CURRENT AMPHIBIOUS FORCE LEVELS

OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT ► TWO TO THREE ARGS FORWARD DEPLOYED  ONE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN / ARABIAN GULF-INDIAN OCEAN AREA  ONE OR TWO IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC AREA.  ONE ARG/MEU IS FORWARD BASED IN SASEBO AND OKINAWA JAPAN.

Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a sea power possesses. BHLiddell Hart

CRITICALITIES ► TRANSITION FROM SEA TO LAND, INVOLVING NAVAL, GROUND AND AIR FORCES MOST DIFFICULT. ► COMMANDS AND CONTROL OF MULTI- SERVICE, MULTI ENVIRONMENT ACTIVITIES COMPLEX ► CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN RESTRICTED WATERS INCREASES VULNERABILITY TO HOSTILE ATTACK, PARTICULARLY DURING EARLY PHASES WHEN SUPPORT OF OWN HEAVY WEAPONS NOT AVAILABLE

RECENT EMPLOYMENT ► FRENCH AND THEN US FORCES FOR OVER 25 YEARS IN INDOCHINA ► ANGLO-FRENCH ASSAULT IN SUEZ, ► FALKLANDS CONFLICT ► US LANDINGS IN GRENADA ► COALITION LANDINGS DURING GULF WAR IN 1992 ► AUSTRALIAN LANDINGS IN EAST TIMOR ► US/ALLIES OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

EARLY DEVELOPMENTS ► INTRODUCED SINCE EARLY DAYS OF INCEPTION OF INDIAN NAVY ► RECOMMENDATION TO POSSESS A SMALL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CAPABLE OF PROTECTING INDIA’S REGIONAL INTERESTS SUGGESTED IN 1946 WHEN INDEPEDENCE ON HORIZON. ► CURRENT CAPABILITY BRIGADE MINUS

INDIAN NAVAL HISTORY ► LST INS MAGAR, OF W W II VINTAGE ACQUIRED IN 1949 ► APPROVAL ACCORDED IN 1958 TO ESTABLISH A PRESENCE IN A& N ISLANDS ► POST INDO CHINA WAR DEBACLE RESIDENT NAVAL OFFICER WAS APPOINTED IN PORT BLAIR. ► INCREASED INDONESIAN INTRUSIONS IN NICOBAR ISLANDS IN 1965

EARLY DEVELOPMENTS ► ORDER PLACED FOR TWO LST (M) FROM RUSSIA IN 1965 ► INDONESIAN THREAT AND INDONESIAN – PAK BONDING OF 1965 ► BOTCHED UP AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AT COX’S BAZAAR IN OPERATION BEAVER AS A PART OF 1971 OPERATIONS. ► LESSONS HOISTED IN IMPORTANCE OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSETS ESTABLISHED

AMPHIBIOUS OPS OF INDIAN NAVY ► SRI LANKA IN 1988, SOMALIA IN 1995, ► CYCLONE RELIEF IN SAURASHTRA IN 1998 /ORISSA IN ► AS A ‘FORCE IN BEING’ ON WEST COAST’ DURING OP PARAKARAM. ► PAKISTAN DIVERTED ONE DIVISION FROM LAND BORDERS TO MAKRAN COAST.

SCOPE ► CURRENT TRENDS IN US NAVY, ROYAL NAVY, PLA NAVY AND AUSTRALIAN NAVY ► FOCUSED ATTENTION ON ‘SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT’ ► TASKS OF INDIAN NAVY ► ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT FORCES ► DEFINING CREDIBLE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE FOR INDIAN NAVY

ROLES OF US NAVY ► SEA CONTROL ► MARITIME SUPREMACY ► POWER PROJECTION ► STRATEGIC DETERRENCE ► FORWARD NAVAL PRESENCE ► STRATEGIC SEALIFT

ORGANISATION ► AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (ATF) ► RANGE FROM A SINGLE AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP/MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE) [ARG/MEU (SOC)], TO A LARGER ORGANIZATION CAPABLE OF EMPLOYING A MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE (MEB) OR EVEN A MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

ROLES/ TASKS ► MAINLAND OPERATIONS  MAKRAN COAST  BANGLADESH ► ASSAULT LANDINGS TO RETAKE LOST TERRITORY. ► AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS ► TACTICAL DECEPTION.

