Evidence on Conditional Cash Transfers in Education Successful partnerships for evidence-based policy-making: Lessons from J-PAL Evidence on Conditional Cash Transfers in Education Laura Poswell, J-PAL Africa IGC Workshop Maputo 6 July 2015 Last updated by Luke Strathmann, 6/18/2015

Overview Who is J-PAL Measuring impact: Why randomise Evidence from randomized evaluations on conditional cash transfers for education Mexico (PROGRESA) Colombia Malawi Lessons and nuances Highlight that evidence on "facts" comes from representative surveys (absence, learning levels etc.) whereas evidence on "impacts" comes from RCT's.

Overview Who is J-PAL Measuring impact: Why randomise Evidence from randomized evaluations on conditional cash transfers for education Mexico (PROGRESA) Colombia Malawi Lessons and nuances Highlight that evidence on "facts" comes from representative surveys (absence, learning levels etc.) whereas evidence on "impacts" comes from RCT's.

J-PAL: Over 110 affiliated researchers and 600 projects in 64 countries

J-PAL’s Work in Education 165 completed and ongoing evaluations in 36 countries Source: http://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluations 165/36 current as of 6/16/2015 NOTE: This presentation does not include evaluations from the USA or other developed countries, which account for around a third of the evaluations (see note below on USA) Top countries: United States 43 India 29 Kenya 13 Chile 11

Overview Who is J-PAL Measuring impact: Why randomise Evidence from randomized evaluations on conditional cash transfers for education Mexico (PROGRESA) Colombia Malawi Lessons and nuances Highlight that evidence on "facts" comes from representative surveys (absence, learning levels etc.) whereas evidence on "impacts" comes from RCT's.

How should we increase secondary school participation? Address health issues (malnutrition, intestinal parasites?) Lower the costs of schooling to families? Inform parents of the returns to secondary schooling?

How to measure impact Attendance Time Intervention Impact Counterfactual Use example of a year of schooling Increase the number of textbooks Time

How to measure impact Attendance Time Impact Intervention Counterfactual Intervention Impact Attendance But it’s also possible that the counterfactual is here (such as if something else happened right around the time of the program, like a period of economic growth or a large country-wide program) Time

Counterfactual How to measure the causal impact of a policy? Counterfactual: Would have happened in the absence of the policy? Problem: Will never observe what would have happened How to measure the causal impact of a policy?

Randomised Evaluations in practice 1. Baseline 4. Endline 3. Intervention 2. Random assignment 3. Comparison

Key advantage of randomised evaluations Members of the groups are statistically identical thus any change can be attributed to the program itself. In all other impact evaluation methods, we need to assume that the two groups do not differ systematically at the outset or that any differences between them have been statistically accounted for But there is no way to test this assumption.

Partnerships for randomised evaluations Implementing Partner (Government, NGOs, Business) Research team (Academics, fieldwork team) Question – Intervention + Evaluation – Results – Scale up Start early together Start early Test the question together Think carefully through the design and theory of change Unpack results Disseminate Continue to test new questions

Overview Who is J-PAL Measuring impact: Why randomise Evidence from randomized evaluations on conditional cash transfers for education Mexico (PROGRESA) Colombia Malawi Lessons and nuances Highlight that evidence on "facts" comes from representative surveys (absence, learning levels etc.) whereas evidence on "impacts" comes from RCT's.

Conditional Cash Transfers Cash transfers to poor families conditional on children’s health and educational investments School attendance Regular medical check ups Can address short term liquidity constraints longer term savings constraints Aim Break the intergenerational cycle of poverty through encouraging investments in children’s education & health Small costs matter as school is never really free short term liquidity constraints longer term savings constraints

Evidence from randomised evaluations on CCTs in education Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs widely tested, consistently effective at increasing participation Over 30 countries have some form of CCT Program Impacts on learning less clear Differential impacts? More or less effective for the most marginal? Other impacts beyond education? Can careful design improve effectiveness? (eg staying in school longer might delay child bearing)

PROGRESA : landmark program and evaluation Context of Program: Beginning of Mexico’s Economic Crisis in 1994 Poor and marginalised populations lagged behind in terms of education, health, and nutrition. Group of cabinet officials with presidential support want to introduce conditional cash transfers for the poorest. Faced some objections  Pilot and then a rigorous evaluation Pilot intervention: cash grants made conditional on the target population attending health centres. Run in Campeche with 31,000 households in medium-sized urban localities (Levy). Evaluation: Purpose was to test the objections in Cabinet to direct cash transfers and so it was implemented and externally evaluated by a well-known university. Emphasised the importance of gathering more data and a more systemic evaluation strategy. Called for a central administrative body to oversee the coordination of the programme’s participants.

