Kakwani decomposition of redistributive effect: origins, criticism and upgrades Ivica Urban Institute of Public Finance, Zagreb to be presented at the.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
The Design of the Tax System
Advertisements

Public Goods and Tax Policy
Federal Planning Bureau Economic analyses and forecasts Federal Planning Bureau Economic analyses and forecasts The gross-net trajectory in MIDAS_BE Some.
CHILD POVERTY AND CHILD RELATED POLICIES: A COMPARISON OF ROMANIA AND CZECH REPUBLIC Silvia Avram*, Eva Militaru**, Silvia Cojanu**, Cristina Stroe** *National.
Assessing “Success” in Anti-Poverty Policy Lars Osberg Dalhousie University October 1, 2004.
INEQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BEN BRAID LORENZ CURVE.
“Analyzing Health Equity Using Household Survey Data” Owen O’Donnell, Eddy van Doorslaer, Adam Wagstaff and Magnus Lindelow, The World Bank, Washington.
Fiscal Incidence, Fiscal Mobility and the Poor: A New Approach Nora Lustig Sean Higgins Department of Economics Tulane University Well-being and inequality.
Poverty, Inequality, and Development
Poverty, Inequality, and Development
Making Taxes Work Presented by Jon Forman at: Law, Society, and Taxation I: What is Tax Reform? Law and Society Association Annual Meeting July 7, 2006.
Economics of Pollution Control: An Overview
Module 10 The Role of Government The Canadian Welfare Society and Taxation.
Chapter 2 – Tools of Positive Analysis
Distributive Politics and Economic Growth Alberto Alesina and Dani Rodrik Economic Growth Spring Semester, 2009 Benedikte Fogh Larsen.
ARE TAX CUTS SELF-FINANCING? Presentation at the CEPOS conference on ”Tax Cuts, Employment and Growth” June 12, 2006 by Professor Peter Birch Sørensen.
Taxes, Social Insurance, and Income Distribution <Review Slides>
Unit VIII Income Inequality. In this chapter, look for the answers to these questions:  How much inequality and poverty exist in our society?  What.
Chapter 6 Slide 1 Copyright © 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.
Policy Issues of EDRC Models Ex-ante Poverty Impact Assessment of Macroeconomic Policies International Workshop Washington, D.C. October 14-15, 2003 Aghasi.
“Analyzing Health Equity Using Household Survey Data” Owen O’Donnell, Eddy van Doorslaer, Adam Wagstaff and Magnus Lindelow, The World Bank, Washington.
Why Has Income Inequality in Thailand Increased? An Analysis Using Surveys.
Chapter 18: Introduction to Taxation This lecture discusses a few institutional and theoretical issues for understanding tax policy. Overview of the types.
Research on redistributive effects of Croatian fiscal system Ivica Urban Institute of Public Finance.
The Incidence of Fiscal Policy in Armenia presentation at American University of Armenia Jan. 20, 2014 Stephen D. Younger.
Harmonization of relations of the state and individuals in the context of taxation theory Y. Tyurina Department of finances, Orenburg state university.
C h a p t e r eighteen © 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick O’Brien—1 st ed. Prepared by: Fernando & Yvonn.
Chapter 16 Income Taxation
QBM117 Business Statistics Estimating the population mean , when the population variance  2, is known.
Eddy van Doorslaer Erasmus University Rotterdam Equity in Health Care Finance and Delivery in Europe: the ECuity Project European Health Forum, Gastein,
Who Pays Taxes in Wisconsin? A Study of Tax Burden, Tax Year 2001 Wisconsin Department of Revenue January 19, 2005.