ROLES/ TASKS ► DEFENCE OF ISLAND TERRITORIES ISLANDS  POACHING, SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN AND GUN RUNNING  PENETRATION BYOF FUNDAMENTALIST IN LAKSWADWEEP ISLANDS WITH THE PREDOMINANTLY MINORITY POPULATION  AIRPORT/PORT/ KEY FACILITY SEIZURE

OUT OF AREA CONTIGENCIES ► IN SUPPORT OF UN /COALITION OPERATIONS ► EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS ► SHOW OF FORCE/ REINFORCEMENT

OTHER TASKS ► CONDUCT LANDINGS IN SUPPORT OF WITHDRAWING TROOPS ► LIMITED OFFENSIVE ATTACK ► HOSTAGE RECOVERY. ► GAS AND OIL PLATFORM OPERATIONS. ► HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

LIMITATIONS AMPHIBIOUS FORCES ► SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT  LST(L), LST(M) AND LCUs LACK SPEED  CAPACITY TO CARRY OUT VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT MINIMAL.  HARD BEACHING TO DISCHARGE ARMOUR  VULNERABLE

ARMY COMPONENT/ NEED FOR RAISING MARINES? ► MOUNTAIN BRIGADE MINUS OF THE INDIAN ARMY IS DESIGNATED AS THE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE. ► BASED IN PORT BLAIR UNDER ANC ► BATTALIONS CHANGED/ REPLACED EVERY TWO YEARS ON A STAGGERED BASIS ► ANOTHER BRIGADE IS KEPT STAND BY ON THE MAINLAND TO AUGMENT THE PORT BLAIR BRIGADE SHOULD THE NEED ARISE.

LIMITATIONS AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS ► LIMITED STAND OFF CAPABILTY 1-2 NM ► LCAS/GEMINIS VULNERABLE IN SURF ZONE ► LIMITED SITES FOR HARD BEACHING BY LST(L) ► UNDERLOADING OF ENGINES

LIMITATIONS - AAV ► AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE-BMP AND BDR FROM MECHANIZED INFANTARY ► INADEQUATE SEA KEEPING ABILITY ► VULNERABLE IN SURF ZONE ► LIMITED OTH CAPABILTY ► GUN TOO LIGHT ► CG HOVERCRAFT – LCAC?

ARMY COMPONENT/ NEED FOR RAISING MARINES? ► STRETCHED ARMY - OP PARAKRAM, THE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE MOBILIZED TO THE WESTERN COMMAND. ► THE TWO YEARLY CHANGES EFFECTS TRAINING. ► TIME FOR CHANGE OVER BY THE TIME, INCOMING BATTALION GOES THROUGH THE TRAINING AND BECOMES PROFICIENT ►

AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING ► NEEDYEAR-ROUND TRAINING. ► TRAINING SEASONAL- WEATHER DEPENDENT ► HIGH SKILLS- NEGOTIATION OF ‘SURF ZONE’ BY BMPS OR LCA ► MUSTERING VARIED ASSETS OF COMPONENTS DIFFICULT. ► NEED FOR DEDICATED AMPHIBIOUS SCHOOL.

INTELLIGENCE ► MOST CRITICAL ► AIR RECONNAISSANCE BY ARC, IAF, IN, CG RESOURCES INCLUDING UAV ► SATELLITE ► INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES LIKE RAW, IB, DIA AND SBS/NAVAL LIAISON TEAMS ► SUBMARINE RECONNAISSANCE ► SIGNIT AND COMINT

COMMAND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS ► SUCCESS DEPENDENT ON C3 ► ‘LESSONS LEARNT ‘ FILES OF AMPHEXES ► INABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL SERVICES TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION LATERALLY

OPS- MAKRAN COAST ► FAVORABLE SEA/ AIR SITUATION ► ROA OF FLEET AIR DEFENCE ► PAKISTANI SURVEILLANCE ► FALKLAND’S CAMPAIGN ► LOW SPEED- AMPHIBIOUS UNITS- A CONSTRAINT ► RAIDS, DECEPTION, OR OPENING A NEW FRONT FOR ONGOING LAND OPERATIONS ► HIGH WASTAGE ► FORCE IN BEING

NAVAL GROWN MARINES ? IS IT THE ANSWER

CREDIBLE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE ► TREND- MODERN AMPHIBIOUS FORCES ► TASKS ► MARITIME INTERESTS GULF TO MALACCA. ► BRIGADE STRENGTH

CREDIBLE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE ► TWO LPD CAPABLE OF CARRYING FOUR LCACS/ LCUS ► THREE LSL (L) WITH IMPROVED SPEED AND SHIP SIDE MEXEFLOTES ► DETERMINE- LST (M) / LCUs AS PER A BRIGADE LEVEL TABLE ► MODERN MEDIUM LIFT HEPTR (10 TONS)

FOOD FOR THOUGHT ► VIRAAT- EX HERMES- HELO CARRIER ► OPERATE HEAVY/ATTACK HELOS OF IAF ► PLAN AN EXERCISE IN A&N ?