Nuclearsafety.gc.ca Development and Implementation of Regulatory Requirements for the Security of Radioactive Sources A Canadian perspective Karen Mayer,

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Presentation transcript:

nuclearsafety.gc.ca Development and Implementation of Regulatory Requirements for the Security of Radioactive Sources A Canadian perspective Karen Mayer, B.Sc. Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Edocs #

2 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission The Canadian Context Canada is one of the world’s largest suppliers of radioactive sealed sources used in various beneficial applications globally Domestically ~ 261 category 1 and 2 high risk radioactive source licensees in Canada Regulator: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC)

3 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Radioactive Source Security: Canadian Practices Effective national legislative framework Independent national regulatory body Regulatory system for authorizations National Sealed Source Registry and Sealed Source Tracking System for high-risk sources Effective import/export controls Enhanced regulatory oversight program for orphan sources Adequately trained and qualified competent authorities NEW: security measures and guidance for high-risk sources

4 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Effective Implementation of Security Measures: Challenges  Responsibility functions  Potential for duplication  Cost  Public access - hospitals and universities  Remote locations  Safety and security interface  Sustainability

5 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Development Process for Security Measures 1.Benchmarking with other Canadian regulators 2.Benchmarking with other countries 3.Review of IAEA recommendations and guidance documents 4.Internal CNSC review 5.Security awareness to inspectors and stakeholders 6.Public consultation - Outreach 7.Presentation to the Commission and approval

6 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Effective Implementation of Security Measures: What Works  Stakeholder engagement (public and industry)  Performance-based compliance activities  Cost-effective solutions  Security culture development through awareness promotion, training and guidance  International coordination

7 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Implementation (on going) Publications in both French and English Media release and public notice Outreach activities with inspectors and stakeholders Security awareness during annual workshops

8 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Next Steps in Implementation of Security Measures for Sources  Work closely with licensees (Industry)  Implementation Strategy – Licence Condition - Timing  Sharing of Best practices (domestically and internationally)

9 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

10 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Holistic approach to radioactive source security

11 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Sealed Source Registration and Tracking National Sealed Source Registry (Category 1 to 5) Tracking high risk sources with Sealed Source Tracking System (Category 1 and 2) Licensee inventory control and verification by CNSC inspectors and licensing staff

12 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Regaining Regulatory Control of Lost, Stolen and Orphan Sources The CNSC has enhanced its regulatory oversight program for the safe and secure handling of orphan sources The program includes: –Promotion & Communication –Prevention –Response and Recovery

13 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Regaining Regulatory Control of Lost, Stolen and Orphan Sources Outreach to metal recycling facilities and steel producers Improved communication (e.g. poster & pamphlets) directed at users of portal monitors To make stakeholders more aware of potential events that they may encounter

14 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Import and Export of Radioactive Sources Establishing effective import and export controls is the first line of defense in ensuring that only authorized recipients receive radioactive sources Requires coordination and cooperation between the importing and exporting states

15 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Import and Export of Radioactive Sources To further ensure that imports and exports of radioactive sources are conducted in a manner consistent with the Code and Guidance, the CNSC continues to establish bilateral arrangements with its foreign regulatory counterparts To date, the CNSC has established 12 such arrangements Arrangements further contribute to ensure that the export and import of radioactive sources are done safely and securely

16 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Incident and Trafficking Database Canada has agreed to participate in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) The ITDB system reposits information on incidents involving illicit trafficking and other related unauthorized activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials The Nuclear Security Division of the CNSC is the designated point-of-contact (POC) for the ITDB for Canada.

17 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Emergency Response & Training Training emergency first responders Conducting and evaluating joint drills and exercises Providing support, guidance and expertise in emergency management Hosted “RADEX 2012” with the GICNT

18 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Detection illicit Trafficking Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) Radiation detection equipment adds another layer of security at marine ports to screen containers Customs and border agents are vital in the detection of smuggled nuclear material

19 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Questions Karen Mayer