Comprehensive Approach (CA) vs Comprehensive Approach (CA) vs. (EBAO) Effects Based Approach to Operations LTC Tibor BABOS (Ph.D.) DCOS, Chief Operations 25th ‘György Klapka’ Infantry Brigade Hungarian Home Defense Forces Tata, Hungary

CV EDUCATION: 1998-04 Ph.D. in Security Policy, Miklós Zrínyi National Defense University, Hungary Dissertation with Summa Cum Laude: “The Five Central Pillars of the European Security” 2002-03 #1 Master of Arts in National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA Thesis: “The role of the Partnership for Peace Program and the State Partnership Program in the Process of NATO Enlargement. The Case of the Hungarian-Ohio Cooperation” 2002-03 #2 Master of Arts in International Security and Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA Thesis: “Regulating the Intelligence System and Oversight in the Hungarian Constitutional Democracy” 1992-95 #3 Master of Arts in Strategic Intelligence, Miklós Zrínyi National Defense University, Hungary Thesis: “Social Psychological Methods for Cognition of a Personality” 1992-93 Miklós Zrínyi General Staff Collage with concentration in Intelligence, Hungary 1986-89 #1 Bachelor of Arts in Intelligence with concentration in Long Range Special Operations and #2 Bachelor of Science in Military Automotive Engineering, Lajos Kossuth Military College, Hungary Thesis: “Development of Military Intelligence” ASSIGNMENTS: 2009- Chief Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff, 25th ‘György Klapka’ Infantry Brigade, Hungarian Home Defense Forces, Tata, Hungary 2005-09 Strategic Representative, Office of the Hungarian Military Representative to NATO and EU, NATO HQ, Brussels 2003-05 Chief Consultant, Defense Policy Department, Ministry of Defense 2001-03 Postgraduate Student, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA 2000-01 Deputy Head, Partnership Cooperation Branch, Ministry of Defense 1998-00 Deputy Head, NATO Relations Branch, Ministry of Defense 1995-98 Senior Military Intelligence Officer, Military Intelligence Office 1993-95 Graduate Student, National Defense University 1989-93 Long Range Reconnaissance Special Team Commander, Hungarian Defense Forces COMMISSIONS: 2008-09 Dean, NATO Military Committee Strategic Representatives, NATO HQ, Brussels 2005-09 Chief Coordinator in Scientific Development Deputy Chief of Hungarian Transformation 2003-05 Chief Coordinator in NATO/EU-Russia, NATO/EU-Ukraine, Mediterranean Dialogue, EUROMED and Iraq affairs Chief Coordinator of the Political-Military Steering Committee, NATO HQ, Brussels 1999- Hungarian Representative to PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Strategic Studies Institutes 1999-01 Chief Coordinator of the NATO Membership Action Plan, Ministry of Defense 1999-00 Chief Coordinator of the Western European Union, Ministry of Defense 1997-98 Hungarian Representative to Intelligence Working Group on NATO Enlargement, NATO HQ, Brussels

OUTLINE Introduction ACT-video Basic points (ppt) Forum-like discussion Pointing out key elements Escalating problems Suggesting ways out

TIMELINE 2002 – Prague Summit > NATO Transformation > Capabilities 2005 – CPG > §17 Effects Based Planning 2006 – Riga Summit > CA 2006 June 6 – Concept on EBAO by NATO MC/ACT 2008 – Bucharest Summit > Plan of Action and CA 2009 – Strasbourg-Kehl Summit > Progress Report Planning and conduct of operations Lessons learned, training, education and exercises Enhancing cooperation with external actors Public messaging Stabilization and reconstruction

”CA vs./& EBAO” Other Elements of Power (political, economic, civil) Operational spectrum Other Elements of Power (political, economic, civil) Comprehensive Approach Level of involvement Military Power Effect Based Approach to Operations War fighting Security Stability Reconstruction

INTEGRATED ”END STATE” APPOACH

BASIC MODEL Mechanism (Cause) Action (Tasks) Effect (Result)

COMPLEX MIL. STRAT. MODEL Visualization Assessment Collaboration Improved Information Superiority and Knowledge Management Better identification of key PMESII nodes and linkages within Area of Operation Better prediction of PMESII reactions and behaviors within Area of Operation Better identification of actions / capabilities required for desired effects Better dialog and interaction among relevant PMESII experts (Hq staff, JIACG, COEs) Situation Awareness Better identification and articulation of key PMESII effects More accurate and faster development of node-effect- action matrix Better prediction of 2nd, 3rd-order effects and unintended consequences Situation Understanding PROCESS Improved Effects-Based Planning Process Better prioritization and linkage of nodes-effects-actions with Command Intent Better synchronization of effects and actions across DIME options Decision Making Greater % of targets and effects within Daily ETO contribute to Command Intent Lower % of targets and effects within Daily ETO lead to unintended outcomes More Effective and Synchronized ETO Command and Control Agility More effective and efficient use of military force Focused Combat Power Force Agility OUTCOME Greater synergy in achieving National Security Objectives ”Transformational” Perspective ”Network Centric” Perspective ”Dictatorial” Perspective

THEORY OF PLANNING VS. EXECUTION

DYNAMIC ”NC” MODULE APPOACH

GRAVITATIONAL MODEL

CAPABILITY APPOACH

CIV. VS. MIL. STRUCTURES

”EFFECTS BASED TRANSFORMATION” Transition Period Effects-Based, Collaborative, Network Centric and Interdependent Deconflict Services & Cultures Stitch Nation Seams Integration of NRF Capabilities Land Forces Air Forces Land Forces Air Forces SOF Maritime Forces Land Forces Air Forces SOF Maritime Forces SOF Maritime Forces Deconflicting Coordinating Integrating Coherence Attributes of a Transforming NATO Force

CASE STUDY ”SERBIA” …desired behavioral outcomes. Plan Disrupt Delivery of POL Effect Destroy Bridge 4 Destroy Bridge 6 Tasks …desired behavioral outcomes. Bridge 4 Destroyed Global Situation Awareness CRISIS Objectives Tasks T A S K L E V N Y I Now Air & Space Control Force Support Application Enhancement Indicators Bridge 6 Destroyed Physical effects that lead to…

CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 1 Expansion West - 2005 Expansion South Jul 2006 Expansion North Dec 2003 Start Kabul Dec 2001 Finish Expansion East 2006 ? Oct 2006

CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 2 Source: CSIS Burke Chair, “Developments in NATO and ISAF” Forces available from: http://www.csis.org/images/stories/burke/090423_developments_nato-isaf_and_us_forces.pdf

CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 3 Source: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf

CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 4 Source: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf

CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 5 2011 ??? Expansion West - 2005 Expansion South Jul 2006 Expansion North Dec 2003 Start Kabul Dec 2001 Finish Expansion East 2006 ? Oct 2006

CASE STUDY ”IRAQ VS. AFGHANISTAN”

”…oooops”

”…now watz da plain?”

SUGGESTIONS Both military and non-military capabilities must be transformed Definition of ”Engagement Space” Lack of political will will kill both CA and EBAO An effects based approach to the Comprehensive Approach is imperative EBAO is part of CA Understanding multinationality and sectorial differences (resources, cultures) in CA/EBAO Overall integrated CA/EBAO is needed

The End LTC Tibor BABOS (Ph.D.) Chief Operations, DCOS 25th György Klapka Infantry Brigade Hungarian Home Defense Forces Tata, Hungary Email: babostibor@yahoo.com Phone: +36-34-589-111

”Strategy is the art of making use of time and space ”Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. Space we can recover, lost time never.”