INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING FORUM (IBF) INTRODUCTION

Pre-IBF Background 1920-es: first ITF-ISF coordination around ILO maritime meetings Up to late 1940-es: relationship restricted to ILO business 1948 – ITF FOC Campaign ISF/ITF “Understanding” on wage rates for non-dom seafarers on national flag ships (under UK “pay parity” regime) 1990-es: ITF-ISF consultations (inability to engage in pay negotiations; no mandate to discuss wages on behalf of national federations; some national owners associations’ without sufficient constitutional status; decisions not compulsory upon members) 1993: ISF’s “London Committee for Asian Crews” changes name to “IMEC”, focuses on ITF FOC standards 1994: IMEC involved in ITF negotiations in India and Philippines 1997: ISF rejects ITF pay increase and negotiations. IMEC takes over. 2000: ITF - IMEC Joint Negotiating Forum; IMEC Model TCC Agreement (with the ITF Benchmark still set unilaterally by ITF)

Year 2003 Expectations out of the new system: Continuity of agreements Real counterpart in place of internal argument Compliance / enforcement New mechanisms to amicably settle with companies More vessels under ITF agreements Inspectors to concentrate on other targets Global scale New areas of cooperation / mutual interest For the ITF: Continuity of agreements Equal participation in discussion in place of ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ offers Competitive benefits / advantage for members Recognition of training and other costs More members to join Mechanisms to amicably resolve problems with Inspectors / affiliates Global scale New areas of cooperation / mutual interest For the Employers:

Creation of the IBF May 2003, Yokohama Parties: ITF and JNG (IMMAJ + IMEC)

Parties to the IBF, as of 2013: ITF maritime affiliates worldwide ISEG (IMMAJ+Evergreen) IMEC KSA International Bargaining Forum ITFJNG

IBF Settlements (pay, contractual and partnership issues) November 2003 (San Francisco) October 2005 (Tokyo) September 2007 (London) October 2009 (Manila) July 2011 (Miami) Model Ship (“Bag”) methodology: wages; company and union funding; vertical & horizontal distribution parameters; complex central-to-local transformations No pay negotiations; DER (SEPF/SPF) New methodology: only wages and union funding (part “A”); each specific local agreement affected

Pay Outcomes: % on IBF Model Ship for two years: 2004 and % on Model Ship in 2006, plus further 5% in Also: extra $10 to ITF WFF in 2006, plus additional $10 in % on Model Ship for two years: 2008 and (Further extended throughout 2010 and 2011) % in 2012; 2.5% in 2013 and 3% in Applicable only upon part "A" of the scale Contractual: amendments to terms and conditions envisaged by CBA ; Special Agreement and Employment Contract Partnership: all MOU issues, incl. ILO; IMO; piracy, disputes, training, welfare, manning agents, P&I, joint secretariats, data exchange, administration and etc

OTHER FEATURES: POSSIBILITY OF HIGHER REBATE FROM ITF WFF AS INCENTIVE TO ENROLL MORE VESSELS (total number of fleets to increase: +2% in 2012; +2% in 2013 and + 1% in 2014) MINIMUM CRITERIA FOR NEW JNG MEMBERS / NEW IBF AGREEMENTS INDEXATION OF COMPESATION LEVELS ALL CBAs SUBJECT TO APPROVAL JOINT CBA VETTING MECHANISM JOINT WARLIKE OPERATIONS AREAS COMMITTEE / SOS CAMPAIGN JOINT OPERATION OF TRAINING AND WELFARE FUNDS CONSTANT INTER-SECRETARIAT COOPERATION

Balancing between “market” and “policy” (ITF’s view, as example): What is artificial / excessive from employers point of view: Ratings wages and compensations could be lower. Some CBA benefits beyond P&I coverage. Wish to negotiate with labor supply only. Why pay beneficial unions and ITF? Why pay for “DER” needs? No need for MOUs, talk onboard conditions only Benefits of having “real” counterparts: guarantee of implementation; argument outside ITF Dangers: external market supply-and-demand rules Balanced outcome: Ratings level maintained despite market and crisis and, steadily, increased. Officers wages still not reflected fully, but minimum figures guaranteed. ITF Beneficial Ownership and other policies – recognized and working. Improving wages, CBA and MOU slow and difficult, but happens regularly. No cuts or downgrading once a level is achieved. Vetting complicated by the variety, but possible. What is insufficient from the ITF point of view: Ratings wages slow increase No uniform benchmarks Officers beyond the ITF’s scope CBA could be better MOU cooperation could be more

IBF bargaining process Central negotiations: Claims consideration & settlement: Amicable Prior paperwork / correspondence Thorough discussion (working groups; experts) Secretariats Argument / Persuasion Reference to objective data Invite third-parties and sources Counter-proposal Counter-balance against other issues Compromise Local / National negotiations: Implementation of central outcome in existing agreements Considerable flexibility System may not be perfect, but time-tested, stable and working!

INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING FORUM 10 YEARS EFFICIENT! IBF