Engaging Cuba: Policy Options for the U.S., Europe and the Western Hemisphere Washington DC, 16 November 2009 Susanne Gratius, FRIDE, Madrid

Cuba’s foreign policy  Foreign policy is the real sucess story of the regime and the main reason for its survival  For 50 years, the Cuban Revolution has been financed by strong external allies (Soviet Union, China/EU, Venezuela)  The conflict with Washington allowed an independent foreign policy: US sanctions justified alliances with US hostile regimes (Russia, China, Vene.) and authoritarianism

Different Types of Partnership :  “Strategic partners”: Russia, China, Venezuela  “Emotional relations”: Spain, the United States  “Economic partnership”: Canada, EU  “Political partnership”: Latin America, Caribbean

Cuba’s international integration: a victory of the regime?  Foreign policy highly supportive to the regime’s goal to stay in power and to maintain authoritarianism.  Western Hemisphere resignated and “gave up”: democracy promotion as a secondary goal  Recent policy shifts: OAS revoked the special Cuba clause; Obama returned to the sanction + engagement policy of Clinton; Latin America fully re-integrated Cuba; the EU reinforced dialogue and might abandon its Common Position.

Cuba’s external priorities  1st circle: Hemisphere: U.S, Caribbean,LA (Venezuela and Brazil)  2nd circle: EU, Spain, Canada as economic partners with a limited impact  3rd circle: China, Russia and others as non- Western and cultural distant partners

The Transatlantic consensus on engagement  United States: sanctions and engagement  Latin America: unconditioned engagement  Canada and Spain: constructive engagement  EU: conditioned engagement

Engagement as a Policy Option:  Transatlantic consensus on engagement and new diverge on democracy  No embargo, no authoritarianism?  Will less external pressure bring more internal pressure or used as a victory by the regime?  Urgent Need of a Transatlantic debate on incentives for Cuban democracy