3.6 Distribution of Income. Use of Taxes Fund spending Steer economy (fiscal policy) Discourage negative externalities Influence “fair” distribution of.
MORE TARGETING, LESS REDISTRIBUTION? AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ROLE OF POLICY DESIGN IVE MARX, LINA SALANAUSKAITE, GERLINDE VERBIST CENTRUM VOOR SOCIAAL BELEID.
1 Estimation From Sample Data Chapter 08. Chapter 8 - Learning Objectives Explain the difference between a point and an interval estimate. Construct and.
27 March 2007 Centre for Tax Policy and Administration Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Reforms of Personal Income Tax in OECD Countries.
Measurement of Income Inequality and Redistribution Ivica Urban Institut za javne financije Croatian Quants Day, Zagreb, 9 April 2010.
Equity, then Social Insurance … Allen C. Goodman © 2013.
Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 19 Confidence Intervals for Proportions.
The Design of the Tax System Chapter 12. “ In this world nothing is certain but death and taxes. ”... Benjamin Franklin Taxes paid.
Chapter 8 Principles of Taxation 1: Efficiency and Equity Issues Chapter outline 1.Efficiency Issues in Tax Design 2.Equity Issues in Tax Design.
Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 18 Taxation and Public Expenditure.
Market Failures and the Role of the Government
Market Failures 1. Review 1.Define Market Failure. 2.Identify the three market failures we have learned so far in this unit. 3.Explain why are public.
TAXATION.
Distribution of income. Direct and Indirect Taxation Direct taxes are paid directly to the tax authority by the taxpayer: –Personal income taxes: on all.
Chapter 2 Tax Policy Issues: Standards for a Good Tax.
AISHA KHAN SUMMER 2009 SECTION G & I LECTURE FOURTEEN & FIFTEEN ECO 102 Development Economics.
Econ 215: Economy of Ghana National Income Accounting Lecture 2.
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY SPILLOVERS: Firm Level Evidence from Chilean industrial sector. Leopoldo LabordaDaniel Sotelsek University of.
Progressivity and Horizontal equity of 2011 Tax Reforms in Sri Lanka Mandarin Orchard Hotel, Singapore/ August 6-8 / Singapore Economic Review Conference/
Threats in Latin American and Caribbean countries: how do inequality and the asymmetries of rules affect tax morale? Mariana Gerstenblüth Natalia Melgar.
AP Stats Check In Where we’ve been… Chapter 7…Chapter 8… Where we are going… Significance Tests!! –Ch 9 Tests about a population proportion –Ch 9Tests.
The Design of the Tax System
CHAPTER 11 Inference for Distributions of Categorical Data
Macroeconomic Objective: Equity in Income Distribution
Taxes: Equity versus Efficiency
AP Stats Check In Where we’ve been… Chapter 7…Chapter 8…
CHAPTER 11 Inference for Distributions of Categorical Data
Market Failures and the Role of the Government
CHAPTER 11 Inference for Distributions of Categorical Data
Presented by Jorrit Zwijnenburg (OECD)
CHAPTER 11 Inference for Distributions of Categorical Data
Market Failures and the Role of the Government
AN APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING AN OPTIMAL GUARANTEED BASIC INCOME
CHAPTER 11 Inference for Distributions of Categorical Data
CHAPTER 11 Inference for Distributions of Categorical Data
CHAPTER 11 Inference for Distributions of Categorical Data
CHAPTER 11 Inference for Distributions of Categorical Data
CHAPTER 11 Inference for Distributions of Categorical Data
CHAPTER 11 Inference for Distributions of Categorical Data
Presentation transcript:

