Department of Homeland Security (DHS) GPS Interference Detection and Mitigation (IDM) John Merrill DHS GIS Program Manager Office of Applied Technology Geospatial Management Office

Topics of Discussion DHS IDM Mandates Threats to Critical Infrastructure (CI)/Key Resources (KR) Relying on GPS Threat Assessment & Operations Plan Incident Response Mitigation & Detection Central Data Repository PNT Interference System Capability

DHS IDM Mandates Coordinate domestic capabilities to identify, analyze, locate, attribute, & mitigate sources of interference to the GPS & its augmentations. Develop & maintain capabilities, procedures & techniques, & routinely exercise civil contingency responses to ensure continuity of operations in the event that access to GPS signal is disrupted or denied. Collect, analyze, store, & disseminate interference reports from all sources to enable appropriate investigation, notification & enforcement action.

GPS Supporting Power Grid Systems Power Grids Substations Wireless Internet Stock Exchanges Banks/ Nodes GPS Supporting Transportation Systems GPS Supporting Banking Operations Internet Banking ATM Networks C 2 Centers Rail Yards Switching Towers & Signals Access GIS / Map Energy Plants GPS Extent of GPS Dependencies GPS Time Air Traffic Control GPS Time & Position Ship Routing GPS Time & Position Relay Position To 911 Dispatch Comms Networks GPS Supporting Communications Systems

Preparedness Activities DOT-DOD Information Dissemination & Coordination Team (IDCT) sponsored a Command Post Exercise on February 19, 2009 to fulfill: –Space-Based PNT Policy goals –DHS Interference Detection and Mitigation (IDM) Plan objectives –National Security Council – Chartered Purposeful Interference Response Team (PIRT) requirements –Rehearse newly revised GPSOC, NOCC, NAVCEN procedures

Preparedness Activities Command Post Exercise (CPX) Simulated purposeful scenarios Illuminated need for –Interagency checklist with clear lead and supporting authorities and incident ranking criteria –Multi-agency collaborative environment for shared situational awareness –Further exercises w/greater complexity, scope, and interaction with PIRT Continue CPX simulations until response is second nature

Threat Assessment & Operations Plan (OPlan) Preliminary Study of CI/KR Vulnerabilities Report with Recommendations: –Joint Civil & Defense Interagency Stakeholders Dependency on GPS –Impact to CI/KR –Technical Tools to Mitigate Vulnerability Gaps –Demonstration/test to ID Vulnerabilities and Measure Effective Mitigation Techniques Operations Plan

Central Data Repository Requirements (Policy Derived Qualitative) Central Interference Report (IR) database focal point of all PNT interference Encompass process and functions for detection validation, investigation, assessment, corroboration of IR Automated dissemination of data and reduce IR information distribution delays for decision support Mechanisms for cataloging PNT applications and associated vulnerabilities to interference Employ information assurance components and processes to protect database Assure the integrity of IR and sensors

Central Data Repository Requirements (Quantitative Goals & Objectives) User Access Threshold – 70 concurrent user access User Access Sign-on – 475 read access 150 PNT incident reports (IR) per month (1800 annually) Database support 500,000 unique IR entries Responses to system queries less than 8 seconds New & updated IRs posted immediately visible, available and accessible System availability of 99.9% Automatic update to subscribers – Initially: –Navigation Center, FAA Operations Center, GPS Operations Center.

Central Data Repository Baseline Requirements - Cost control, use existing architecture FAA Spectrum Engineering Tracking System (SETS) Integrated Common Analytical Viewer (iCAV) –Geospatial enabling/visualization tool –Geographic Information System interface that integrates multiple geospatial data sources from a centralized geospatial data warehouse –Based on the Environmental Systems Research Institute’s (ESIR) suite of products; ability to map, analyze, and view information from a mission specific application which assembles and compares data from various sources.

Central Data Repository Federal Aviation Administration’s SETS core 10 data fields (mandatory entries): 1. SETS ID # {Record URL} 2. DATE START - DD/MM/YYYY 3. DATE STOP - DD/MM/YYYY 4. EVENT TIME START - #### UTC 5. EVENT TIME STOP - #### UTC 6. LATITUDE - +##.####### Degrees 7. LONGITUDE - +###.####### Degrees 8. USER EQUIPMENT TYPE 9. FREQUENCY (L1, L2, L5… etc.) - ####.#### 10. REMARKS & OTHER RELEVENT INFORMATION

Central Data Repository Federal Aviation Administration’s SETS four additional data fields (optional entries): 11. Event Status 12. Source 13. Joint Spectrum Interference Report (JSIR) DTG 14. Altitude Future data field: US National Grid The following slides show the existing FAA’s SETS web pages which will be changed to a DHS PNTIP “look & feel”

Equip – FAA Equipment types which may be experiencing the interference. Eventually populate with PNT equipment This is the Intranet available to authenticated users Address will change to:

This is currently the FAA Maintenance Management System Mainframe event code category. In the GPS SETS module is replaced by Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR) date time group.

PNTIP

PNT Interference System Capability Collaboration of Federal Agencies Utilize Existing Infrastructure for Mitigation of PNT Interference –CORS, NDGPS, Rescue-21 –Excess of 25,000 available –Negotiating with TELCOM Industry Leverage Current Technology

Patriot Watch Overlook Systems Technologies, Inc. System-of-Systems approach to provide real- time monitoring (preparedness), location & notification (response) of GPS interference –Designed with government & commercial hardware –Persistent monitoring yields situational awareness –Timely response to anomalies –Sensor placement based on PNT critical infrastructure & resources –Remains operational when GPS systems is “stressed”

Patriot Shield Overlook Systems Technologies, Inc. System-of-Systems designed to deny the nefarious use of PNT signals within the United States –Deployable & fixed assets part of national solution –Intelligence community part of systems activation –CONOPS requires coordinated operational threat response –Modeling, simulation, & testing critical to systems development –Will leverage existing Electronic Attack & Testing Coordination protocols for notification & response

Multiple DF Sensor Network - Low Data Message Handling Requirements State & Local Fusion Centers (notional) Central Data Repository Regional Alarm Summary Data National Alarm Summary Sensor Data Detection Descriptor Word (Position, Amp, Freq, Time and LOB Data) Local Law DHS DOT DoD FAA FCC Homeland Special Signal Detection & Geo-location National Level System Architecture Regional Sensor Network

FOX ABC Bloomberg UN

Summary Central Data Repository Funded; TRIAD & other federal agencies by December 2009 Vulnerability Assessment & OPLAN Early 2009/2010 National Level Sensor Capability 3 – 6 Years

Partnerships Department of Homeland Security U. S. Coast Guard National Geospatial Intelligence Agency National Security Agency Naval Surface Warfare Center – Dahlgren, VA USAF GPS Wing Joint Navigation Warfare Center USAF Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program Federal Aviation Administration National PNT Coordination Office Overlook Systems Technologies, Inc. NAVSYS Corporation L3 Communications Integrity Applications, Inc.

DHS Geospatial Management Office Mr. John Merrill