Social Justice: Hardin, Singer, and Arthur Philosophy 220 Social Justice: Hardin, Singer, and Arthur

World Hunger and Poverty Go check out these sites: http://www.stopthehunger.com/ http://feedingamerica.org/faces-of-hunger/hunger-101/hunger-and-poverty-statistics.aspx Scrolling down the first page, reveals a series of estimates challenging common moral intuitions. The moral concerns they raise are captured in these questions: “Are economically advantaged people morally required to participate in…redistribution…[to the] severely economically disadvantaged?” “…what best explains this obligation?” (444)

An Answer to #2 A duty to Beneficence (to help those in dire need) is widely assumed. If we accept such a duty, the issues we need to flesh out are: What is the scope of the duty? Whose need are we obliged to address? What is the content of the duty? How much are we required to sacrifice to meet the obligation. How compelling (strong) is the duty? How does our duty to beneficence compare to other duties we have (to ourselves, to our children, etc.) or to other interests we have (say in expensive cars).

What about #1? Clearly, fleshing out the answer to the second question has important implications for the first question. If you understand the scope, content and strength to be significant, then you are going to answer the first question in the affirmative, and interpret its requirements expansively. “I/We should be actively and substantially trying to reduce the need of the neediest.” If, on the other hand, you understand the scope, content and strength to be negligible, then your answer will either be negative or weakly, negligibly positive. “I have no obligation to help,” “I/We should help, but I have other important things to address.”

Consequentialism From the consequentialist standpoint, fleshing out our answer to the second question is going to depend on the evaluation of the consequences that would follow from helping the needy. Consequentialists have differed in their evaluations, with much debate turning on the likely efficacy or optimality of substantial economic sacrifice.

Kantian Moral Theory Not surprisingly, adherents of KMT take a very different approach to this question. Kant defended the notion that we have a duty of beneficence, largely on the basis of the Humanity Formulation of the Categorical Imperative (Treat people as ends.) Kant doesn’t, however, specify the scope, content or strength of the duty, insisting that only those who have the duty are in a position to do so.

Hardin, “Lifeboat Ethics” Hardin starts with what to him seems a troubling metaphor: Spaceship Earth. The trouble comes from it’s tendency to produce a feature famously identified by Hardin: The Tragedy of the Commons. Another problem is the one of command and control: who is the captain of the spaceship? What theory of human nature is Hardin assuming in all of this?

A Better Metaphor Let’s set up some lifeboats: see 448c1. What should we do with all of those swimming poor people? A Key Concept: Capacity Limitations. What should we do? Be a Christian or a Marxist (they’re the same thing!) Let in 10 more, exceed safety limits. Let in no one. Differing rates of reproduction only exacerbate the problem.

A Common Ruin The lifeboat metaphor is an example of Hardin’s argument that free access and unrestricted demand for a finite resource ultimately dooms the resource through over-exploitation. This occurs because the benefits of exploitation accrue to individuals or groups, each of whom is motivated to maximize use of the resource while the costs of the exploitation are borne by all those to whom the resource is available. “Nice Guys finish last.” This, in turn, causes demand for the resource to increase, which causes the problem to snowball to the point that the resource is exhausted.

Ratchet Effect There’s a sort of biofeedback mechanism to the tragedy that is also apparent, Hardin insists, in the use of international aid to prevent hunger or starvation. Helping them just lets them breed more which ultimately just causes another collapse. See figures 11.1 and 11.2.

What about the swimmers? The conclusion of Hardin’s argument is that, for consequentialist reasons, we have no obligations to help the needy around us. Agreeing or disagreeing with Hardin requires an examination of the assumptions about consequences that his argument relies on.

Singer, “Famine, Affluence and Morality” Singer uses a consequentialist standpoint to evaluate our moral responsibilities in the face of widespread poverty, starvation and need. He offers two versions of a principle aimed to specify this responsibility: Strong Principle: “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (454). Weak Principle: “If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening,without sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it” (Ibid.).

The Argument Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The Strong Principle. (You could use the weak one as well.) Question: What does Singer mean by “without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance”? Answer “...without causing anything else comparably bad to happen, or doing something that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good, comparable in significance to the bad thing that we can prevent.” It is within our power to prevent suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. So, we ought, morally, to prevent such suffering and death.

