University of Buckingham Humanities Graduate Centre. Advanced Studies Seminars 2013 Thursday 25 April 2013 How immigration is changing Britain and other European societies David Coleman, University of Oxford

A nation of immigrants? Yes – in the very long run! Most genetic ancestry appears to be ancient Uncertain magnitude and effects of Saxon invasions 5 th – 7 th centuries, Danes 8 th – 9 th. Relatively small contributions from Romans, Normans and others. Later arrivals episodic, more impact on culture and economy than on population.

Post-war immigration to Europe and the rise of ethnic minority populations. Historically, Europe a region of emigration. Large-scale immigration in peacetime mostly from 1960s: Guest-workers to some countries Easy entry from former colonies – for a time. Subsequent entry of dependants and new spouses Chain migration from non-European countries helped by ‘familist’ culture, large family size, revolutions in information, transport, rights. EU expansion Renewed recent interest in skilled migration, age structure. Policy important but erratic; many now restrictive

Some facilitating factors for migration Unequal pace of economic development and demographic transition in ‘North’ and ‘South’. Geographical proximity (UK/Ireland, Sweden/Finland.) Political / historical connections. Post-war ‘revolutions’ in transport, information and rights. State policy in sending and receiving countries. Expansion of EU and its powers. International conventions / human rights. The ‘migration industry’ and trafficking.

Peculiar characteristics of migration to UK Labour migration not organised by state – no ‘guest worker’ scheme except in 1940s. Foreign immigration controlled since 1905, immigration of ‘British subjects’ not until 1962 / 71. Some persistent electoral privileges for Commonwealth Low levels of immigration from EU15, high from A8. No significant organised return migration or repatriation. Prominence of ‘ethnic’ classifications, not ‘immigrant ‘ or ‘foreigner’, multicultural policies. Consensus on relatively restrictive migration policy 1963 – 1997, new pro-migration policy since 1997 – 2010, PBS. (Vague) numerical target for first time since Weak data, no register, but only country with emigration data.

Turkey and Western Europe – an illustration of demographic disparity

Migration flows to European Union and USA, 1960 – 2011 (nb EU data include movement from one EU country to another; about 40%)

Gross migration flow to France 2005, by reason for admission (%).

Long-term migration trends to the United Kingdom 1967 – 2011, UK and non-UK citizens.

Net migration to selected European countries 1997 – 2011

Net migration to Italy and Spain 1997 – Note: increase primarily due to illegal immigration and regularisation of illegal residence through amnesties.

Net migration can go down as well as up. Germany 1954 – 2011.

Net migration per thousand population, selected European countries. Source: Eurostat

Relative importance of migration and natural change in population growth and decline, Europe 2011.

European comparisons – effect of projected migration levels on projected population size, 2010 compared with Western and Southern Europe. Source: Eurostat.

European comparisons – effect of projected migration levels on projected population size, 2010 compared with Eastern Europe. Source: Eurostat.

Demographic consequences to the UK of projected levels of migration,

Age-structure at different levels of net migration, UK , with constant TFR = 1.84 and falling mortality. Source: ONS and OXPOP

Retirement age and the PSR, UK

Ethnic change Continued migration from one population, into another with sub-replacement fertility, must eventually replace one with the other. If incoming populations have higher fertility, the process will be accelerated. Migration, not differential fertility, is usually the dominant factor.

Selected European populations, percent of residents born abroad, Source: Eurostat

Estimates of foreign origin and immigrant population, selected European countries. Sources: national statistical offices

TFR trends of UK ethnic minority populations 1965 – 2006 data from Labour Force Survey by own-child method, 7-year moving averages

Convergence in fertility: total fertility of Pakistani women in the UK by birthplace. Source: Coleman and Dubuc 2010.

Ethnic change in the USA, projected

A projection of ethnic transformation in the UK 2006 – TFR = 1.84, net immigration = 180,000 / year. Source: Coleman 2010.

Very long-term ethnic change in the UK in relation to level of net immigration (+180k, +81k, ‘balanced’ and natural change). Source: Coleman 2010 Figure 6.

Comparison of results of European ‘foreign-origin’ projections

UK population projection 2051 by age, sex and origin Assumptions for total population as GAD Principal Projection 2006 (net migration 190K; TFR 1.84)

The faces of the future?

ethnic groups of mixed origin, England and Wales Source: 2001 Census.

UK 2006 – Projected continued growth of mixed ethnic groups without migration. Source: Coleman 2010.

An end to ‘ethnic’ categories? The rise of mixed populations. Probabilistic projections of the UK , average outcome for major groups (percent).

Concluding points Migration from developing world may be over within a century (?); but effects on ancestry permanent. Migration the key driver; in theory under policy control Significance for social and political change: religion, identity, segregation, language, law, foreign policy? (depends on numbers, pace, origins, policy). Integration / assimilation, or ‘community of communities’? And who adapts to whom? Is ‘parity’ or ‘majority’ important? Inter-ethnic union may change relative group size, eventually create completely new mixed populations of increasingly ill-defined ancestry.