Chapter 12 Pricing and Advertising

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Presentation transcript:

Chapter 12 Pricing and Advertising Everything is worth what its purchaser will pay for it. Publilius Syrus (first century BC)

Chapter 12 Outline Challenge: Sale Price 12.1 Conditions for Price Discrimination 12.2 Perfect Price Discrimination 12.3 Group Price Discrimination 12.4 Nonlinear Pricing 12.5 Two-Part Pricing 12.6 Tie-In Sales 12.7 Advertising Challenge Solution

Challenge: Sale Price Background: Questions: Because many firms use sales—temporarily setting the price below the usual price—some customers pay lower prices than others over time. When Heinz ketchup goes on sale, switchers — ketchup customers who normally buy whichever brand is least expensive—purchase Heinz rather than the low price generic ketchup. Questions: How can Heinz’s managers design a pattern of sales that maximizes Heinz’s profit by obtaining extra sales from switchers without losing substantial sums by selling to its loyal customers at a discount price? Under what conditions does it pay for Heinz to have a policy of periodic sales?

12.1 Conditions for Price Discrimination Why does Disneyworld charge local residents $369 for an annual pass and out-of-towners $489? Why are airline fares less if you book in advance? Why are computers and software bundled and sold at a single price? Firms sometimes use nonuniform pricing, where prices vary across customers, to earn a higher profit.

12.1 Conditions for Price Discrimination A firm engages in price discrimination by charging consumers different prices for the same good based on individual characteristics belonging to an indentifiable sub-group of consumers the quantity purchased Two reasons why a firm earns a higher profit from price discrimination than uniform pricing: Price-discriminating firms charge higher prices to customers who are willing to pay more than the uniform price. Price-discriminating firms sell to some people who are not willing to pay as much as the uniform price.

12.1 Conditions for Price Discrimination Necessary conditions for successful price discrimination: A firm must have market power (otherwise it cannot charge a price above the competitive price). Examples: monopolist, oligopolist, monopolistically competitive, cartel A firm must be able to identify which consumers are willing to pay relatively more and there must be variation in consumers’ reservation price, the maximum amount someone is willing to pay. A firm must be able to prevent or limit resale from customers who are charged a relatively low price to those who are charged a relatively high price.

12.1 Conditions for Price Discrimination A firm’s inability to prevent resale is often the biggest obstacle to successful price discrimination. Resale is difficult or impossible for services and when transaction costs are high. Examples: haircuts, plumbing services, admission that requires showing an ID Not all differential pricing is price discrimination. It is not price discrimination if the different prices simply reflect differences in costs. Example: selling magazines at a newsstand for a higher price than via direct mailing

12.1 Types of Price Discrimination First-degree Also known as perfect price discrimination Each unit sold for each customer’s reservation price Second-degree Also known as nonlinear discrimination Firm charges a different price for large quantities than for small quantities Third-degree Also known as group price discrimination Firm charges different groups of customers different prices, but charges any one customer the same price for all units sold

12.2 Perfect Price Discrimination Under perfect price discrimination, the firm charges each consumer a price that is exactly equal to the maximum he/she is willing to pay. Thus, each consumer gets zero consumer surplus. Firm profit is increased by the amount of consumer surplus that would exist in a competitive market; all CS is transferred to the firm.

12.2 Perfect Price Discrimination All consumer surplus is transformed into firm profit.

12.2 Perfect Price Discrimination If D(Q) is the inverse demand function for total output, Q, and p = D(Q) is the reservation price charged of each customer, the discriminating monopoly’s revenue is: This is equal to the area under the demand curve up to Q. Maximizing profit by choosing output: FOC: Result: produce where D(Q) equals MC.

12.2 Perfect Price Discrimination Producing where Demand = MC, all consumer surplus (A+B+C) is transformed into firm profit.

12.2 Perfect Price Discrimination The perfect price discrimination result of producing where demand equals MC means that the competitive quantity of output gets produced. This outcome is efficient: it maximizes total welfare no deadweight loss is generated But the outcome is harmful to consumers because all surplus is producer surplus!

