An Empirical Study of Vulnerability Rewards Programs Matthew Finifter, Devdatta Akhawe, David Wagner UC Berkeley.

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Presentation transcript:

An Empirical Study of Vulnerability Rewards Programs Matthew Finifter, Devdatta Akhawe, David Wagner UC Berkeley

security development lifecycle

Vulnerability Remediation Defense in Depth Operational Security Incident Response A vulnerability remediation strategy is any systematic approach whose goal is to reduce the number of software vulnerabilities. CERT Code Reviews Penetration Testing Dynamic/Static Analysis Tools Bug Bounties?

Copyright Adam Mein and Chris Evans, Google Inc.

There is an active debate over the value and effectiveness of VRPs. A number of vendors, notably Microsoft, Adobe, and Oracle, do not maintain a VRP, with Microsoft arguing that VRPs do not represent the best return on investment on a per-bug basis -- Our paper

There is an active debate over the value and effectiveness of VRPs. A number of vendors, notably Microsoft, Adobe, and Oracle, do not maintain a VRP, with Microsoft arguing that VRPs do not represent the best return on investment on a per-bug basis

today Analysis of Chrome & Firefox VRPs From 2 viewpoints – Software Vendor – Security Researchers Other analysis of the data Lots of hypotheses – We can’t do experiments!

Firefox VRP Started in 1995 by Netscape Rewards increased to $3000 on July 1, 2010 All high/critical vulns get $3000! Chrome VRP Started in Jan 2010 Rewards ranging from $500 to $1337 Amounts increased over time to $1000--$ – $31,336 for exceptional reports with patches

data

Bugs Found using the VRP Bugs affecting stable releases Bugs found by VRP AND affecting stable releases Severity, reporter, report date For VRP bugs, reward amount (always $3K for Firefox) For stable bugs, date a patched version available to end-users

Severity An ordinal measure of “badness” of a security bug Arbitrary code execution with user’s privilege on the OS considered critical severity by both browsers – Chrome has a privilege separated design and a memory corruption vulnerability in the “renderer” process is only high severity (same origin bypass) – Nearly all memory corruption vulnerabilities in Firefox are critical severity

Severity Chrome Stable Chrome Bounty Firefox Stable Firefox Bounty Low Medium High Critical Unknown Total

software vendor perspective

Finding Bugs 1

Bugs found 27.5% of bugs affecting Chrome releases originate from VRP contributions (371 of 1347), and 24.1% of bugs affecting Firefox releases (148 of 613) result from VRP contributions. – Effective! Note that we are only looking at bugs affecting release versions! – 140 high/crit Jan-May ’13 in Chrome, only 40 found by VRP

Bugs found 27.5% of bugs affecting Chrome releases originate from VRP contributions (371 of 1347), and 24.1% of bugs affecting Firefox releases (148 of 613) result from VRP contributions. – Effective!

Bugs found 27.5% of bugs affecting Chrome releases originate from VRP contributions (371 of 1347), and 24.1% of bugs affecting Firefox releases (148 of 613) result from VRP contributions. – Effective! Total bugs found by Chrome VRP: 371 – Max found by best internal researcher: found by Firefox VRP (vs 48 by best internal)

27.5% of bugs affecting Chrome releases originate from VRP contributions (371 of 1347), and 24.1% of bugs affecting Firefox releases (148 of 613) result from VRP contributions. – Effective! But is it cost-effective? Bugs found

Cost 2

Cost of VRP Chrome Firefox Roughly $400,000 over 3 years for bugs affecting stable releases

Cost of VRP Chrome Total Cost Stable pre-release Firefox Total Cost Stable pre-release

Chrome total cost: $579,605 ($485/day) – $186,839 (32%) for non-release bugs Firefox total cost: $570,000 ($658/day) – $126,000 (22%) for non-release bugs Roughly, $190,000/year – Comparable to total cost of ONE security engineer – $100, % overhead = $500/day But is it cost-effective? YES Cost of VRP

Community Engagement 3

Get more security bugs from the community Community Engagement

Community Engagement: Critical Bugs internal (blue) vs external (red) Chrome Firefox Increase in reward amounts

Get more security bugs from the community – VRP found more critical bugs in Chrome (release) than Internal researchers – For Firefox, internal researchers find the lion’s share of critical vulnerabilities Although, VRP impact is improving Community Engagement

Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow Linus’ Law

45/46 people only reported 1 high/critical bug

Maybe if we offer money?

Get more security bugs from the community Get more eyeballs on code Get more diverse bugs from the community – Chrome awards amounts ending with 337 for particularly smart/novel vulnerabilities – 31 such awards in our dataset Anecdotal evidence that it can lead to more bugs! – PinkiePie’s exploit => full review of kernel API – a large number of similar issues found Community Engagement

software vendor perspective

Effective: ~25% of bugs affecting release Cost effective: comparable to ONE developer Community Engagement – More bugs from community – More eyeballs – Diverse bugs leading to finding more issues From the Software Vendor’s view

security researcher perspective

Reward Amount 1

Chrome Reward Amounts 95.8% of awards ≤ $3000 (Firefox)

Vast majority of rewards for Chrome under $1000 (median: $1000, mean $1156.9) Firefox award is $3000 (high/critical) or $0 Lottery? – Low (or possibly negative) expected return on investment of finding bugs – But possibility of very large rewards! Reward Amounts

Repeat Participation 2

First time vs. Repeat Contribution First-time (blue) vs repeat (red) Chrome Firefox

VRP as Employment 3

Total Income

The very best earn at the most $47,000 per year – Such a person likely to make much more working for Firefox and Chrome Both Google and Mozilla hired researchers found via VRPs – Hypothesis: The best security researchers bubble to the top, where a full-time job awaits. VRP as Employment

security researcher perspective

Participation in a single VRP program likely not comparable to full-time employment – Although, good performance might lead to a job – Multiple programs could provide significant income Repeat participation is increasing – Suggests that researchers have a good experience with the programs Expected reward in Firefox higher than in Chrome – Although, possibility of much higher payoff in Chrome From the Researcher’s view

other analysis

Severity 1

Chrome Stable Chrome Bounty Firefox Stable Firefox Bounty Low Medium High Critical Unknown Total

Fraction of Vulns by Severity High Critical High Hypothesis: This difference is due to privilege separation

Time to Patch 2

Hypothesis: This difference is due to privilege separation

final thoughts

Despite costing roughly the same, the Chrome VRP – Identified 3x bugs – More popular – Similar participation between repeat and first- time – External Researchers competitive with Internal researchers (for bugs in release versions) Why? Firefox vs Chrome

Tiered Reward Structure – Incentivizes participation, keeps cost low Low variance/mean time to patch – Researchers like when bugs get patched quickly Higher Profile for Chrome – Pwnium, a high profile event – sudden top-ups for rewards – Such “gamification” leads to more participation Possible Reasons

VRPs seem cost-effective strategy Try to reduce time-to-patch Consider tiered incentives like Chrome Architecture can have massive impact – See impact of privilege separation for Google Chrome Recommendations for Vendors

thanks Thanks to Dan Veditz and Chris Evans for all their help