PROGRESA PROGRESA program details Included education, nutrition, and health conditions. Two-stage targeting mechanism (geographic, household) Ave. transfer amount = 22% of the monthly income of beneficiary families. Evaluation integrated into programme design Evaluation at scale planned from the outset Budget and administration constraints  Randomised phase-in design (320 localities receive program in first 2 years, remaining 186 in year 3) Description: CCT program that provides cash grants, distributed to the female head of household, on the condition of children’s school attendance and preventative health measures. Conditions Education: encouraging completion of primary and secondary education. A cash transfer is provided to households for each enrolled child under 22 years old between the third grade of primary and the third grade of secondary school. Transfer amount increases with each school year. Households also receive subsidies each year for school supplies. Amounts of the monthly educational grants ranged from 90 pesos in the third grade of primary to 290 pesos for boys and 335 pesos for girls in the third year of secondary school (Parker and Skoufias 2000) In secondary school, transfer amount is higher for girls than boys due to higher drop-out rate for girls. A one-time cash transfer is provided to all those who complete secondary school. Health: improving household access to healthcare, especially preventive health care. Participating household members required to make assigned number of visits to health clinics in order to qualify for cash transfer. Nutrition: to supplement health interventions and ensure that children are healthy and able to attend school All households receive a fixed monthly cash stipend for improved food consumption on their visits to the health clinic. This amount was initially 135 pesos (Parker and Skoufias 2000). Targeting mechanism: designed to minimize disincentives by considering more than just current income. Process was also clear and transparent. Stage 1: Geographical targeting Aim was to identify those localities that were likely to have the extreme poor and be most affected by the Economic Crisis. Ranked localities according to a constructed “marginality index” and designated the 506 most marginalised as being eligible for Progresa. Stage 2: Household targeting Aim was to identify the poorest households within eligible localities. Census data was used to construct a latent poverty index as a proxy means test. Households below a certain level of poverty were deemed eligible for Progresa. Evaluation: To take advantage of longer time period over which to observe programme effects. To ensure the credibility of impact results and the legitimacy of the program as a whole in order to increase the probability of the program continuing on through political change. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) were contracted to evaluate the entire program for three years. All programme data was made publically available, allowing for unsolicited research. Random Assignment: Due to budgetary constraints, not all 506 of the eligible localities could receive the programme. Government officials made a conscious decision to take advantage of the constraints by implementing a randomised phase-in design. 320 of the 506 eligible localities were randomly assigned to receive the programme in the first two years. This group of localities functioned as a treatment group. 186 of the 506 eligible localities were randomly assigned to only receive the programme in its third year. This group of localities functioned as a control group. This design allowed for subsequent rigorous impact evaluation of the programme using randomised evaluation.

