1 Root Cause Analysis of BIT False Alarms Presented to National Defense Industrial Association 6th Annual Systems Engineering Conference Mr. Kerry Westervelt.

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Presentation transcript:

1 Root Cause Analysis of BIT False Alarms Presented to National Defense Industrial Association 6th Annual Systems Engineering Conference Mr. Kerry Westervelt 23 October 2003

2 Introduction Root cause analysis is an essential task to mature false alarm performance Effectiveness of corrective actions is highly dependent upon how well engineers analyze false alarms This brief outlines a success ‑ oriented engineering approach on how to perform root cause analysis

3 Collect and Analyze BIT Indications Step 1: Collect and analyze BIT indications –Collect reports from the Aircraft Maintenance Event Ground Station (AMEGS) –Analyze reports using AMEGS Viewer or Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System-Optimized Organization Maintenance Activity (NALCOMIS-OOMA) –Decipher fault translation data using interface design document –Collate indications with the following items Pre-flight & post-flight test cards Maintenance tie-in reports –Verify whether indications have been documented as a false alarm and if they have a completed root cause analysis

4 Collect and Analyze BIT Indications Radar Altimeter (RADALT) communication false alarm in AMEGS report

5 Collect and Analyze BIT Indications No fault data with communication failures - All bits set to zero

6 Attempt to Duplicate Indications Step 2: Attempt to duplicate indications –Run subsystem initiated Built-In-Test (BIT) –Perform functional check on subsystem –Fly same profile that code set –Check equipment on the V-22 electrical system test lab PFDNAVFLIRSTATSYST * MAINT FLT SUM MAINT LAYER *ALL SUM WRA PRES STAT APU BIT DISPLAY UNIT CLUTCH ENABLE VALVE CLUTCH SERVO VALVE ECU FAIL INDICATOR FUEL CONTR SERVO VALVE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE LUBE BYPASS VALVE MAIN FUEL VALVE OIL HEATER VALVE ENGAGE INDICATOR START FUEL VALVE SEQ WRA TEST STATUS PAGE 1 OF 1 STAT (T) F(T) (T) F(T) (T) SYST STAT PG TEST

7 Verify Equipment Configuration Step 3: Verify equipment configuration –Ensure latest software version –Check part numbers and serial numbers –Consult configuration with equipment vendor

8 Analyze BIT Design Step 4: Analyze BIT design –Review interface control document –Review BIT description document –Review V-22 Integrated Avionics System to the V-22 Maintenance Data Processing System Interface Control Document – Part 2 Software –Review BIT Traceability Diagrams –Consult with equipment vendor

9 Analyze BIT Design RADALT bits

10 Analyze Software Design Step 5: Analyze software design - requirements and actual coding –Review Joint Vertical-lift eXperimental (JVX) Avionics Support Software (JASS) software design document –Review subsystem software design document –Software interface control drawings –Check logic associated with interfacing equipment –NOTE: Concentrate on BIT thresholds and filtering (i.e., IF / AND statements, time counter functions, and parameter limit comparisons i.e. =, >, <, etc)

11 Analyze Software Design RADALT fault processing in JASS software design document

12 Analyze Software Design Original RADALT BIT Mechanization –RADAR_ALT_TRANS_VALID sets PBIT failure indication, F(C) 20 Hz signal –RADAR_ALT_VALID sets PBIT failure indication, F(P) 0.5 second filter on 20 Hz signal –RADALT_BIT_INITIATE sets IBIT failure indication, F(T), if: IBIT duration exceeds 4 seconds RADAR_ALT_VALID indicates invalid state RADAR_ALT_TRANS_VALID indicates invalid state RADAR_ALT indicates altitude not between 93 to 107 feet –Operator commands RADALT IBIT IBIT only available before engine start RADALT contains NO periodic BIT only IBIT –RAD ALT FAIL advisory; set by RADAR_ALT_TRANS_VALID RADAR_ALT_VALID – AFCS FAULT advisory; set by RADAR_ALT_TRANS_VALID RADAR_ALT_VALID – RALT TO BALT caution ; set by RADAR_ALT_TRANS_VALID RADAR_ALT_VALID

13 Analyze Quick Merge Data Step 6: Analyze Quick Merge Data –Plot all indications that are reported from subsystem –Plot these indications along with AMEGS reported indications –Plot aircraft operating parameters –Plot indications sent to other subsystems –Compare plots to actual software design requirements and actual coding

14 Analyze Quick Merge Data Select RADALT parameters in Quick Merge

15 Analyze Quick Merge Data

16 Return Equipment To Vendor Step 7: Return Equipment to Vendor for Analysis –Provide vendor aircraft operating data with failure indications –Stress equipment similar to aircraft conditions Monitor indications using factory test equipment –NOTE: Acceptance test procedures in lab sometimes insufficient –Coordinate software design requirements and actual coding with vendor Review JASS software design document Review subsystem software design document Software interface control drawings Check logic associated with interfacing equipment NOTE: Concentrate on BIT thresholds and filtering (e.g., IF / AND statements, time counter functions, and parameter limit comparisons i.e., =, >, <, etc)

17 Corrective Action Plan New RADALT BIT Mechanization –RADAR_ALT_TRANS_VALID sets PBIT failure indication, F(C) (Delete PBIT test) 20 Hz signal –RADAR_ALT_VALID sets PBIT failure indication, F(P) (Delete PBIT test) 0.5 second filter on 20 Hz signal –RADALT_BIT_INITIATE sets IBIT failure indication, F(T), if: IBIT duration exceeds 4 seconds RADAR_ALT_VALID indicates invalid state RADAR_ALT_TRANS_VALID indicates invalid state RADAR_ALT indicates altitude not between 93 to 107 feet –Operator commands RADALT IBIT IBIT only available before engine start RADALT contains NO periodic BIT only IBIT –RAD ALT FAIL advisory; set by (Rename WCA “RAD ALT INOP”) RADAR_ALT_TRANS_VALID RADAR_ALT_VALID – AFCS FAULT advisory; set by RADAR_ALT_TRANS_VALID RADAR_ALT_VALID – RALT TO BALT caution ; set by RADAR_ALT_TRANS_VALID RADAR_ALT_VALID

18 Conclusions Seven-step process provides logical approach on how to perform root cause analysis of false alarms Corrective action plans can be developed based upon empirical data to improve their effectiveness Changes to BIT thresholds and filtering are optimized to the aircraft’s operating environment

19 Questions?