Philosophy 220 Reproductive Technologies: Cloning

A Brave New World Louise Brown, the first child born using in vitro fertilization Dolly, the first successfully cloned large animal.

The Issue The remarkable progress made in our ability to manipulate mammalian reproduction raises some pressing moral questions. While some technologies, like In vitro fertilization, seem at this point relatively uncontroversial, others like reproductive cloning (cloning aimed at producing a new member of the species), therapeutic cloning (cloning aimed at the production of embryos for use in medical interventions and research), and genetic manipulation (or enhancement) (manipulation of genetic material to enhance or correct the capacities of animals or their offspring) raise a number of serious concerns. We can summarize the central moral concerns as follows: o Is either type of cloning, or genetic manipulation or enhancement, ever morally permissible? o What explains why or why not?

Some Important Terminology Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer: a form of asexual reproduction where the nucleus of an unfertilized mammalian egg is replaced by the nucleus of a donor cell. Stem Cells: cells found throughout the body that can develop into a wide variety of specific cell types. o Adult Stem Cells are tissue or organ specific, embryonic stem cells are pluripotent (they can become any cell type). Eugenics: program of improving a species through genetic manipulation.

The Theories Natural Law Theory: Concerns about these reproductive technologies can be understood as developing from a two different directions. First, in as much a cloning is asexual reproduction, it may be argued to be unnatural (Corvino?). Second, if procreation is a fundamental good, then it and its products (children) are things for which we have fundamental responsibilities. RT threaten to undermine this fundamental character. Kantian Moral Theory: Kantian concerns are going to focus on whether or not we are treating the individuals produced through these technologies as ends in themselves rather than as means. Consequentialism: As always, consequentialists are going to focus our attention on likely or possible consequences of that adoption of these technologies. Rights-Based Theory: How should we balance the rights of the donors against the rights of the individuals produced. Virtue Theory: Is cloning consistent with virtue? What sorts of habits or dispositions would result from the adoption of these technologies?

Robertson, “Human Cloning” Robertson’s starting point is the assumption that at some point we will develop human cloning programs that are safe and effective. If we reach this point, for Robertson the question becomes would such programs fall within the range of what could be called “procreative freedom,” the liberty to exercise what for him is a fundamental right to decide whether or not to reproduce. o For Robertson, “reproduction” involves not only the creation of new life, but also the rearing of that individual (430c2). Though obviously a moral issue, Robertson is also concerned about the creation of appropriate public policy.

The Call for Human Cloning One question we might ask is why people might be interested in cloning. o Clearly, many people would be interested in pursuit of a family, motivated by the desire to have and rear a child. A couple might choose to have and rear a clone because of the advantages of cloning over other assisted reproductive techniques; or because it gives them a choice over their offspring’s genetics. In this context, the key question is, “Can cloning be used responsibly to help a couple achieve legitimate reproductive goals?” o And, If so, do these uses fall within the “procreative freedom” of individuals?

Procreative Freedom and Cloning It is generally acknowledged that people should be free to make decisions about their reproduction. On the assumption that infertile couples have the same interests in reproducing as fertile couples, the fact that they are infertile should not bar them from reproducing with technological assistance any more than the blind should be barred from reading with the assistance of Braille. Assuming non-problematic technological capacity, Robertson insists that couples should have the right to gamete and embryo donors for the purposes of reproductive and therapeutic cloning.

Reproductive and Theraputic Cloning For Robertson, if most current forms of assisted reproduction and genetic selection fall under procreative freedom, so too should human cloning, whether reproductive or therapeutic. o Unlike other forms of assisted reproduction, however, cloning is not concerned only with producing a child, but also with the genes the child will have. People make decisions to reproduce or not in part because of the desire for experiences that reproduction would bring about. o Since the desire for these experiences are central to the decision whether or not a couple reproduces, a right to reproductive decisions based on these experiences should follow. o Since such decisions may be made on the basis of the characteristics of the child, some right to choose the child’s characteristics should follow as well.

What’s the Difference, anyway? Cloning is so similar to standard coital and non-coital forms of reproduction that they should be treated in the same way, regardless of who serves as the genetic source for the clone. A couple may choose to clone an existing embryo, either through embryo splitting or nuclear transfer. o Such an action is intended to bring about the birth of a child that will be reared by its parents, whether as an additional child, or to replace a child who has died. Couples may seek to clone embryos not to produce a child to rear, but for embryonic stem cells for an existing child. o As such an act involves reproduction and enables an existing child to live, it too should be found within the couple’s procreative liberty.

The Boys (or Girls) from Brazil? Parent’s might instead choose to clone an existing child, for a variety of possible reasons. o Where the existing child is so perfect the parents don’t want to “roll the dice” again. o Where the existing child might need an organ or tissue transplant. o Where the existing child is dying (or has died) and the parents want to allow it to “continue” to live. These might be the same (or similar) motivations for a couple who reproduces in standard coital or non-coital ways. As such standard reproduction would fall within the realm of procreative liberty, so too should cloning to produce the same ends.

