediately around the affected neighborhood.  Cisco TacOps mutual aid request via NCRIC in support of San Mateo County OES.  Provided communications support to Incident Command Post.  GIS support through Google disaster response team for NTSB.  Extensive After Action: “San Bruno Fire Technical Debrief” from CMU-SV DMI

© 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 12 Conclusion  Internet infrastructure in developed countries is highly resilient to disasters at a macro scale – redundant links + dynamic routing.  Local disruptions are possible – prepare redundancy into your organization.  Recent Internet history in disaster demonstrates it is reliable and indispensable in a crisis.

13 © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco PublicABAG – IP Resiliency 13 Questions?