12.3 Group Price Discrimination Firms divide potential customers into two or more groups (based on some easily observable characteristic) and set a different price for each group. Example: senior or student discounts The firm chooses quantities sold to each group, Q1 and Q2, such that FOCs: Marginal revenue from each group should be the same and equal to marginal cost:

12.3 Group Price Discrimination The first-order conditions imply that marginal revenue from each group should be the same and equal to marginal cost: Because marginal revenue is a function of elasticity, we can write: Thus, the higher price will be charged in the less elastic market segment.

12.3 Group Price Discrimination A higher price will be charged in the market with the more price-inelastic demand.

12.3 Group Price Discrimination Welfare under multimarket price discrimination is lower than it is under either competition or perfect price discrimination. Under competition, more output is produced and CS is greater The welfare effects relative to uniform price monopoly are indeterminate. Both types of monopolies set price above marginal cost, so output is lower than in competition. Welfare is likely to be lower with discrimination due to consumption inefficiency and time wasted shopping.

12.4 Nonlinear Price Discrimination Price varies only with the quantity purchased, but each customer faces the same nonlinear pricing schedule. Not all quantity discounts are price discrimination; some reflect reductions in firm costs associated with large-quantity sales. Many utilities use block-pricing schedules, by which they charge one price for the first few units of usage (block) and then a different price for subsequent blocks. Example: increasing-block pricing associated with electricity; per KWH charge increases the more you use

12.4 Nonlinear Price Discrimination Consider a firm that uses declining-block prices to maximize profit. $70 is charged for 1 ≤ Q ≤ 20 $50 is charged for Q > 20 Thus, a consumer who buys 30 units pays $70 • 20 = $1400 for the first block and $50 • 10 = $500 for the second block, for a total of $1900. By contrast, under a non-discriminating monopoly, this consumer would be charged a uniform price of $60 and pay a total of $1,800 for 30 units.

12.4 Nonlinear Price Discrimination

12.5 Two-Part Pricing Another form of nonlinear pricing, a two-part tariff, is when the firm charges a consumer a lump-sum fee for the right to purchase (first tariff) and a per unit fee for each unit actually purchased (second tariff). Think of the first tariff as an “access fee” and the second as a “usage fee”. Examples: A country club charges a membership fee and greens fees to play a round of golf The state fair charges an entrance fee and a per ticket fee for rides Cell phone service providers charge a monthly service fee and a fee per text message

12.5 Two-Part Tariffs If all consumers are identical, the firm can capture all CS by setting charging a lump-sum “access fee” equal to CS (A1+B1+C1) and a “usage fee” equal to marginal cost (m).

12.5 Two-Part Tariffs Now assume that the monopoly has two customers. If the firm can treat customers differently, it can still capture all consumer surplus as in the previous graph. If the firm has to charge all customers the same price, it maximizes profit by: Setting the lump-sum “access fee” equal to the potential CS of the consumer with the smaller demand and a price that is above marginal cost.

12.5 Two-Part Tariffs With different customers, firm charges lump-sum fee of A1 and per unit fee of $20.

12.6 Tie-In Sales Another type of nonuniform pricing is a tie-in sale, in which customers can buy one product only if they agree to purchase another product as well. Requirement tie-in sale: customers who buy one product from a firm are required to make all purchases of related products from that firm Example: photocopying machine buyers must buy services and supplies from same company Bundling: two goods are combined so that customers cannot buy either good separately Example: Refrigerators are sold with shelves

12.7 Advertising Monopoly firms don’t just decide on price and quantity, they also make important decisions about how much to advertise their products. Advertising may positively influence consumers’ preferences and thereby increase demand for the product. Although higher demand increases gross profit, if the cost of advertising is substantial, net profit may or may not increase.

12.7 Deciding Whether to Advertise Advertise if cost is less than additional gross profit, area B.

12.7 How Much to Advertise If a monopoly raises advertising expenditures by $1, how much does its gross profit rise? Additional advertising pays when gross profit rises by more than $1 following an additional dollar spent on advertising. Thus, the profit-maximizing amount of advertising equates the marginal benefit and marginal cost of advertising. Mathematically: where R is revenue and is a function of output and advertising cost

12.7 How Much to Advertise Given the maximization problem: The profit-maximizing output and advertising levels are the Q* and A* that simultaneously satisfy the FOCs: The monopoly advertises until the marginal benefit from the last unit of advertising equals $1, the marginal cost.

Challenge Solution