Worldwide Developments in BRT Walter Hook, Executive Director, ITDP Transforming Transportation, World Bank, January 2011
Guangzhou: “Hybrid full featured direct service” BRT. Over 800,000 daily passengers. Three consortiums under QOS contracts compete. Revenue collected by metro company and divided by formula
Gangding, off-peak traffic into the city centre
Offset where road narrows
Bike sharing Bike parking Stations away from Junctions. Turning buses pull into mixed traffic Split stations decision: discuss
BRT route selection Services to be included and excluded from BRT corridor
Not a complete corridor. The original 23 Phase I BRT routes (40+ are operating) 7
Flexible Operation Route using corridor /route length more than 30 % BRT Vehicle,can leave corridor Don’t need feeder
The Bus Routes are similar to the old routes, but now they are “B” routes.
Bike sharing along BRT corridor, Over 5000 bikes today, expanding to 20,000 by 2011
Integrated with Metro at 4 stations.
TransJakarta just opened routes 9 and 10, making it the longest BRT
A B 6 11 Rasuna Said – Gatot Subroto – Sudirman – Senayan – Penjernihan Kp. Melayu – Casablanca – DR Satrio – Mas Mansyur – Cideng 15 Busway Corridors Planned, 10 are built
Corridor are Euro 0 diesel. Sulfur in fuel still too high. Corridor 2-8 (and beyond) buses run on CNG. No GHG CO2 advantage because inefficiencies with refueling Major operating costs and service delays. National government recently settled the price and agreed to add fueling stations Problems with CNG
-Non-standardized approach to contracting -Because 40% of the total system costs are government, (rest is bus procurement) tendered 40%, and lowest bidder will set the price for the remaining. -Contracts are different. Existing operators consortium took to the courts. Operations stalled for months. -Independence of TransJakarta agency still not legalized but improved. -Ticketing system still paper tickets and ‘non-transparency’… Legal and institutional problems are key
Lane enforcement has been lax
MC Escher was called in on the design
At least Corridor I of TransJakarta still slips past the traffic.
Ahmedabad
Construction complete on 30 km of planned 90 km network -50,000 passengers / day -27% of riders from private vehicles Competitive bidding for bus operations and fare collection Quality of service contracting
Segregated median bus lanes
Level boarding 900 mm
Two-phase junctions
The “Square-about”
Johannesburg’s Rea Vaya: Sub-Saharan Africa’s First Full Featured BRT System
Johannesburg: Trunk, Feeder and Complimentary Corridor length: 63 km Number of stations: 78 Corridor length: 63 km Number of stations: 78
Pre-paid, level boarding Secure, weather-protected Aesthetically pleasing Successes: The Stations are World Class
Vehicles are World Class: Low-Emission Engines, High Quality Euro IV diesel engine with particulate traps (Bogota is Euro II, so Rea Vaya is much cleaner!)
Best Practice: Passing lanes and multiple stopping bays at stations ensures high capacity and allows for integrated express services
Innovative Complementary Routes Trunk/feeder hybrid Doors on both sides Facilitates bigger service range while trunk infrastructure is being expanded. Poorly implemented…
One way streets have special problems. Central verge on a one way street is working well, but…
ITDP issues to discuss Network effects are a problem.
HR Company Cashiers/ Ambassadors Significant accountability issues
The Taxi Transition: Competitive tender abandoned for ‘negotiated settlement’ with ‘affected operators’ to avoid violence, but… Who represents the ‘affected operators?’ 4 levels of associations (national, province, city, district) from 2 warring associations, members don’t recognize leaders 8 vehicles per legal operating license.
Where are we now… 37 Dialog with Affected Operators and Interested Parties Negotiators with Clear Mandate of all affected operators Bus Operating Companies Regionally Competitive ISO Compliant World Class Companies Yes Almost
10 local associations affected. City defined the affected routes, the number of routes/association, certified the operators, and decided on 1 share for every vehicle and license upon turning over vehicle 38
Issues Non competitive tender drove up operating costs by at least 30% - 40% and undermined transition timetable by years Some routes more lucrative than others (from R2000 to R9000 per month) so 1 share one vehicle + license caused problems Monthly share dividend had to be +/- the highest route value for all to agree driving up fee/km