Kakwani decomposition of redistributive effect: origins, criticism and upgrades Ivica Urban Institute of Public Finance, Zagreb to be presented at the Fourth Winter School on Inequality and Collective Welfare Theory January 2009

Kakwani decomposition of redistributive effect Kakwani (1984) decomposition of redistributive effect into vertical and reranking (horizontal inequity) terms One of the most important tools in income redistribution literature in last 25 years

Its popularity rests on... simplicity and ease of computation comprehensiveness: captures two different notions of redistributive justice availability for straightforward policy interpretation: for example, “redistributive power can be enhanced if horizontal inequity is reduced” decomposability

This presentation... a critical overview of development of Kakwani dec. the context in which reranking and vertical index have emerged and how they fit into Kakwani dec. short review of upgrades

Outline 1 Introduction 2 The decomposition 3 Horizontal inequity or reranking? 4 Origins of the vertical effect 5 Origins of the reranking effect 6 Criticism of Lerman and Yitzhaki and their new framework 7 Extension to the net fiscal system 8 Frameworks capturing vertical and horizontal inequity and reranking 9 Kakwani-Lambert “new approach” 10 Approach based on relative deprivation

References Kakwani (1984) On the measurement of tax progressivity and redistributive effect of taxes with applications to horizontal and vertical equity Kakwani (1986) Analyzing redistribution policies: A study using Australian data Section title in both works: “Measures of horizontal and vertical equity”

Modern presentation concentration coefficient of post-tax income Gini coefficients of pre- and post-tax income the average tax rate and Kakwani progressivity index decomposition: concentration coefficient of tax

Comparison of presentations Original Modern

Derivation using L/C curves

Horizontal inequity or reranking? The principle of vertical equity requires that people with larger incomes pay higher taxes than those with lower incomes Horizontal equity in taxation requires that people with equal incomes pay equal taxes Violation of this principle gives rise to horizontal inequity Following several other authors, Kakwani identifies horizontal inequity with reranking

Horizontal inequity or reranking? it is common to name the effect “reranking” instead of “horizontal inequity” Kaplow (1989) Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle Aronson, Johnson, Lambert (1994) Redistributive effect and unequal income tax treatment

Horizontal inequity or reranking? it seems that by Kakwani dec. we obtain two measures that both deal with unequal treatment of unequals Example: pre-fiscal income post-fiscal income A B 100

Origins of the vertical effect Kakwani (1977) Measurement of Progressivity: An International Comparison criticizes RE as a progressivity index: it should be an index of redistributive effect appropriate index of tax progressivity will indicate that two tax systems with equal elasticity (everywhere) are equally progressive

Origins of the vertical effect Kakwani then proposes an index that does satisfy the requirement:...and shows why RE doesn’t... (assume there is no reranking: ) (of two systems having the same elasticity, the one with higher ATR will be deemed as more progressive by RE)

Origins of the reranking effect: Atkinson Atkinson: some empirical studies used the measure, which understates the true post-fiscal inequality, in other words, a measure overstates the redistributive effect of fiscal system, One motive for measurement of reranking: to estimate redistribution correctly

Atkinson: “Changes in the ranking of observations as a result of taxation do not in themselves affect the degree of inequality in the post-tax distribution. They do, however, influence certain ways of representing the redistribution and of calculating summary measures of inequality.” In other words: Reranking is a by-product, not a causing factor; Reranking does not contribute, positively or negatively, to the redistributive effect Origins of the reranking effect: Atkinson

In Plotnick’s model: “the structure of postredistribution income inequality is taken as a datum by the measure.” “...given the change in inequality, the measure should tell us how seriously the redistributive activities violated the norms of horizontal equity.” the measure of reranking “should not attempt to compare the actual extent of redistribution or change in inequality to some exogenous criterion. Doing so would be an exercise in measuring vertical inequity.” Origins of the reranking effect: Plotnick

Advice: How to use it Atkinson and Plotnick: although aware of the strong connection between the concepts of vertical and horizontal equity, they do not attempt to build comprehensive model capturing both of them they suggest to future users and developers to be cautious about introduction of reranking measure into other, more comprehensive frameworks

Was the advice taken? However, for Kakwani, the reranking measures the reduction of the redistributive effect caused by fiscal activities or “increase in inequality” Reranking is not only a by-product, it is a causing factor Usual interpretation: Progressive fiscal system reduces inequality and is positive: vertical inequity is “good”; In presence of reranking, is positive and increases inequality; this is evidence of the notion that horizontal inequity is “bad”.

