European Integration after Lisbon: New Personnel, Old Legitimacy Problems? Achim Hurrelmann Carleton University

The European Union in 2010: A new start, but little substantive change  Legal Framework: Lisbon Treaty brings legal simplification, more powers for European Parliament, lower thresholds for majority voting in Council of Ministers, new leadership positions. BUT: Little change to core policy processes  Personnel: President of the European Council (Herman van Rompuy), High Representative for Foreign Affairs (Catherine Ashton), and new EU Commission take office; Parliament was elected in BUT: New offices are largely symbolic, Commission remains under centre-right leadership (Manuel Barroso)

Key players in EU external trade policy  EU Commission: EU Trade Commissioner – now Karel de Gucht, an experienced Liberal politician from Belgium – and his staff conduct negotiations for all EU states  Council of Ministers: Defines mandate for negotiations, monitors negotiations through special committee, approves final agreement (qualified majority)  European Parliament: Is briefed about negotiations but cannot actively influence them, has to approve (but cannot amend) final agreement The Lisbon Treaty does not alter power dynamics between these actors (possible exception: FDI)!

Benchmarks from EU standpoint: Existing internal market rules  Free movement of goods: Customs duties and quantitative restrictions on intra-EU trade have been abolished; technical barriers to trade largely harmonized  Free movement of persons: EU citizens can take up employment or establish a company in any member state  Free movement of capital: No restrictions on capital transfers between member states  Free movement of services: Not fully liberalized; Commission failed to establish ‘country of origin’ rules in 2006, but European Court of Justice (ECJ) might implement principle through the back door Competition policy: EU Commission sanctions violations of free competition rules

Current conflicts about the internal market: The ECJ as driver of liberalization  ‘Posted workers’: ECJ rules that companies ‘posting’ workers to other EU states need not respect local collective agreements (only legal minimum wages); industrial action on behalf of workers violates employer’s freedom of service delivery  Company relocation: ECJ rules that companies can relocate (or reflag ships, etc.) to save on wages; industrial action on behalf of affected workers violates employer’s freedom of establishment Alliance of Commission and Court of Justice currently drives internal ‘liberalization’ agenda.

Political context of the negotiations  The public: The European citizens have not taken note of the negotiations; most of them are generally not interested in the EU’s day-to-day policy making  Public criticism tends to focus on treaty revisions, not policy  The elites: EU elites are eager to move beyond preoccupation with treaty reform; seek to highlight ‘Europe of results’ (Barroso)  Agreement with Canada would suit this agenda  The invisible partner: One main appeal of the EU-Canada negotiations, for the EU, is their role as ‘test case’ for similar negotiations with the US  This might provide some leverage for generating more political/societal interest in the negotiations