The EU’s Neighbourhood Policy in the Mediterranean Area The Young Generation Iván Martín SAHWA Project Coordinator CIDOB, Barcelona Center for International Affairs

THE YOUNG GENERATION  Population: 60 million young people in Arab Mediterranean Countries (15-30 years old) (largest group in society)  In 2020, 70 million  Education: Close to 6 million illiterate (10%) Average university enrolment rate: 30%  NEET: 30% in a very prudent estimate: 20 mill. 3/4 of them young women  THE PRESENT, NOT THE FUTURE  EXCLUSION AS DEFINING FEATURE

Youth in AMCs Youth in AMCs (60 millions old) In education (33% - 20 mill.) In formal employment (2% -1,2 mill.) In informal employment (25% -15 mill.) NEET - neither in education nor in employment or training (40% -24 mill.) UfM Regional Employability Review 2012 (ETF)

YOUTH AS A PROBLEM  Arab Spring as an alarm indicator of the problem of youth and youth as a problem:  Too many, too needy, badly educated….  Frustrated and angry, unmarried graduates…  Anxious to migrate….. (EU Neighbourhood Barometer: 18% of Maghreb & 14% Mashrek youth “likely to move in the next two years”)  Youth as an emergent social category:  object of “empowerment” and mobilization programmes  object of research (SAHWA, Power2Youth….)  object of specific policies (youth policies)  INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IS MARGINAL FOR YOUTH LIVES IN AMCs

ENP AND YOUTH IN MED Since 2011 more PROJECTS focused on youth…  Regional: Euromed Youth (€ 11 mill., ) EU-CoE Youth Partnership NET-Med Youth (€ 8 mill.) (UNESCO) Exchanges, capacity-building, youth policies  Regional Approach?  Bilateral: Long-existing Vocational Education and Training New Youth Employment projects in many countries Sectorial approach  Strategic Approach? (is youth considered when discussing DCFTAs, Mobility Partnerships or Neighbourhood Actions Plans?)

ENP AND YOUTH IN MED … but ENP still inadequate for youth inclusion  After the Arab Spring, cooperation has focused more on a) reaching out to new, unknown actors; b) supporting technical infrastructure of the transition process, where youth were largely excluded  Beneficiaries are still governments rather than people  Implemented largely through budget support and technical assistance to public institutions  Focused on reform and intensifying relations with the EU (exchanges, legal convergence) rather than on social services or direct support to people  Complexity (country programmes, several thematic programmes, regional programmes…) and heavy bureaucratic imperatives  Mobility is strongly restricted, even within Mobility Partnerships  ENP PERCEIVED AS REMOTE AND SELF-CONTAINED  HOW DOES THIS AFFECTS EU CREDIBILITY (DESPITE BEING A MAJOR DONOR)?

AN ENP VISION FOR (YOUTH) INCLUSION & OWNERSHIP  Budget resources maintained…  : €10.26 bn. for ENI-South, €7.3 per inhabitant/year  … but ENP should aim integration, not cooperation Rationale of ENP is to extend the enlargement method; so partners should not be treated as third countries, but as members of the same community (co-responsibility):  Mobility (trainees, Mode IV service liberalization, some day job search visas)  Employment (Strategy Europe 2020, Euromed Employment Strategy/2010 Framework of Action, EURES, Youth Guarantee)  Regional development and cohesion (Structural Funds)  NEED FOR YOUTH MAINSTREAMING INTO ENP  AT STAKE: ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF THE EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR