Intervention, Engagement, Confrontation Cold War Strategies Intervention, Engagement, Confrontation

What Never Changed Goals: 1. Containment of USSR 2. Avoiding Nuclear War The Dilemma: How do you contain the USSR without risking a nuclear war?

What Did Change Strategies Intervention (Korea and Vietnam) Containment by direct political-military involvement Engagement (Détente) Containment by management of Soviet behavior Confrontation (Reagan Doctrine) Containment by challenging the Soviets

The Dynamic Intervention was the logic of containment in action Was engagement the result of the failures of intervention? Was confrontation the result of the failures of engagement?

1. Intervention How do you fight communism and avoid nuclear war? 5

Korean War 1950-53 Limited War Goals Weapons Geography Talk and Fight 6

Viet Nam (after 1954) 7

Strategic Logic Domino Theory 8

Containment and Domestic Politics JFK LBJ 9

The Dilemma of Viet Nam Can’t lose South Viet Nam Can’t do what we need to win Insurgency vs. counterinsurgency WW III? Solution Limited War Coercive Diplomacy (Bombing) 10

From LBJ to Nixon 1968-69 Nixon’s War LBJ says Goodbye More bombing Withdrawing 11

Post-Vietnam Changes Congressional Power Foreign Policy Consensus Vietnam Syndrome

1. Congress Challenges President in Foreign Policy War Powers Resolution 1973 (PL 93-148) (from Federation of American Scientists , see Appendix 3) The Use of Force

Congress finds its real power: $$$$$$$$$$ Clark Amendment to Arms Export Control Act 1976 14

2. End of US Foreign Policy Consensus? Truman Doctrine: Consensus L R Post-Viet Nam: Polarization 15

3. Viet Nam Syndrome http://www.mbc.edu/faculty/gbowen/PublicOpinionVietWar.htm 16

The Post-Vietnam Dilemma 2. Engagement The Post-Vietnam Dilemma How do you contain and compete with the USSR while avoiding nuclear war and avoiding another Korea or Vietnam?

Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 18

Nixon and Henry Kissinger 19

Why Détente? Viet Nam Syndrome Strategic parity Sino-Soviet Split 20

Viet Nam Syndrome Nixon recognizes this: Nixon Doctrine Remarks July 25, 1969 (see Q and A) Address to the nation, Nov. 3, 1969 21

Strategic Parity 22

Sino-Soviet Conflict

Detente Still containment New Goal: Change USSR behavior Old-school Balance of Power 24

Arms Control Policy Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, May 1972 Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 25

2. Triangular Diplomacy US USSR PRC 26

Kissinger to China, July 1971 27

Nixon-Mao Summit in China, February 1972 Shanghai Communique 28

China and Taiwan 29

Détente Collapses: Ford and Carter

SALT II 31

1979-1981 Crises Détente Collapse Iran Afghanistan

Iranian Revolution Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini Shah of Iran Mohammed Reza Pahlevi Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 33

November 4, 1979 34

December 1979

“Arc of Crisis” 36

Détente Ends Carter Gets Tough SALT II Dies Defense Buildup Carter Doctrine Rescue Mission Secretary of State Cyrus Vance resigns 37

Rescue Mission April 1980 38

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3. Confrontation The dilemma of containing the USSR, avoiding nuclear war, avoiding direct US intervention, but pressuring the USSR

Ronald Reagan

Reagan’s View of the USSR “Evil Empire” Speech to the National Association of Evangelicals March 10, 1983

Realist Secretaries of State Alexander Haig 1981-1982 George Shultz 1982-1989

The Problems Third Wave of Marxism Viet Nam Syndrome Decade of Neglect

1. Third Wave of Marxism Ethiopia 1974 Cambodia 1975 Vietnam 1975 Angola 1975 Mozambique 1975 Afghanistan 1979 Nicaragua 1979 Grenada 1979

Solution to Third Wave: Reagan Doctrine Nicaragua Contras

Contras

Afghanistan Mujahadin

Angola UNITA’s Jonas Savimbi

1980s Map of the Cold War http://imgur.com/Ah9tS

2. Viet Nam Syndrome Fall of Saigon, April 29, 1975

Solution to Viet Nam Syndrome: Use Force Libya 1981

Grenada 1983

Beirut 1983

3. Decade of Neglect From: ARMING AMERICA: Attention and Inertia in U.S. National Security Spending http://dept.lamar.edu/polisci/TRUE/True_art_tlp.html

Soviet ICBMs 1980s-90s From, US Dept of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1987: http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/smp_87_ch2.htm

Solution to Decade of Neglect Source: Center for Defense Information 2004 Yearbook (http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~jephrean/classweb/United%20States.html)

Strategic Defense Initiative Reagan’s SDI speech, March 23, 1983 From: http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/spacecom/sdi.gif

Political/Cultural Effects

When Reagan and Congress Disagree? Nicaragua: Boland Amendment restricts aid to Contras (1984) Administration funds them covertly Iran: Legislation prohibiting US arms sales to Iran Sells weapons to Iran in exchange for hostages held by Hezbollah-related groups

Big Picture Issue Congress has the power to restrict US government spending Can the President ignore those restrictions? Can President ignore aspects of law President does not agree with? If so, does Congress have any role to shape foreign policy? If so, do we have checks and balances?

The Iran Contra Scandal (for reference only) Private US $ Foreign Gov’t $ $$$ Hostages weapons Swiss bank accounts; controlled by North Iran US Israel

Key Phrase of 2nd Boland Amendment: (1984-1986) ( for reference only) ''No funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement or individual.” From: NY TIMES on line: http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/16/world/iran-contra-hearings-text-of-key-amendment.html?pagewanted=1; For Excerpts and explanation, from US Government Accountability Office – GAO, http://redbook.gao.gov/14/fl0067296.php

Legislative Limits on Arms Sales (for reference only) Arms Export Control Acts No arms sales to nations determined to be sponsors of terrorism (US State Dept determines which nations fit into this category; it included Iran) No arms sales of over $25 m in value without congressional approval (1974); A 1976 bill lowered this to $14 m for sophisticated weaponry and $50 m for other items Both the House and Senate would have to reject the arms sales