This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium This project is funded by the European Union Projekat finansira Evropska Unija Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Projekat realizuje Human Dynamics Konzorcijum PRACTICE Antony Thanos Ph.D. Chem. Eng.

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Hazard Identification (line from tank to pump)  HAZOP technique, examine deviations for : oNO FLOW, LESS FLOW oMORE TEMPERATURE oLOSS OF CONTAINEMENT Ομάδα HAZOP V-1 P-2 V-2 LI PI LPG Tank

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Hazard Identification (cont.), HAZOP form for use Ομάδα HAZOP NoDeviationCausesConsequencesSafeguards Comments, Recommendations 1 No flow 2 Less flow 3 More Temperature 4 Loss of Containment

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Hazard Identification (cont.), answers example Ομάδα HAZOP NoDeviationCausesConsequencesSafeguards Comments, Recommendations 1 No Flow V1 or V2 closed and P1 starts Cavitation in pump, potential pump failure, as seal failure with LPG release, in prolonged or repeated cases No remote pump start capability (local only) and V2 very close to pump Closed suction results in excessive noise, operator will immediately identify incident Develop written procedure to require check of proper line-up before pump start. Installation of limit switches for V1 position with position signal to pump house. 2 Less Flow LI very lowAs in No.1Procedures require check for adequate level in tank before pump start. Examine installation of level transmitter with level indication to pump- house, along with visual alarm, forcing pump trip in very low level.

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Hazard Identification (cont.), answers example Ομάδα HAZOP NoDeviationCausesConsequencesSafeguards Comments, Recommendations 3 More Temperature V1 and V2 closed in summer conditions Thermal expansion increases pressure, potential for pipe rupture Piping test pressure according to standards Install Thermal Relief Valve (TRV) between V1 and V2 4 Loss of Containment Piping mechanical failure Collision of vehicle in piping Release of LPG from tank, uncontrolled if V1 cannot close (failure close to V1) or failure upstream of V1 Manual isolation of V1 Install Fail-Safe remote operated isolation valve at valve outlet (internal if possible) Establish protection of piping routing from collisions

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Accident scenarios  Define some worst-case scenarios for LPG installation Ομάδα HAZOP LI PI LPG Tank 200 m 3 2 in hose 2 in, gas phase LPG Tank 120 m 3 to other tanks, compressor to other tanks Supply pipeline from refinery LPG Road Tanker 20 tn 6 in, liquid phase

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Accident scenarios (cont.), answers example  Storage area (tanks) oCatastrophic failure of 200 m 3 tank  Movement facilities oCatastrophic failure of road tanker oCatastrophic failure (FBR) of 6 inch pipeline from refinery Ομάδα HAZOP

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Top event scenarios  Initial event : Catastrophic failure of 200 m 3 LPG tank, complete top events in event tree Ομάδα HAZOP PHASEIGNITIONCONFINEMENTTOP EVENT DIRECT 2-PHASE DELAYED NO CONFINEMENT CONFINEMENT NO IGNITION DIRECT LIQUID DELAYEDNO CONFINEMENT PHASE CONFINEMENT NO IGNITION

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Top event scenarios (cont.), answer  Initial event : Catastrophic failure of 200 m 3 LPG tank Ομάδα HAZOP PHASEIGNITIONCONFINEMENTTOP EVENT DIRECT FIREBALL (BLEVE) 2-PHASE DELAYED NO CONFINEMENTFLASH FIRE CONFINEMENTUVCE NO IGNITIONSAFE DISPERSION DIRECTPOOL FIRE LIQUID DELAYEDNO CONFINEMENTFLASH FIRE PHASE CONFINEMENTUVCE NO IGNITIONSAFE DISPERSION

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Risk analysis on consequence, Domino effects  Comment Domino effects from tanker BLEVE

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Risk analysis on consequence, Domino effects (cont.), comments example on “internal” effects  Domino radius includes LPGSITE tanks. Secondary accidents expected in LPGSITE tanks, resulting, in worst-case, in more severe consequences compared to primary accident (tanker BLEVE), due to higher capacity of tanks (100 m 3 ) than tanker capacity (appr. 40 m 3 )  Domino radius includes other LPGSITE areas (e.g. cylinder filling station, piping network). Not significant secondary accidents, due to less severe consequences in those areas

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Risk analysis on consequence, Domino effects (cont.), comments example on “external” effects to be made from LPGSITE  Domino radius includes areas of GASCOMP site  GASCOMP must be informed in order to take the relevant risk into account in its own risk assessments  Usually no detailed map of neighbour site is available, nor details of operation  Not detailed comments to be made from LPGSITE for accidents in GASCOMP

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Risk analysis on consequence, Domino effects (cont.), example of comments to be made from GASCOMP (owner and responsible for risk analysis) on “external” effects from LPGSITE primary accident  Domino area does not include GASCOMP tanks area, or road tanker station. No secondary accidents expected in this area (excluding fragment effects)  Domino area includes pump station  GASCOMP must examine accidents in pump station (and in piping included in domino area)

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Risk analysis on consequence, effects to people

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Risk analysis on consequence, effects to people (cont.)  Tank BLEVE accident in LPG installation located within industrial park, close to village oVery severe effects : 1500 TDU, 3 rd degree burns in more than 50% of exposed population oSevere effects : 450 TDU, 3 rd degree burns in 1% of exposed population oMild effects : 170 TDU, 1 st degree burns at significant part of exposed population (TDU : (kW/m 2 ) 4/3. sec, be careful with units)

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Risk analysis on consequence, effects to people (cont.)  Comment on effects to population  Comment on access to site  Comment on effects to transportation routes  Consider emergency planning actions

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Risk analysis on consequence, effects to people (cont.), comments example  Very severe effects restricted within industrial park. 3 neighbour sites in very sever effects zone. Sections of 2 other neighbour sites in very severe effects zone  Severe effects restricted within industrial park. A few additional sites within zone  Mild effects zone includes mainly industrial park, but approaches village limits  No vulnerable places (schools etc.) within zones examined

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Risk analysis on consequence, effects to people (cont.), comments example  Access to site for emergency personnel is established via 3 alternative routes  No main transportation routes affected, only roads within industrial park. Road to village approached only by external zone

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Risk analysis on consequence, effects to people (cont.), comments example  Traffic blockage to be established at mild zone limits, in order to avoid consequences to police personnel  Precautionary blocking traffic in wider area is beneficial for protection from potential BLEVE fragments

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Risk analysis on consequence, effects to people, (cont.), comments example  BLEVE can develop within rather limited timeframe from initial event (e.g. jet flame from nearby tank)  Limited time can be available for protection actions to be implemented by authorities  Proper training for self-protection to affected population, especially for the very severe and severe effects zone, is indispensable

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Risk analysis on consequence, effects to people, (cont.), comments example  Evacuation from lethal zone is a priority, if time is available. Absolute evacuation necessity for area within fireball limit  Enclosure to closed spaces (building internal, away from windows) can be efficient protection action for the other zones