Corruption: Concepts, causes and consequences Inge Amundsen, researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute Thursday, November 3 rd, 2011, 08:30 Petrad, Stavanger.

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Presentation transcript:

Corruption: Concepts, causes and consequences Inge Amundsen, researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute Thursday, November 3 rd, 2011, 08:30 Petrad, Stavanger

Concepts, causes and consequences What is Corruption? –Definitions and basic forms of corruption –A Role Play Causes, costs, and consequences –Economic, political, institutional and social-cultural –Resource Curse Theory Corruption in the Petroleum Sector –Corruption risks in the value chain

Abuse (capture) of public power for private benefit World Bank Misuse of entrusted power for private gain Transparency International Concepts: Definitions Behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence (Nye) A form of secret social exchange through which those in power (political or administrative) take personal advantage, of one type or another, of the influence they exercise in virtue of their mandate or their function (Méry)

Forms of corruption: Two actors The STATE Civil servants Functionaries Bureaucrats Politicians Elected, hired, nominated Any non-governmental agent Private firms, businesses (contractors, bidders) Private individuals (users, clients) Organisations, NGOs (consultants, clients, users)

Forms of corruption: Two perspectives Demand oriented Corrupted, public side Extractive, neopatrimonial, kleptocratic state Supply oriented Corruptor, private side (bribing firms) “Captured state”

Forms of corruption: Two types Controlled Centralised Coordinated Disciplined Uncontrolled Disorganised Competitive Unpredictable Damaging!

Forms of corruption: Two levels Political corruption Grand, large scale Administrative corruption Petty, small scale Extraction Power preservation ? ?

Embezzlement Bribery “Commissions” “Privatisations” Tax systems Concessions, licences “Freedoms” Monopolies Favouritism Nepotism Vote buying Cooptations Manipulated institutions Gov’t resources for elections Impunity Political corruption Extraction Power preservation Political corruption: Two faces/phases

Forms of corruption: Several techniques Bribery –Corruption per se –Kickbacks, sweeteners, grease money, pourboire, pay-offs, consultant fees, … Embezzlement –Theft. Only one party Fraud –Economic crime. Element of cheating, swindle Extortion –Element of violence. No/little returns Favouritism –Patronage politics, nepotism, clientelism –Manipulation of institutions, impunity –Buying of votes, constituencies, support

A Role Play

Causes: Corruption and Economics

Causes: Corruption and Politics

Causes: The Resource Curse –The Dutch Disease –The Paradox of Plenty –The Rentier State model Oil rich countries can be worse off –Rich in natural resources –Poor in economic development Explanations –Economic explanations –Political explanations Examples –Malaysia vs Nigeria The institutions that matter –Institutions of extraction –Institutions of redistribution Norway Australia Canada Chile Brazil Malaysia Botswana … Nigeria Angola DR Congo The Sudan Sierra Leone Liberia Zambia Colombia Azerbaijan …

Economic Explanations Why? –Relative price effect Higher currency value More imports (cheaper) Competition difficult –Volatility Uncertainty for businesses Low investments in alternative production Government waste and debt Capital flight –The ‘Dutch Disease’ Over-investment in extractive industries Under-investments in manufacture, agriculture De-industrialisation Reform fatigue Consequences –Crowding out productive sectors Capital absorption Contraction Concentration –Weak Redistribution Increasing inequalities Increasing poverty –Squander Grandiose projects Pocketed Capital flight

Political explanations Why? –The prize of controlling the state increases Higher government revenues Larger benefits in being the “state elite” Available consumption, enrichment, corruption, embezzlement –State autonomy increases Off-shore, foreign, High-Tec Natural resources: “un-earned”, easy Little taxation of domestic economic activity No “social contract” Little influence of business interests, middle class Little influence of civil society, interest organisations –Rents increases the powers of the state Means to manipulate institutions Means to buy (off) rivals Means to buy instruments of coercion Consequences –Increasing conflicts Increasing inequalities Increasing poverty Uneven distribution –Increasing authoritarianism Entrenched elites Violent defence of privileges

Two country examples Malaysia 1973 Emerging from devastating inter-ethnic riots Natural resources giving high revenues 1983Broad-based prosperity Ethnic groups sharing gains from revenues 1993 Spectacular progress High investment inflows 2003Malaysia a world-class economy (Kuala Lumpur tallest building in the world) HDI rank 66 (0,829 high ▲ ) President handling over power in a smooth transition Nigeria 1973Post-conflict Oil starting to flow 1983First oil boom wasted Coup d'état Abacha embezzeled 2-5 bn US$ Second oil boom wasted Two more coups d'état “Niger Delta Syndrome” 2003Total income $ 300 bn over 25 years Economy as poor as in 1973 (after $200bn of oil money) HDI rank 158 (0.511 low ▼) Reform just started

“Without improving their democratic institutions and administrative capacity, it is unlikely that African oil exporters will be able to use petrodollars to fuel poverty reduction; instead oil monies are more likely to make matters worse for the poor” Catholic Relief Services (2003): Bottom of the Barrel. Africa’s Oil Boom and the Poor

Corruption challenges in the petroleum sector Petroleum sector corruption characteristics –High tech, high states, high politics Licensing and exploration –Paying up for access to resources? Production –Paying up for maximum profits? Decommissioning –Paying up to pollute? Revenue management –Paying for power preservation?

Corruption challenges –Weak legal, regulatory and contractual framework Weak institutions and ill-defined institutional responsibilities Weak jurisdiction and authority over territory (on-shore, off-shore) –Lack of a national petroleum policy, lack of long-term plans Haphazard access to and control of seismic data Lack of transparency in data handling –Secrecy, confidentiality, and discretionary decision-making Non-transparent bidding and award procedures “Royalties” and “signature bonuses” to politicians Political interference and favouritism in individual cases

Corruption challenges –Weak legal, regulatory and contractual framework Unclear access to and handling concessions for production Exaggerated development costs Re-negotiation of and amendments to development contracts –Unclear ownership of companies, changing hands Oil companies (concessionaire and partners) Sub-contractors: service delivery companies –Lack of standards for environment, health and labour safety –Land use conflicts Construction and installation of necessary infrastructure Rigs, support camps, subsea systems, pipelines, etc. Community compensation

Corruption challenges –Preferential and favouritist contracting and sub- contracting Secrecy, confidentiality, exclusivity, discretionary decision-making “Dead meat” national private oil companies –Weak institutions and ill-defined institutional responsibilities Surveillance/monitoring of activities, production levels, etc. –Weak tax regime Tax evasion, capital flight, tax havens Oil and service companies’ off-budget social investments (CSR)

Corruption challenges –Buying regulatory exemptions and early abandon Buying sub-standard rehabilitation Removing installations and clean-up –Lack of optimization of recoverable volumes and revenue

Revenue Management: Paying for power preservation? Embezzlement Bribery “Commissions” “Privatisations” Tax systems Concessions “Freedoms” Monopolies Favouritism Nepotism Vote buying Cooptations Manipulated inst Elections Impunity Political corruption ExtractionPower preservation Counter-measures Make economic diversification –Productive sectors –Agriculture Ensure fair redistribution –Decrease inequalities –Decrease poverty –Stop squander and grandiose projects –Stop capital flight Increase democracy –Defuse conflicts –Ensure participation –Ensure legitimacy –Restrict the entrenched elites –Restrict privileges

The petroleum sector ideal

Petroleum sector corruption