Industry Session – Mixed Criticality and Multi-Core David Corman Program Director, Cyber Physical Systems National Science Foundation 1.

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Presentation transcript:

Industry Session – Mixed Criticality and Multi-Core David Corman Program Director, Cyber Physical Systems National Science Foundation 1

Outline Need and terms of reference Progress Remaining

What do we mean by Criticality Criticality (Aerospace)– assurance against failure. Frequently refer to levels from DO-178B – Level A – catastrophic. Failure may cause crash. Loss of critical function required to safely fly and land – Level B – hazardous. Negative impact on safety or performance, reduced ability to operate aircraft, safety significant – Level C – major. Failure is significant but lesser impact than B. May lead to passenger discomfort rather than injuries, increased workload – Level D – minor. Failure noticable, but lesser impact. Inconvenience vs distress. – Level E –Failure has no impact on safety, operation, or workload Similar issues in automotive (Automotive Safety and Integrity Levels)

Mixed Critical Systems Definition Two or more levels of criticality on same system Mixed criticality systems - a mixed-critical system is an integrated suite of hardware, operating system and middleware services and application software that supports the execution of safety-critical, mission-critical, and non-critical software within a single, secure compute platform – Ref: Joint white paper from Boeing, LM, Honeywell, AFRL, and Northrop from 2009 CPS Week

Criticality Levels – Focus on UAS Flight Critical Required to prevent ~  Unintended loss of life.  Unintended reduction of public safety.  Substantial damage to the vehicle or its support structure.  Loss of vehicle  Unintended event (e.g., crash) into politically sensitive area Mission Critical Required to prevent ~  Unintended loss of the vehicle’s function (mission sensors or other effectors).  Unintended loss of support structure function (e.g., ability of operator to use on-board UAV sensors). Maintenance Critical Required to prevent ~  Inefficient use of the vehicle’s resources.  Inefficient use of ground support structure. Red: Boeing Presentation at S5 – June 2011

Aerospace Motivation Today most platforms incorporate subsystems with separate levels of criticality Would like to evolve to more integrated platforms / systems that can be developed, meet stringent requirements for cost, SWAP, and be certified airworthy as rapidly as possible – Reduced number of processors and you reduce the weight, power required, heat generated, and cost to build, but – Increase risk in development, verification, validation, and certification

Some Initial Thoughts – From AFRL Safe & Secure Systems & Software Symposium (S5)

Roadmap from MCAR Whitepaper Not quite but some progress More challenges with Multi-core

Progress Much research progress on CPS with single processors -- great reference “Mixed Criticality Systems – A Review”, Burns and Davis, Dept of Computer Science, University of York, York, UK –WCET analysis –Scheduling models Fixed priority scheduling Maximize priority of high critical tasks subject to system being schedulable Slack Scheduling approaches – low criticality jobs are run in slack created by high criticality jobs using only low criticality execution budgets Some progress on multi-core but doesn’t seem to have been a research focus over last several years –Multi-core activity in CPS has been largely in the application side –Looking at utilization supporting multiple lower criticality applications including auto infotainment –Some activity in dynamic scheduling for automotive sensor fusion 9

Future CPS program typically includes panels dealing with platforms and infrastructures and safety / verification –Both provide logical areas for mixed criticality research at foundational level –Potentially impactful area of research with TTP option Important to check what has been previously funded in CPS, CSR, and CCF core programs.