Notes on bargaining 1.What is bargaining 2.Bargaining power 3.Issue of communication.

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Notes on bargaining 1.What is bargaining 2.Bargaining power 3.Issue of communication

Conflict and bargaining In conflict situations: –Pure conflict: zero-sum game –Pure cooperation: common goals and interests: a coordination game –Most cases: mixed actors want to coordinate but over different outcomes: thus, both of a bargaining and coordination game Actors are willing to coordinate Actors prefer different outcomes Thus, actors need to bargain over the distribution of costs and benefits –Bargaining is the process through which actors coordinate their positions or expectations over possible outcomes Transferring of information Signalling commitment e.g. rules of an IGO; agreement over the outcome of a civil war –Bargaining theory: explains how rational actors try to influence each other’s expectations (and positions) to resolve a conflict.

Bargaining power Bargaining power: the ability of a rational actor to influence other actors to modify their expectations and positions. Elements of bargaining power: –It is relative not absolute (e.g. depends on the issue area that is negotiated) –It should be strategic Brute force is not always an option; bargaining power is based on potential use of power rather than its application –Commitment Use of threats and promises to affect other actors Threats and promises must be credible Showing commitment is a way to signal credibility

A few bargaining tips to consider An effective threat is one that hurts you more than the opponent (e.g. burning bridges, ships, etc.): signalling commitment Sometimes fewer options can be a strategic advantage: reduce freedom of action Sometimes it is better to relinquish initiative: e.g. US blockade in Cuban Missile Crisis.

Communicating incentives and commitment Signalling intentions –Audience costs Domestic and international –For signalling to work it must be costly, cheap talk does not work in bargaining. Types of bargaining given the nature of communication explicit (actors communicate with words) –Official and unofficial diplomacy (track one and two respectively) tacit (actors communicate through actions) –E.g. prior behaviour, audience costs