Implication As Singer makes clear, there is a surprising and significant implication of this argument. Suppose my family income is $200,000 per year and, moved by the plight of the world’s poor, I give ten dollars to a global disaster relief agency such as Oxfam or Doctors without Borders. Then I think about going to the movies. But wait, I could instead donate another ten dollars to Oxfam. And another, and another. Singer’s argument seems to conclude that I should continue giving this way until further giving would lead to a comparable moral sacrifice, maybe all the way to the global poverty level.

Can This be Right? This seems implausible, but Singer uses an analogical application of the Strong Principle to buttress his case. Suppose I am walking by a pond in the woods. I’m alone. I see a small child drowning in shallow water. I could save the child easily and without risk to myself, suffering only the slight inconvenience of getting my pants muddy. Singer says one is morally obligated to pull the drowning child from the shallow pond to prevent the drowning. Singer insists that there is no morally significant difference between the drowning child case and the decision I face when I could spend money on myself or instead donate resources to famine relief. So, if you think you should save the child, you should get out your checkbook.

Duty? Another implication of this argument is that the traditional, conventional way of drawing the line between moral duty and charity cannot be maintained. According to common moral opinion, one is morally bound not to harm others, but helping others is morally optional. If you do help others, you are going above and beyond the call of duty, and are to be commended for being charitable—doing good you were not duty-bound to do. On Singer’s Strong Principle, this way of characterizing the relationship between duty and charity is turned upside down. Singer would agree with Kant that we do have a duty to be charitable, but he would go further and insist that the duty is a defined one.

Objections and Replies Pt. 1 Objection 1. The child in the example is close by and the global poor one might aid are far away . Also, the child will drown right now if you do not help, but giving to relief agencies will only prevent deaths in the future. Singer’s reply: Mere distance in time and distance in space are in and of themselves irrelevant to the determination of what one ought to do. Objection 2. In the drowning child example, you are the only one who could help. In the case of disaster relief, you are one of many people who could help. Singer’s reply: It does not matter morally how many people could help the situation. Suppose 100 people are on the beach, and see a child drowning in shallow water. Any of the 100 could help. If no one helps, all do wrong. That others could have helped does not lessen your responsibility.

Objections and Replies Pt. 2 Objection 3. The argument’s conclusion is drastically at odds with our current moral beliefs so cannot be right. Singer’s reply: Why assume our current moral beliefs are all correct? I have asserted a principle, and tried to show what conduct is required by the principle. If the principle is acceptable, and the reasoning from the principle is sound, the conclusion, even if at odds with current opinions, stands. Objection 4. The morality that Singer is proposing is far beyond the capacities of the ordinary person, so should not be accepted and established in society. Singer’s reply: “The issue here is: Where should we draw the line between conduct that is required and conduct that is good although not required, so as to get the best possible result?” This looks to be a hard empirical issue, and it is far from obvious that the answer is that moral requirements should be minimal.

Arthur, “Hunger and Obligation” Arthur criticizes Singer’s conclusions in “Famine, Affluence and Morality.” His criticism rests on his analysis of Singer’s Strong Principle. On his reading, the Strong Principle is justified by Singer explicitly with reference to the drowning child analogy, but implicitly by reference to what Arthur identifies as a principle of Moral Equality: the poor are just as important as we are, so it would be unjust if I prefer my trivial interests to preservation of their lives.

Moral Equality? At first glance, this principle seems non-controversial (perhaps this is why Singer never really highlights it), but Arthur argues that there is more to the question than meets the eye. What the equality principle overlooks is another important moral concept: entitlement.

Moral Entitlement According to Arthur, and in agreement with much philosophical and legal precedent, there are two kinds of entitlements: rights and desert. Entitlements of Rights: we are not obligated to heroism (e.g., to give up, our kidneys or eyes or grant sexual favors to save someone else’s life or sanity (459)). Strangers have only negative rights (rights of non-interference), unless we have volunteered more. Entitlements of Desert: we have a right to what we deserve based on the past. Story of the industrious and lazy farmers (460).

Implications Our moral system already gives weight to both future and past, consequences and entitlements. Of course we ought to help the drowning child if nothing of greater importance is at stake; but our moral code must take into account both consequences and entitlements. According to Arthur, Singer just completely ignores backward-looking considerations. We do have obligations to help others, but they don’t overwhelm our moral entitlements (e.g., to go to the movies). This is a kind of moderate position.