What about Clones of Third Parties? A desire to clone another individual is most likely to arise in couples who are otherwise unable to reproduce. We already recognize that couples have a right to use gamete donation (sperm and egg donors) to form a family. As such, we should also consider embryo donation as a part of the same liberty. o It is not a great stretch to recognize the donation of the DNA of a third party as a part of that liberty. o Without some overriding harm, there seems no reason for this to fall outside procreative freedom. o Of course, the couple must be willing to raise the child—if not, it would seem to treat children as a commodity.

The Greatest Love of All Of course, an individual might be interested in raising a clone of themselves. Robertson suggests that the right way to view the situation is as a variation on the right to use a gamete donor. o I’m donating to myself! o Jokes aside, if such a right exists, it plausibly follows that a possible parent has a right to choose the source of gamete. o As such, they should be able to choose their own DNA. This is reproduction in it’s purest sense, “[T]he genetic replication involved in cloning [oneself] is directly and quintessentially reproductive” (435c1). Again, only some overriding harm could justify restrictions on self-cloning.

What about that slope? There are some common slippery slope arguments that Robertson briefly considers and dismisses. The sort of arguments he discusses concern the possible implications of the widespread acceptance of cloning on traditional ideas of reproduction, family, parenting, etc. His responds by pointing out that these ideas have been changing for a long time (perhaps they are always contested ideas, always in flux) and that we do no specific harm to them if we recognize cloning as another reproductive choice.

Policy? On the assumption that human cloning could be done safely and reliably, Robertson believes it should be permitted. Of course, some regulations should be in place to minimize any possible general harms. The most important one he articulates is that there should be no cloning without associated parenting. o This would prevent the possible commodification of clones, or the creation of an underclass as was portrayed in fiction like Brave New World and in movies like Gattaca.

Kass, “Preventing” Kass raises four particular objections to the project of human cloning: 1.That human cloning constitutes unethical experimentation. 2.That human cloning threatens identity and individuality. 3.That human cloning turns procreation into manufacture. 4.That human cloning means despotism over children and the perversion of parenthood. It’s easy to develop possibilities that seem disquieting: o Kass reviews a number of the possibilities that Robertson happily accepted, but with a quite different tone. Of course, differences in tone do not amount to an argument, even if the discomfort he portrays suggests that, “cloning represents a profound defilement of our given nature as procreative beings, and of the social relations built on this natural ground” (441c2)

Human Cloning Constitutes Unethical Experimentation Cloning could easily be used to reproduce living or deceased persons without their consent. The success rate of cloning (at least at first) will probably not be very high. o Fewer than two to three percent of all animal cloning attempts have succeeded. o Before Dolly was created, Scottish scientists transferred 277 adult nuclei into sheep eggs and implanted 29 clonal embryos. Dolly was the only living result. o Many of the so-called “successes” have included major disabilities and deformities. There is good reason to think the same sort of success rate would be found in attempts at human cloning. “We cannot ethically even get to know whether or not human cloning is feasible” (442c1)

Human Cloning Threatens Identity and Individuality Even if human cloning were successful, the clone may experience concerns about his distinctive identity: o He will be in genotype and appearance identical to another human being. o The person to whom he is identical will be his “father” or “mother”. There are unique, unprecedented dangers of mixing the twin relation with the parent-child relation. o Virtually no one will be able to treat his clone as he would a traditional child. o “What will happen when the adolescent clone of Mommy becomes the spitting image of the woman with whom Daddy once fell in love?” (442c2). The life of the clone will constantly be scrutinized in relation to that of the older version. o “Unlike ‘normal’ identical twins, a cloned individual—copied from whomever— will be saddled with a genotype that has already lived.” (ibid.) o The matter will only be worse for the clone of somebody famous.

Human Cloning Turns Procreation into Manufacture Human cloning would represent a giant step toward turning procreation into manufacture. Steps have already been made in this direction with in vitro fertilization and genetic testing of embryos. Children would become simply another kind of man- made thing, with prospective “parents” adopting a technocratic attitude towards their children. o “The problem is that any child whose being, character, and capacities exist owing to human design does not stand on the same plane with its makers” (443c1). The effect is the dehumanization of children and the commodification of human life.

Human Cloning Means Despotism over Children and Perversion of Parenthood Normally, in producing children, we embrace the novelty of the child, and accept the limits of our control. Reproduction by human cloning will create a “profound misunderstanding” of the parent-child relationship. o Children are not our property or possessions. o Children are supposed to live their own lives, not ours. o Whereas most parents have hopes for their children, cloning parents will have expectations. o Children will hold their cloners fully responsible for their nature and their nurture.

Down the Slope Defenders of cloning want large-scale cloning for animals, and wish to preserve cloning as a human option for exercising our “right to reproduce.” o We already practice forms of “unnatural,” artificial, and extra-marital reproduction, as well as early forms of eugenics. o So, defenders argue, cloning is “no big deal.” However, such a principle “slips” all the way down to producing children whose entire genetic makeup will be the product of eugenics, without limit. Once this is a possibility, parents will leap at the opportunity to “improve” their offspring: “Indeed, not to do so will be socially regarded as a form of child neglect” (444c2).