PROGRESA evaluation outcomes Education outcomes Increased enrolment rates especially for children transitioning to junior secondary school (11.1 percentage points) And especially for girls (14.8 percentage points) Lower dropout rates Reduced child labour No significant impacts on learning outcomes Recorded Outcomes Based on Original IFPRI Evaluation Report Education There was an increase in enrolment rates for both boys and girls benefiting from Progresa at primary and secondary levels (Shultz 2001) Treatment effects on enrolment were positive and statistically significant for children who had completed the 1st to 6th grades. Increase in enrolment rates ranged from 2.0-11.1 percentage points. Impact on enrolment rates found to be largest for children who had completed the sixth grade and were transitioning to junior secondary school. Treatment effect was an increase in enrolment of 11.1 percentage points for all children. This effect was larger for girls than boys: For girls who had completed sixth grade, enrolment increased by 14.8 percentage points. For their male counterparts, enrolment increased by 6.5 percentage points. Results implied that program was having an impact on the transition from primary to junior secondary school, especially for girls. Participation in the program associated with lower dropout rates, especially during the transition to (junior) secondary school (Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd 2001). Progresa also shown to reduce children’s labour force participation (Parker and Skoufias 2000) Not shown to have any significant impact on learning outcomes, as measured by student scores on achievement tests (Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd 2001). Health and Nutrition There were 2.09 more visists per day to clinis in Progresa areas than in non-Progresa areas (Gertler and Boyce 2001). Child beneficiaries had a 23 percent reduction in the incidence of illness, an 18 percent reduction in anaemia, and between a 1 and 4 percent increase in height compared to non-beneficiaries (Gertler and Boyce 2001). Adult beneficiaries of the programme were also found to be significantly healthier than non-beneficiaries, with a 19% reduction in the number of days they lost to illness (Gertler and Boyce 2001). Evaluation recommendations: For grants to be extended to high school (senior secondary school) level. Government should explore the possibility of including bonuses for good academic performance. Questions raised by IFPRI report re: programme design Are there more effective methods to identify the poorest households for targeting? Is the cash transfer amount too high or not high enough? Is the simultaneous targeting of education, health, and nutrition outcomes better to targeting outcomes in only one of these sectors? Should cash transfers be made to schools (supply side) to schools instead to improve attendance and performance? What if the benefits were given to fathers instead of mothers? Should children of younger or older ages be targeted? Implications of Rigorous Evaluation Credibility: The rigorous program and impact evaluation process of the programme gave its success credibility in Mexico and the rest of the world. In Mexico, this credibility helped to make the programme politically robust. When a new government entered in 2000, it not only continued to support Progresa but actually worked to expand it based on the lessons from the programme’s evaluation. The programme gained international recognition, attracting financial support such as the billion dollar loan from the Inter-American Development Bank and prompting adoption of similar CCT programmes all over the world. Precedence: Set a new high standard for the design and conduct of social policy in Mexico and in the region at large. In particular, it encouraged the early involvement of both federal government and researchers in the design and evaluation of programs. Evaluation results and recommendations inspired new questions about program choices and program design. These in turn have informed the programme designs of subsequent CCT programs in Latin America and the rest of the world. References: Shultz (2001), Behrman et al 2001)

PROGRESA-OPORTUNIDADES Implications of Rigorous Evaluation Credibility People believed the results – international recognition Made it politically robust – new government in 2000 continues and expands the program 2.6 million families by 2000 Precedence Set a new high standard for the design and conduct of social policy - early involvement of government & researchers Evaluation recommendations lead to new questions for further program improvements CCTs introduced in more and more countries and many rigorous evaluations done Recorded Outcomes Based on Original IFPRI Evaluation Report Education There was an increase in enrolment rates for both boys and girls benefiting from Progresa at primary and secondary levels (Shultz 2001) Treatment effects on enrolment were positive and statistically significant for children who had completed the 1st to 6th grades. Increase in enrolment rates ranged from 2.0-11.1 percentage points. Impact on enrolment rates found to be largest for children who had completed the sixth grade and were transitioning to junior secondary school. Treatment effect was an increase in enrolment of 11.1 percentage points for all children. This effect was larger for girls than boys: For girls who had completed sixth grade, enrolment increased by 14.8 percentage points. For their male counterparts, enrolment increased by 6.5 percentage points. Results implied that program was having an impact on the transition from primary to junior secondary school, especially for girls. Participation in the program associated with lower dropout rates, especially during the transition to (junior) secondary school (Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd 2001). Progresa also shown to reduce children’s labour force participation (Parker and Skoufias 2000) Not shown to have any significant impact on learning outcomes, as measured by student scores on achievement tests (Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd 2001). Health and Nutrition There were 2.09 more visists per day to clinis in Progresa areas than in non-Progresa areas (Gertler and Boyce 2001). Child beneficiaries had a 23 percent reduction in the incidence of illness, an 18 percent reduction in anaemia, and between a 1 and 4 percent increase in height compared to non-beneficiaries (Gertler and Boyce 2001). Adult beneficiaries of the programme were also found to be significantly healthier than non-beneficiaries, with a 19% reduction in the number of days they lost to illness (Gertler and Boyce 2001). Evaluation recommendations: For grants to be extended to high school (senior secondary school) level. Government should explore the possibility of including bonuses for good academic performance. Questions raised by IFPRI report re: programme design Are there more effective methods to identify the poorest households for targeting? Is the cash transfer amount too high or not high enough? Is the simultaneous targeting of education, health, and nutrition outcomes better to targeting outcomes in only one of these sectors? Should cash transfers be made to schools (supply side) to schools instead to improve attendance and performance? What if the benefits were given to fathers instead of mothers? Should children of younger or older ages be targeted? Implications of Rigorous Evaluation Credibility: The rigorous program and impact evaluation process of the programme gave its success credibility in Mexico and the rest of the world. In Mexico, this credibility helped to make the programme politically robust. When a new government entered in 2000, it not only continued to support Progresa but actually worked to expand it based on the lessons from the programme’s evaluation. The programme gained international recognition, attracting financial support such as the billion dollar loan from the Inter-American Development Bank and prompting adoption of similar CCT programmes all over the world. Precedence: Set a new high standard for the design and conduct of social policy in Mexico and in the region at large. In particular, it encouraged the early involvement of both federal government and researchers in the design and evaluation of programs. Evaluation results and recommendations inspired new questions about program choices and program design. These in turn have informed the programme designs of subsequent CCT programs in Latin America and the rest of the world.