Was the advice taken? Furthermore, actual redistribution is only. Here, measures a potential redistributive effect; one that could be attained if reranking were somehow eliminated:

Popular recipe researcher may offer straightforward advice to policymakers: by reduction of horizontal inequity, without additional resources, you can increase redistributive effect by x percent Although this interpretation was not present in Kakwani (1984 and 1986), it might be said that these works encouraged it

New decomposition Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995) Changing ranks and the inequality impacts of taxes and transfers criticism of Kakwani decomposition They develop their own decomposition of redistributive effect following the “philosophy” of Kakwani, but arrive at different conclusions about the role of reranking: it positively contributes to inequality reduction, together with “gap narrowing” (which corresponds to vertical effect)

Comparison of presentations Lerman and YitzhakiKakwani

Derivation using L/C curves

Interpretations... the method enables decomposition of redistributive effect “into two exclusive, exhaustive terms”. As Kakwani, they regard reranking as an independent source of redistributive effect: “...policies may reduce inequality by rearranging rankings as well.” They even claim that Atkinson supported this view: he indicated “that the reranking effect might be important in explaining a proportion of the impact of taxes on inequality.” (...but that is not what he meant)

Why new decomposition? they criticize Kakwani vertical effect: for given redistributive effect it increases automatically when reranking is increased “the after-tax ranking is the appropriate ranking for calculating progressivity” (because the after-tax ranking is proper ranking in analysis of marginal changes in the tax system)

Case of “total reranking”

more reranking results in an increase of Kakwani vertical effect, based on pre-tax rankings this suggests that even more taxation of the “now poor” is desired unfortunately, they do not involve in deeper technical elaboration of their criticism no followers, despite interesting framework

Redistributive effect of the net fiscal system Lambert (1985) On the redistributive effect of taxes and benefits decomposes Kakwani vertical effect on tax and benefit contributions

Redistributive effect of the net fiscal system The decomposition helps to reveal an interesting interaction: even if overall tax system is regressive ( ), taxes do reinforce the redistributive effect of the net fiscal system, so that.

Vertical and horizontal inequity and reranking effects Aronson, Johnson, Lambert (1994) Redistributive effect and unequal income tax treatment decomposition of redistributive effect into vertical inequity, horizontal inequity and reranking effects problem: the model works only with true equals – units with identical income

Vertical and horizontal inequity and reranking effects

Duclos, Jalbert and Araar (2003) Classical horizontal inequity and reranking: an integrated approach

“PIT decomposition” Pfähler (1990) Redistributive Effect of Income Taxation: Decomposing Tax Base and Tax Rates Effects decomposes vertical effect (or progressivity index) of tax into four contributions / effects: allowance, deductions, tax credits and tax- schedule

Kakwani-Lambert “New approach” Kakwani and Lambert (1998) On Measuring Inequity in Taxation: A New Approach three axioms dealing with both horizontal and vertical equity A1: „minimal progression“: tax should increase monotonically with income A2: „progressive principle“: higher income people must be faced with higher tax rates A3: „no reranking“ criterion: marginal tax rate should not exceed 100 percent

Kakwani-Lambert “New approach” from calculations based on Australian income tax data in 1984: (Kakwani decomposition) RE could be improved by removal of inequities “without change to the marginal rate structure which governs incentives.”

Approach based on relative deprivation Duclos (2000) Gini Indices and the Redistribution of Income Gini coefficient can be represented as an average of relative deprivation in population based on this principle the concepts of “fiscal harshness”, “fiscal looseness” and “ill- fortune” emerge for each concept a measure is derived

Relative deprivation based approach all the terms in Kakwani decomposition(s) are “reinvented” using these measures Kakwani index of progressivity: a difference between the (mean-normalized average) fiscal harshness and average relative deprivation in the population. Kakwani index of vertical inequity: a difference between the (mean-normalized average) relative deprivation and average fiscal looseness. Atkinson-Plotnick index of reranking is (mean- normalised average) of ill-fortune in the population