The Fisheries Co-management Experience in the Sultanate of Oman: Challenges and Prospects Hamed Al-Oufi & Younis Al-Akhzami* Department of Marine Science and Fisheries Sultan Qaboos University *Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Oman

Most centralized management systems are not sustainable especially in developing countries Why?  High transaction costs  Lack of incentive

Transaction costs Transaction costs are grouped on the basis of the sequence of fishery management decision - 4 stages (Hanna, 2003): 2 ex ante stages Information gathering and management program design 2 ex post stages Implementation and enforcement

The cost of generating information on stocks do not vary with management structure Other costs will vary with the management structure and with the relative position of users and government in making decisions When regulations are legitimate, compliance is likely to be high, thus enforcement costs decrease

Incentives Most centralized management systems place limit on output, creating an incentives for fishermen to compete. Competitive race for fish has led to rising cost of fishing effort and dissipation of rent StrategyCo-operateDefect Co-operate3, 3-1, 4 Defect4, -10, 0 * Fisherman 2 Fisherman 1 * Nash equilibrium

There is more incentive for user-groups to achieve optimal exploitation when they can control access to the fishing grounds and when their tenure to the fishery is ensured Incentives

Co-management is a collaborative and participatory process of regulatory decision-making between: Representatives of user-groups Government Research institutions Other stakeholders What is Co-management?

As a concept is new in fisheries ( years only) As a practice it has existed in fisheries for decades and in some fisheries for centuries  Lofoten Islands, Norway. Functioning successfully for 100 years  Senate Al-Bahar (Oman) a local fisheries management institution based on traditional conventions and informal social sanctions that existed for 100 years

Examples of co-management in practice around the world Lake kariba, Zambia implemented for the Zambian gill-net fishery in 1994 San Migual bay, Philippines implemented in 1991 to address overfishing and conflicts Lofoten Islands, Norway. Functioning successfully for 100 years Coastal fisheries, Japan Coastal fisheries, Turkey

Characteristics: small scale 30,000 fishermen 12,000 vessels (5-10 m LOA) ranked second after oil landings 120 MT/years Management system: State control CPR Oman Fisheries

1. Before 1970 Community based management (Senate Al- Bahar) State control CPR present State control CPR & Government-sponsored co-management institutions Fisheries Management System

1. Management system before 1970 Community based management (Senate Al-Bahar) Coastal fisheries in Oman were managed by an indigenous management institution known as Senate Al-Bahar (code of the sea) Senate Al-Bahar was evolved several hundred years by fishermen to: Manage and restrain the take of fish from the resources Control the activities of fishermen on land and at sea

Senate Al-Bahar is chaired by a charismatic leader with good credibility and experience Responsibilities of the institution: devised local accords to address common problems address technological externalities and assignment problems devised rules to conserve important fishery from depletion. 1. Management system before 1970 Community based management (Senate Al-Bahar)

Under this management system, coastal fisheries exploitation was sustainable because: 1. Boundaries were identified 2. Access to the fishery was controlled by users 3. The institution’s role and rights were recognized by the political and the legal systems (the institution comply with Ostrom, E. (1990) design principles) 1. Management system before 1970 Community based management (Senate Al-Bahar)

In 1970s, a Fisheries Development Program was initiated to develop the sector Royal Decree RD53/1981 and Ministerial Decision, MD3/1982 which is known as the Fisheries Act of 1981 Fisheries management was the responsibility of the government both national and regional (State control CPR)

Local management institutions were steadily eroded with community authority and rights were superseded by the government control Management measures (regulatory instruments) have been ineffective to promote sustainable development and management (State control CPR)

By early 1990s, inshore resources of the Sultanate have witnessed the symptoms of overfishing, e.g.,  Kingfish fishery  Lobster fishery  Abalone fishery  Other demersal species During late 1990s, the problem of the fishery continue to worsen and alternative methods of resource use and management were explored (State control CPR)

Since 1997, 25 local management institutions were established in each town with support from the Government present State control CPR & Government-sponsored co- management institutions Co-management implemented to promote the tradition of Senate Al-Bahar in fisheries management

These committees are responsible to: monitor compliance review fisheries regulations resolve conflicts work toward needed fishery management decisions The government retains final authority for decisions, but consults with Senate committees present ( State control & co-management)

Structure of management committees in each coastal town: Chair: Wali (local governor) Members: Shura counsel member (1) fishermen’s representative (500:1) Ministry representative (1) present ( State control & co-management)

Local committees meet 4 times a year Since its establishment in 1997, a number of fisheries regulations were reviewed Managers hoped that fisheries regulations would be considered legitimate by fishermen to promote higher compliance present ( State control & co-management)

Challenges Little progress has been achieved in the way coastal fisheries are managed Timeframe for the institutions to evolve is from 5 to 10 years (early to make a decision) present ( State control & co-management) Government-sponsored institutions – officially recognized but ineffective since it does not represent fishermen

Local management committees are facing some difficulties because: Chaired by a Wali (governor) who is, in most cases, has no interest in fisheries Members are selected by local political elites Fishermen representation is limited Lack of power Irregular meetings Some are not functioning

Thank you