Pilot project proposal: AffiL Affiliated domain names for trust Dave Crocker Brandenburg InternetWorking bbiw.net

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Presentation transcript:

Pilot project proposal: AffiL Affiliated domain names for trust Dave Crocker Brandenburg InternetWorking bbiw.net

2 2 D. CrockerAffiL Proposal Identification – IP vs. Domain IP  Pros  Can be at SMTP time  Lots of existing practice  High granularity  Cons  Dynamic  Not portable  Shared among senders  Tied to machine, not org.IP  Pros  Can be at SMTP time  Lots of existing practice  High granularity  Cons  Dynamic  Not portable  Shared among senders  Tied to machine, not org. Domain Names  Pros  Aligns better with org  Long-term stability  Less long-term admin  Can be delegated  Cons  Must wait for message header to be transmitted  More complex software Domain Names  Pros  Aligns better with org  Long-term stability  Less long-term admin  Can be delegated  Cons  Must wait for message header to be transmitted  More complex software

3 3 D. CrockerAffiL Proposal DKIM – Identify a Responsible Party RFC 4871 Goals  Any handler can sign  Compatible/transparent with existing infrastructure  Minimal new infrastructure  Implemented independently of MUA clients  Deployed incrementally  Permit delegation of signing to third parties (non-authors)Goals  Any handler can sign  Compatible/transparent with existing infrastructure  Minimal new infrastructure  Implemented independently of MUA clients  Deployed incrementally  Permit delegation of signing to third parties (non-authors)Non-Goals  No linkage to other ID field  No assertions about behaviors of signing identity  Not directions to receivers  No protection after signature verification.  No re-play protection  Transit intermediary or a recipient can re-post the messageNon-Goals  No linkage to other ID field  No assertions about behaviors of signing identity  Not directions to receivers  No protection after signature verification.  No re-play protection  Transit intermediary or a recipient can re-post the message

4 4 D. CrockerAffiL Proposal Authentication is Useless…  … by itself  We all say this, but do we appreciate what it really means?  We often say: If you have a validated name, you can make simple decisions for folks you know.  After all, you already know that I’m a great guy…  But this means really means you’ve gone beyond simple authentication… into reputation.  This added layer is a barrier to adoption of authentication!  Must have a reputation step, before an adopter gets value.  Potential adopters of authentication are waiting for compelling and immediate utility that is turnkey.  … by itself  We all say this, but do we appreciate what it really means?  We often say: If you have a validated name, you can make simple decisions for folks you know.  After all, you already know that I’m a great guy…  But this means really means you’ve gone beyond simple authentication… into reputation.  This added layer is a barrier to adoption of authentication!  Must have a reputation step, before an adopter gets value.  Potential adopters of authentication are waiting for compelling and immediate utility that is turnkey.

5 5 D. CrockerAffiL Proposal Trust can be a separate channel FilterFilter Receiver is on their own: Forced to guess FilterFilter FilterFilter Sender/Receiver collaboration

6 6 D. CrockerAffiL Proposal Recipe for Trust  Identification generated by ‘sender’  Validation it really is them  Assessment of the sender’s worthiness  Reputation of goodness/badness  Attributes  Reputation  [ Multiple assessments  filter ]  Identification generated by ‘sender’  Validation it really is them  Assessment of the sender’s worthiness  Reputation of goodness/badness  Attributes  Reputation  [ Multiple assessments  filter ] Author DKIMDKIM ValidatingSigning Identity Assessor Responsible Identity Handling Filter Recipient

7 7 D. CrockerAffiL Proposal Can a simple project help?  Some utility, based on authentication  Without prior sender/receiver arrangement  Goals  Simple, useful  Not compete with “reputation” services…  Possibly serve as a template for others  Proposal  Affiliations List (AffiL): “belonging” not “goodness”  Spec: mipassoc.org/affil  Some utility, based on authentication  Without prior sender/receiver arrangement  Goals  Simple, useful  Not compete with “reputation” services…  Possibly serve as a template for others  Proposal  Affiliations List (AffiL): “belonging” not “goodness”  Spec: mipassoc.org/affil

8 8 D. CrockerAffiL Proposal Affiliations List (AffiL)  Pilot project  Create an trust domain among member institutions to permit streamlined filter handling.  Demonstrate utility of validated affiliations list  Publish a list of affiliations (membership)  Membership can be a meaningful “indication” of Goodness  Might publish related attributes, like type of institution  Assessor might interpret favorably, but not give message a free pass  Could be template for other organizations to use  Pilot project  Create an trust domain among member institutions to permit streamlined filter handling.  Demonstrate utility of validated affiliations list  Publish a list of affiliations (membership)  Membership can be a meaningful “indication” of Goodness  Might publish related attributes, like type of institution  Assessor might interpret favorably, but not give message a free pass  Could be template for other organizations to use

9 9 D. CrockerAffiL Proposal Example Affiliations  FDIC member organization  Sent from the US Senate  Better Business Bureau member  ISOI attendee  DMA member  FDIC member organization  Sent from the US Senate  Better Business Bureau member  ISOI attendee  DMA member  Authorized 3 rd- party agent of purported author  Domain name (actually) owned by the most spoofed company  Authorized 3 rd- party agent of purported author  Domain name (actually) owned by the most spoofed company

10 D. CrockerAffiL Proposal Project Details  Write charter for project  Define expected use by assessment engine  Agree on list semantics  Evaluate legal implications  Document and publish it  Write charter for project  Define expected use by assessment engine  Agree on list semantics  Evaluate legal implications  Document and publish it  Obtain agreements to publish  Define DNS/VBR* query format  Begin operation  Document the project  Recruit spamassassin and other users of list  Obtain agreements to publish  Define DNS/VBR* query format  Begin operation  Document the project  Recruit spamassassin and other users of list * VBR: Vouch by Reference

11 D. CrockerAffiL Proposal Attributes in an Entry  Domain name  Associated name of organization  Member attributes, such as  Type of membership  Duration of membership  Security policies  …  Domain name  Associated name of organization  Member attributes, such as  Type of membership  Duration of membership  Security policies  …

12 D. CrockerAffiL Proposal Your turn…  Interest?  Idea of membership lists  Participation in pilot project  Concerns?  Interest?  Idea of membership lists  Participation in pilot project  Concerns?