Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 1 Stopping Next-Gen Threats Dan Walters – Sr. Systems Engineer Mgr.

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Presentation transcript:

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 1 Stopping Next-Gen Threats Dan Walters – Sr. Systems Engineer Mgr.

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 2

3 "We're moving towards a world where every attack is effectively zero-day… having a signatured piece of malware, that shouldn't be the foundation on which any security model works." - Chris Young, GVP Cisco Security Tech Week Europe, September 28 th 2012

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 4 High Profile APT Attacks Are Increasingly Common

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 5 The Attack Lifecycle – Multiple Stages Exploitation of system 1 3 Callbacks and control established 2 Malware binary download Compromised Web server, or Web 2.0 site 1 Callback Server IPS 3 2 DMZ File Share 2 File Share 1

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 6 Crimeware == for the $

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 7 Advanced Persistent Threat == Human

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 8 This is Alex == FireEye Research

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 9 The Usual Suspects

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 10 Organized…Persistent…

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 11 Reconnaissance made easy…

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 12 The Exploit

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 13 LaserMotive

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 14 CEOs are targeted

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 15 Could you stop this?

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 16 The Callback

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 17 Hidden in plain view…

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 18 Blog Post?

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 19 RSS Feed?

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 20 We’re Only Human

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 21 HR make for easy targets

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 22 Just doing my job…

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 23 NATO is a frequent spearphish target

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 24 Global Unrest

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 25 Who’s Oil is it?

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 26 The curious case of Trojan.Bisonal Targets 100% Japanese organizations Delivered via weaponized doc/xls files Embeds the target name into the command and control traffic

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 27 Custom “Flag” and c2 domain GET /j/news.asp?id=* HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: flag:khi host:Business IP: OS:XPSP3 vm: �� proxy: �� Host: online.cleansite.us Cache-Control: no-cache GET /a.asp?id=* HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0;.NET CLR ;.NET CLR ;.NET CLR ) Host: khi.acmetoy.com Connection: Keep-Alive

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 28 Other “Flag”s seen flag:410maff <-- ministry of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries flag:1223 Flag:712mhi<-- mitsubishi heavy industries Flag:727x Flag:8080 Flag:84d flag:boat Flag:d2 Flag:dick flag:jsexe flag:jyt Flag:m615 flag:toray Flag:MARK 1 flag:nec01<-- nec corporation Flag:qqq flag:nids<-- national institute for defense studies (nids.go.jp) flag:nsc516<-- nippon steel corp flag:ihi<-- ihi corp

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 29 China is not the only threat

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 30 Multi-Protocol, Real-Time VX Engine PHASE 1PHASE 1 Multi-Protocol Object Capture PHASE 2PHASE 2 Virtual Execution Environments PHASE 1: WEB MPS Aggressive Capture Web Object Filter DYNAMIC, REAL-TIME ANALYSIS Exploit detection Malware binary analysis Cross-matrix of OS/apps Originating URL Subsequent URLs OS modification report C&C protocol descriptors Map to Target OS and Applications PHASE 1: MPS Attachments URL Analysis

Copyright (c) 2011, FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. | CONFIDENTIAL 31 Thank You! FireEye - Modern Malware Protection System