DTLS-SRTP Handling in SIP B2BUAs draft-ram-straw-b2bua-dtls-srtp IETF-91 Hawaii, Nov 12, 2014 Presenter: Tirumaleswar Reddy Authors: Ram Mohan, Tirumaleswar.

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Presentation transcript:

DTLS-SRTP Handling in SIP B2BUAs draft-ram-straw-b2bua-dtls-srtp IETF-91 Hawaii, Nov 12, 2014 Presenter: Tirumaleswar Reddy Authors: Ram Mohan, Tirumaleswar Reddy, Gonzalo Salgueiro, Victor Pascual 1

Agenda B2BUA modes and possible MITM attacks 2

B2BUA Modes 1.Media Relay 2.Media Aware 3.Media Terminator 3

Legitimate Media Relay  Media  Forwards packets without inspection or modification  Only modifies the L3 and L4 headers  Signaling  It MUST forward the received certificate fingerprint without any modifications 4

Malicious Media Relay  Media  Forwards packets with inspection or modification  Signaling  Modifies the certificate fingerprint and signals its own fingerprint 5

Possible Mitigation  Mandate authenticated identity management in SIP ( draft-ietf-stir- rfc4474bis)  signed-identity-digest carries the signed hash of certificate fingerprint  Mandate Identity headers to be present 6

2. The outbound proxy for the Alice’s domain verifies that this is from Alice and adds an assertion(based of 4474bis) that is it from 3. This assertion is signed with the atlanta.com certificate from a well known certificate authority 4. The B2BUA here just changes UDP/IP header and does not modify payload INVITE Challenge INVITE Alice atlanta.com 1.Alice calls Bob Authenticated identity management Alice Alice’s Proxy SIP Cloud bob Alice’s B2BUA (Back-to-Back User Agent)

B2BUA Modes 1.Media Relay 2.Media Aware 3.Media Terminator 8

Legitimate Media Aware  Media  Modifies the RTP header  Signaling  Terminates the DTLS connection and acts as a DTLS proxy -Changes the certificate fingerprint and signals its own fingerprint -Decrypts and re-encrypts the payload 9

Malicious Media Aware  Media  Inspects or modifies the payload. 10

2. The outbound proxy for the Alice’s domain verifies that this is from Alice and adds an assertion(based of 4474bis) that is it from 3. This assertion is signed with the atlanta.com certificate from a well known certificate authority 4. The B2BUA changes the RTP header INVITE Challenge INVITE Alice atlanta.com 1.Alice calls Bob B2BUA in the same administrative domain Alice Alice’s Proxy SIP Cloud bob Alice’s B2BUA (Back-to-Back User Agent)

Possible mitigations  Option 1> SRTP for cloud services (draft- cheng-srtp-cloud-00) proposes a mechanism where confidentiality and message authentication is independent of the RTP header  Option 2> Trust the B2BUA 12

2. The outbound proxy for the Alice’s domain verifies that this is from Alice and adds an assertion(based of 4474bis) that is it from 3. This assertion is signed with the atlanta.com certificate from a well known certificate authority 4. The B2BUA changes the RTP header INVITE Challenge INVITE Alice atlanta.com ISP 1.Alice calls Bob B2BUA in different administrative domain Alice Alice’s Proxy SIP Cloud bob B2BUA (Back-to-Back User Agent)

Possible mitigation  SRTP for cloud services (draft-cheng-srtp- cloud-00) proposes a mechanism where confidentiality and message authentication is independent of the RTP header 14

B2BUA Modes 1.Media Relay 2.Media Aware 3.Media Terminator 15

Media Terminator  Media terminator modifies the payload  Terminates the DTLS connection, acts as a DTLS proxy -Changes the certificate fingerprint and signals its own fingerprint -Decrypts and re-encrypts the payload 16

Possible attacks  Breaks end-to-end security. 17

2. The outbound proxy for the Alice’s domain verifies that this is from Alice and adds an assertion(based of 4474bis) that is it from 3. This assertion is signed with the atlanta.com certificate from a well known certificate authority 4. The B2BUA modifies the payload INVITE Challenge INVITE Alice atlanta.com ISP 1.Alice calls Bob B2BUA in same administrative domain Alice Alice’s Proxy SIP Cloud bob B2BUA (Back-to-Back User Agent)

Possible mitigations  Clients can be configured to maintain the B2BUA server's certificate fingerprints. This way the client is aware that B2BUA is playing the role of a media-proxy. 19

2. The outbound proxy for the Alice’s domain verifies that this is from Alice and adds an assertion(based of 4474bis) that is it from 3. This assertion is signed with the atlanta.com certificate from a well known certificate authority 4. The B2BUA modifies the payload INVITE Challenge INVITE Alice atlanta.com ISP 1.Alice calls Bob B2BUA in different administrative domain Alice Alice’s Proxy SIP Cloud bob B2BUA (Back-to-Back User Agent)

Possible mitigations Discourage media terminator mode. 21

Next Steps 22 DTLS-SRTP Handling in SIP B2BUAs

Backup 23

B2BUA Modes Media Relay - Only changes UDP/IP header- e.g.: topology hiding, privacy Media Aware - relay which can change RTP/RTCP headers- e.g.: monitors RTCP for QoS, mux/demuxes RTP/RTCP on same 5-tuple Media Terminator - Transcoders, Conference Servers 24