Columbia Study Timing and size of payout Structure of most CCT programs is surprisingly similar: Families receive money (often every 2 months) when their children meet specified monthly attendance targets Usually +- 80% In 2005 the Secretary of Education of the City of Bogota decided to pilot a new CCT programme to: Prevent drop out from secondary school Encourage matric graduation & tertiary enrollment Pilot in 2 of 12 localities in the city for 1 year Results to inform the design for city-wide program Barrera-Osorio, Bertrand, Linden et al 2011 References: Barrera-Osorio et al. (2011)

Columbia study: 3 programs tested Intervention Regular Transfers Conditions Additional Transfers 1 Standard CCT 30,000 pesos (US$15)/month 80 % attendance /month   2 Savings CCT 20,000 pesos (US$10)/month 100,000 pesos (US$50) at enrollment time of next school year 3 Graduation CCT Graduated from secondary school 600,000 pesos (US$300) immediate payment with proof of enrolment in higher education; otherwise, payment delayed by one year number of students San Cristobal 6851 treated, 4056 control (11k) Suba 1133 treated, 1393 control (2.5k) Students must pay to enroll each year and pay for required items like uniforms, books, and supplies. Monthly education costs fluctuate between US$13 and US$22 – a relatively large expense considering that the poorest families in Bogota earn less than US$750 a year. The standard and savings interventions were tested in the locality of San Cristóbal (grades 6–11), while the more expensive graduation intervention was tested on a smaller group of students in the locality of Suba (grades 9–11). Each intervention had a randomly selected comparison group in that location, which allowed the researchers to measure its impact. However, it is not possible to directly compare the interventions in San Cristóbal with the intervention in Suba.

Colombia study: Attendance Despite reducing the amount for regular payments, the saving and graduation CCTs  attendance >= standard CCT

Colombia study: Re-enrollment Savings & graduation CCTs  on re-enrolment > standard CCT

Colombia study: Tertiary enrollment Savings & graduation CCTs  tertiary enrollment but standard CCT does not (not statistically significant)

Columbia study: Other effects? Savings CCT Especially effective at improving re-enrollment of the poorest students & those most at risk of dropping out +- 12 percentage point  Eligibility rules & Unintended consequences: Families on average did not enrol all eligible children And if they were registered, but not selected, they attended school less than a sibling who was selected Barrera-Osorio, Bertrand, Linden et al 2011

Transfer size? In Colombia – the savings CCT reduced the monthly transfer by 30% from the standard CCT. Did not result in lower monthly attendance than the standard CCT CCT study in Malawi Randomly varied CCT amounts in Malawi: $1/month to girls as effective as $2-5, similar results for transfers to parents Transfer Size in Malawi Authors: Baird, Sarah, Craig McIntosh, and Berk Özler Link to J-PAL Evaluation Summary or Paper: http://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluation/impact-cash-transfers-educational-attainment-sexual-behavior-and-hiv-status-adolescent-gi Additional Details: Researchers selected 176 enumeration areas (EAs), or administrative subdivisions containing around 250 households, from urban, semi-rural, and rural areas of Zomba district for the study. In each EA, a portion of unmarried girls aged 13 to 22 was randomly selected to participate. Girls who were in school at the start of the study (“baseline schoolgirls”) were offered conditional transfers in 46 EAs, unconditional transfers in 27 EAs, and no transfers in 15 EAs. In all 88 of the treatment EAs, girls who had dropped out of school at the start of the study (“baseline dropouts”) were offered cash transfers conditional on attending school. Girls who received a transfer were randomly assigned an amount of US$1, $2, $3, $4, or $5 per month. The girls’ parents received a transfer of US$4, $6, $8, or $10 per month, which randomly varied by EA.  Researchers found that CCTs to teenage girls and their families improved a wide range of outcomes, including school attendance, sexual behavior, and disease prevalence. The unconditional variation of the program, which did not impose attendance requirements for receiving payment, was more effective in helping baseline schoolgirls delay marriage and childbearing The CCT program improved schooling outcomes more effectively than the UCT program. Among girls who were enrolled in school at baseline, those in the CCT group were enrolled for 0.54 more terms throughout the six-term program, relative to a comparison group average of 4.8 terms. Girls in the UCT group were enrolled for 0.23 additional terms. Attendance was 8 percentage points higher in the CCT group, relative to a comparison group average of 81 percent. The UCT program did not significantly affect attendance. Girls in the CCT group performed better on tests of English reading comprehension and cognitive ability, but the UCT program had no effect on test scores. Different sizes tested To compare the generosity of this pilot project to other cash transfer programs, we measure the annual transfer amount that each household was eligible for as a fraction of household per capita expenditures and find that At BF= 10.4 percent, the Burkina Faso cash transfer pilot was small in size (see Fiszbein and Schady, 2009 who note CCT program generosity levels of 1, 6, 17, 22, and 29 percent of household expenditures in Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Nicaragua, respectively).

