Status Update for Algorithm Transition for the RPKI (draft-ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility) Steve Kent Roque Gagliano Sean Turner.

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Presentation transcript:

Status Update for Algorithm Transition for the RPKI (draft-ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility) Steve Kent Roque Gagliano Sean Turner

Algorithm Transition Document SIDR agreed to adopt this as a WG item, and a new version appeared in late February Target is a standards track RFC from SIDR The document describes – What CAs have to do to effect algorithm transition – What RPs can expect during algorithm transition – How transition interacts with repository structure – How algorithm transition and key rollover interact 2

Changes from the Individual Submission Adopted top-down transition model The document now describes – Multi-algorithm support in the provisioning protocol – Dealing with multiple instances of signed products – Use of independent publication points – Key rollover is independent per algorithm suite – Parallel certificates MUST be revoked together Added Security Considerations & Acknowledgements sections 3

Terminology Algorithm A - the current signature and hash algorithm suite Algorithm B - the next signature and hash algorithm suite 4

CA & RP Transition Phases 5 Algorithm Document & CP update CA B Ready CA B Go A Twilight A EOL RP B Ready Phase 0Phase 1Phase 2Phase 3Phase 0Phase 4

Algorithm Transition Milestones (1/2) Steady state (using algorithm A) Update algorithm specification and CP CA Algorithm B Ready – all CAs are ready to process a certificate request for a certificate containing an Algorithm B key, signed under Algorithm B CA Algorithm B Go – all CAs reissue all signed products under Algorithm B (and continue issuing under Algorithm A) 6

Algorithm Transition Milestones (2/2) RP Ready Algorithm B – all RPs are ready to process signed products using Algorithm B Twilight Algorithm A – CAs MAY stop issuing signed products using Algorithm A, and RPs MAY cease validating signed products under Algorithm A EOL Algorithm A – CAs no longer issue signed products using Algorithm A, and RPs reject any signed product under Algorithm A 7

A A B B A A B B CA X CA Y A A CA Z B B If each CA issues certificates that use the same algorithm for certificate signing and for the key in the certificate, then directory growth is at most 2X. Top-down Transition Model CA X’s parent has to issue an Algorithm B certificate to CA X before that CA can issue an Algorithm B certificate to CA Y

Repository Management The transition process requires CAs to publish signed products under both algorithms During “CA Algorithm B Ready” there may be only a few products (CA certificates) under Algorithm B, so the duplication is not complete By “CA Algorithm B Go” a full, duplicate product set exists, 2X repository size Using separate publication points makes life simpler 9

Relying Parties This design provides RPs with signed products under the current and new algorithms for a while, because we assume that it will take a while for ALL RPs to be able to make the transition This imposes a burden on CAs to maintain parallel signed product sets from “CA Algorithm B Go” until “Algorithm A Twilight” If an RP fetches both product sets, and either set is OK, then that’s good enough! 10

Observations This is still a new document, and thus needs review and comments from the WG It is only a 25 page document, but the process is complex, so it calls for careful reading We have had almost no comments from the broad WG population so far Please read and provide feedback! 11