SISTEMA Example Two. Schneider Electric – Areva D Acquisition – June 2010 2 Example 2: Safe stopping of a PLC-driven drive with emergency stop – Category.

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Presentation transcript:

SISTEMA Example Two

Schneider Electric – Areva D Acquisition – June Example 2: Safe stopping of a PLC-driven drive with emergency stop – Category 3 – PL c Circuit Diagram

Schneider Electric – Areva D Acquisition – June Example 2: Safe stopping of a PLC-driven drive with emergency stop – Category 3 – PL c Safety function ● Safety-related stop function/emergency stop function: following a stop or emergency stop command, the drive is halted (SS1 – safe stop 1). Functional Description ●The hazardous movement is interrupted redundantly if either the stop button S1 or one of the emergency stop devices S3 or S4 is actuated. The drive is halted in an emergency following actuation of S3/S4, resulting in deactivation of the safety-related emergency stop control device K4 and de-energization of the contactor relays K1 and K2. Opening of the make contact K1 on input I4 of the PLC K5 causes the starting signal on the frequency inverter (FI) T1 to be cancelled via the PLC output O2. Redundantly to the K1- K5-T1 chain, opening of the make contact K2 upstream of the contactor relay K3 (with drop-out delay) initiates a braking timer.

Schneider Electric – Areva D Acquisition – June Example 2: Safe stopping of a PLC-driven drive with emergency stop – Category 3 – PL c Functional Description Cont. ●Upon timeout of the braking timer the actuating signal for the mains contactor Q1 is interrupted. The timer setting is selected such that under unfavorable operating conditions, the machine movement is halted before the mains contactor Q1 has dropped out. ●Functional stopping of the drive following a stop command is caused by the opening of the two break contacts of the stop button S1. As with stopping in an emergency, the status is first queried by PLC K5, in this case via input I0, and the FI is shut down by resetting of the PLC output O2. Redundantly to this process, the contactor relay K3 is de-energized – with drop-out delay provided by the capacitor C1 and following timeout of the set braking time, the activation signal to mains contactor Q1 is interrupted.

Schneider Electric – Areva D Acquisition – June Example 2: Safe stopping of a PLC-driven drive with emergency stop – Category 3 – PL c Functional Description Cont. ●In the event of failure of the PLC K5, the frequency inverter T1, the mains contactor Q1, the contactor relays K1/K2 or the contactor relay with drop-out delay K3, stopping of the drive is assured since two mutually independent de-energization paths are always present. Failure of the contactor relays K1 and K2 to drop out is detected, at the latest, following resetting of the actuated emergency stop device. This is achieved by monitoring of the mechanically linked break contacts within the safety-related emergency stop control device K4. Failure of the auxiliary contactor K3 to drop out is detected, at the latest, before renewed start-up of the machine movement through feedback of the mechanically linked break contact to the PLC input I3. Failure of the mains contactor Q1 to drop out is detected by the mirror contact read in on PLC input I3.

Schneider Electric – Areva D Acquisition – June Example 2: Safe stopping of a PLC-driven drive with emergency stop – Category 3 – PL c Design Features ● Basic and well-tried safety principles are observed and the requirements of Category B are met. Protective circuits (e.g. contact protection) as described in the initial paragraphs of Chapter 8 are implemented. ●The contactor relays K1, K2 and K3 possess mechanically linked contact elements in accordance with IEC , Annex L. ●The contacts of the pushbuttons S1, S3 and S4 are mechanically linked in accordance with IEC , Annex K. ●The contactor Q1 possesses a mirror contact according to IEC , Annex F. ●The standard components K5 and T1 are employed in accordance with the instructions in Section

Schneider Electric – Areva D Acquisition – June Example 2: Safe stopping of a PLC-driven drive with emergency stop – Category 3 – PL c Design Features Cont. ●The software (SRASW) is programmed in accordance with the requirements for PL b (downgraded owing to diversity) and the instructions in Section 6.3. ●The delayed initiation of the stopping by the second de-energization path alone in the event of a fault must not involve an unacceptably high residual risk. ● The safety-related control part of the safety-related emergency stop control device K4 satisfies all requirements for Category 3 and PL d.