Conditional vs Unconditional? Malawi study – first study to test CCT vs UCT Considers effects on education and sexual behaviour of adolescent girls Zomba district, 2007 - 2009 Sample size – nearly 3,000 schoolgirls aged 13 – 22 CCT - 80 % attendance /month UCT – no conditions QJE: This article assesses the role of conditionality in cash transfer programs using a unique experiment targeted at adolescent girls in Malawi. The program featured two distinct interventions: unconditional transfers (UCT arm) and transfers conditional on school attendance (CCT arm). Although there was a modest decline in the dropout rate in the UCT arm in comparison with the control group, it was only 43% as large as the impact in the CCT arm at the end of the 2-year program. The CCT arm also outperformed the UCT arm in tests of English reading comprehension. However, teenage pregnancy and marriage rates were substantially lower in the UCT than the CCT arm, entirely due to the impact of UCTs on these outcomes among girls who dropped out of school. Using independently administered tests of cognitive ability, mathematics, and English reading comprehension, we find that although achievement is significantly improved in all three tests in the CCT arm compared with the control group, no such gains are detectable in th When we turn to examine marriage and pregnancy rates, however, unconditional transfers dominate. The likelihood of being ever pregnant and ever married were 27% and 44% lower in the UCT arm than in the control group at the end of the 2-year intervention, respectively,whereas programimpacts onthese two outcomes were small and statistically insignificant in the CCT arm. These substantial delays in marriage and fertility in the UCT armare found entirely among adolescent girls who dropped out of school after the start of the 2-year intervention; rates of marriage and fertility among girls still enrolled in school at follow-up were negligible regardless of treatment status. Hence, the success of the conditionality in promoting the formation of humancapital among the compliers appears tobe achievedat the cost of denying transfers to noncompliers who are shown to be particularly at risk for earlymarriage and teenage pregnancy.e UCT arm. 176 EAs. Randomised at EA level. 88 get a UCT or CCT. Transferamounts to the parents were varied randomly across EAs between $4, $6, $8, and$10 permonth, sothat eachparentwithinanEA received the same offer. Within each EA, a lottery was held to determine the transfer amount to the young female program beneficiaries Monthly school attendance for all girls in the CCT arm was checked and payment for the following month was withheld for any student whose attendance was below 80% of the number of days school was in session for the previous month. References: Baird et al (2011)

Malawi study – Education Results Enrollment UCTs - 5% higher than control CCTs – 11% higher Attendance UCTs – no significant impact CCTs - 8% points higher than control Learning (English, Maths, Cognitive tests) UCTs – no significant difference CCTs – significant improvements in all

Malawi study – Other Results Marriage/ Pregnancy Married after 2 years Control: 18% married UCT: 10% CCT: no significant difference Pregnant during the program Control: 25% UCT: 18% UCT effect appears to be driven by cash to school drop outs as opposed to CCT where no cash if drop out It appears that the unconditional transfer allowed girls who dropped out of school–and therefore would have stopped receiving conditional payments–to support themselves without relying on a husband or having transactional sex with older men, thereby delaying marriage and childbearing.

Mixed Results on Importance of Conditionality In rural Burkina Faso CCT vs UCT study for children 7 – 15 , Very low enrollment - +- 50% UCTS = CCTs  in erollment for non-marginal children (boys, older & higher ability children) CCTS >  enrollment for marginal children (girls, younger children, lower ability children) “Labeled” cash transfers as effective as CCTs in Morocco In Burkina Faso, conditionality was important for more marginalized students Authors: Akresh, Richard and de Walque, Damien and Kazianga, Harounan Link to J-PAL Evaluation Summary or Paper: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/01/28/000158349_20130128162856/Rendered/PDF/wps6340.pdf Additional Details: We conduct a randomized experiment in Burkina Faso to estimate the impact of alternative cash transfer delivery mechanisms on education. The two-year pilot program randomly distributed cash transfers that were either conditional (on enrollment and attendance) or unconditional. Results indicate that conditional and unconditional transfers have similar impacts increasing enrollment for children traditionally favored by parents for school participation, including boys, older children, and higher ability children. However, conditional transfers are significantly more effective than unconditional transfers in improving the enrollment of “marginal children”, those less likely to go to school, such as girls, younger children, and lower ability children. The two-year pilot program randomly distributed cash transfers that were either conditional or unconditional. Families under the conditional schemes were required to have their children ages 7–15 enrolled in school and attending classes regularly The results indicate that unconditional and conditional cash transfer programs have a similar impact increasing the enrollment of children who are traditionally favored by parents for school participation, including boys, older children, and higher ability children. However, the conditional transfers are significantly more effective than the unconditional transfers in improving the enrollment of “marginal children” who are initially less likely to go to school, such as girls, younger children, and lower ability children. Thus, conditionality plays a critical role in benefiting children who are less likely to receive investments from their parents. Attrition very low at 1-year / 2-year follow up amounts of $17.6 for children ages 7-10 and $35.2 for children ages 11-15, we find that CCTs With annual transfer lead to statistically significant increases in enrollment of 20.3 percent for girls, 37.3 percent for younger children, and 36.2 percent for low ability children relative to mean enrollment in those sub-groups. For these same categories of marginal children, UCTs either had no statistically significant impact or showed an impact that was significantly smaller than the CCT effect. However, we find that UCTs and CCTs have similar impacts in increasing the enrollment of children who are already enrolled at baseline or are traditionally prioritized by parents for school increases due to CCTs and UCTs respectively of 21.8 and 22.2 percent for boys, 17.4 and 14 participation, including boys, older children, and higher ability children. We find enrollment percent for older children, and 27.0 and 28.5 percent for higher ability children. Labeled” cash transfers as effective as CCTs in Morocco Authors: Benhassine, Najy, Florencia Devoto, Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, and Victor Pouliquen Link to J-PAL Evaluation Summary or Paper: http://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluation/cash-transfers-education-morocco Additional Details: Labeled cash transfer (LCT): In this version of the program, families with children of primary school age could receive transfers whether or not their children attended school. In practice, since enrollment in the Tayssir program happened at schools, children enrolled in Tayssir were automatically registered and enrolled in school at the same time, but the transfers were not conditional on continued enrollment. The monthly amount per child increased as each child progressed through school, starting from 60 MAD (US$8) for each child in grades 1 and 2 and increasing to 100 MAD (US$13) for children in grades 5 and 6. The average transfer amount represented about 5 percent of the average household’s monthly consumption, which is small compared to a range of 6 to 25 percent for existing CCTs in middle-income countries. Conditional cash transfer (CCT): In this version of the program, cash transfers were disbursed to parents of primary school-age children, as long as their child did not miss school more than four times each month. The monthly transfer amounts were the same as those in the LCT program. The Tayssir cash transfers greatly increased school participation under all versions of the program, with the LCT having slightly larger impacts. References: Akresh et al (2013), Benhassine et al (2014)

Overview Measuring impact: Why randomise Who is J-PAL Evidence from randomized evaluations on conditional cash transfers for education Mexico (PROGRESA) Colombia Malawi Lessons and nuances Highlight that evidence on "facts" comes from representative surveys (absence, learning levels etc.) whereas evidence on "impacts" comes from RCT's.

Lots of lessons, many nuances Many are supportive Some conflict When thinking through your own design: Try to understand the evidence And what might be most applicable to your context Ask new questions important to you based on work already done Work with partners from early on How much should the grant be? Should it be conditional?/ labelled? UCT? How to target? What might be the unintended consequences? What other positive benefits might the money have? What are my baseline conditions? How do these relate to those in othre evaluations

J-PAL’s Post Primary Education Initiative To promote policy-relevant research on secondary, tertiary, and vocational education in developing countries Step 1: Review paper Highlighted gaps in the literature Identified policies that that should be given the highest priority for future research

J-PAL’s Post Primary Education Initiative Research questions Pedagogy The role of information communication technology The design of teacher incentives Strategies to include and support disadvantaged students The role of private schools Mechanisms to increase the demand for schooling among students and their parents (CCTs, information interventions)